Singapore, 19 April 1966
474. Confidential
I discussed confrontation with Rajaratnam this morning in the light of Djakarta’s 4151 (incomplete version).
2. He said Singapore’s information through various channels was that Malik wanted to dismantle confrontation and get on with economic rehabilitation before the mob started after him and his colleagues.2 Normalisation of relations and, especially, resumed trade with Singapore were part of this. The Indonesians said they wanted talks with Malaysia to find a mutually acceptable face-saving formula for ending confrontation. Reascertainment in Borneo was only a maximum demand. Let the Malaysians now suggest something more acceptable.
3. The Indonesians, Rajaratnam said, had expressed surprise at the Tunku’s reaction to their statement on Singapore’s recognition. Why couldn’t he keep quiet as they were keeping Sukarno quiet? Naturally their presentation was provocative. What else did the Malaysians expect? But the substance was a step forward and the Malaysians could have handled things much more skilfully. Did the Malaysians really believe that the Indonesians thought there was a prospect of splitting Singapore and Malaysia?
4. I said all this seemed rather ingenuous. The Indonesians’ declaration was to be expected to retard a rapprochement. But Rajaratnam said that in fact the Tunku had now made a major concession in offering to talk if confrontation was only temporarily halted. The Indonesian statement had got things moving.
5. Rajaratnam thought there were strong forces for and against the Malaysians seeking an end to confrontation. In favour were primarily the strong sentiment of the Malay, Muslim public for friendly relations with Indonesia and the strategy of Malay extremists to deal with Singapore and the Chinese in the area generally by joint action with Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur would also not want to be the sole country in the area with bad relations with Indonesia.
6. On the other hand, certain vested interests had grown up. Confrontation caused no direct suffering, as in Singapore. It enabled the Government to maintain a tight grip on the country by means of various emergency regulations. It promoted the growth of armed forces and jobs for UMNO youth. Kuala Lumpur could talk big behind the British shield; none of its own forces was exposed to danger. Confrontation attracted international support and economic aid. And it kept Singapore politically safe, since the British would never allow a Barisan Sosialis3 government there. Such advantages would be lost with the ending of confrontation.
7. For these reasons, the Kuala Lumpur regime might look to the future with some apprehension, but, Rajaratnam thought, public opinion would be stronger, particularly if Malays saw relations develop between Indonesia and the Chinese city of Singapore.
8. Rajaratnam several times returned to the point that we would not expect Malik to be replaced by anybody more likely to make an acceptable arrangement. The opportunity presented by Malik, perhaps not even for twelve months, to restore relations with Indonesia should therefore not be lost and a determined effort should be made to reach a settlement. Unfortunately, Kuala Lumpur’s diplomatic ineptness would much complicate this.
9. Rajaratnam did not disguise Singapore’s keen interest in revived trade with Indonesia, even if only for two or three years, and this is a major factor influencing his assessment. I doubt the Singaporeans otherwise see the future in definite terms, but they are alert to any opportunity possibly offering a point of balance between Indonesia and Malaysia, while recognising their basic interest in a re-association with Malaysia. (Rajaratnam seemed hardly to appreciate how precarious this balance might be.) Indonesian recognition of Singapore would, of course, be a preliminary step to having it at the conference table if the Indonesians genuinely intended to end confrontation or merely to secure talks as a diplomatic move to sow dissension in the Malaysian region. It is interesting that Rajaratnam argues the end of confrontation will increase Singapore’s leverage on Malaysia because of the increased threat of political extremism here: Lee has argued it would lessen the leverage since Singapore would no longer be so important in respect of Malaysian defence.
10. From our point of view, now that opportunities for constructive discussion might open up in Djakarta, even though confrontation continues one way or another, it would seem worthwhile to try to start getting down to fundamentals with the Indonesians on their attitude to the Overseas Chinese’. Their behaviour greatly complicates the task of absorption and must promote that very turning to Peking among the Chinese communities that they say is the main danger to us all, and a justification for confrontation. Our interest is closely involved in this and, once we have clarified our own thing, I suggest we should ask the Indonesians how they expect their policies to offer any ultimate benefit and see if we can get them to take a more considered attitude.
[NAA: A9735, 225/5 part 1]
1 Document 358.
2 A reference to the student rioting for economic reform during February and March (see Document 354).
3 See footnote 3, Document 9.