Kuala Lumpur, 7 May 1966
1173. Secret Priority
Indonesia/Malaysia
Ghazali sent for Wade and I (Eastman away meeting daughter) this morning to brief us on his discussions last weekend with Malik in Bangkok1 and his subsequent talks with Tunku. He had seen Walker2 earlier in the morning. Ghazali’s account differs both in emphasis and in substance from earlier accounts from Zainal Sulong3 (our 11564 and British cables refer).5
2. Ghazali emphasised that meeting had been entirely at Malik’s initiative and was held in secrecy even from the Thais. (He has since told them.) Ghazali commented generally that the two of them talked freely and frankly to one another and that he was convinced of Malik’s complete sincerity. Malik had talked openly about his own desire to be speedily rid of Sukarno but referred to the Generals playing a Javanese game of easing Sukarno out slowly.
3. Malik said that he was unhappy at Kuala Lumpur’s sharp reaction over Indonesia’s intention to recognise Singapore. He said he had asked Gilchrist to explain it to the Malaysians. Ghazali asked sharply, ‘Why the British?’ and said that in any event no message was received. Malik said that the whole reason for Singapore recognition was to end confrontation (never mind propaganda announcements) because—
(a) Sukarno did not like it. Thus, it was a test case to see Sukarno’s reactions and whether he would try to rally support against it;
(b) It was a good first step because it would be easier to explain Malaysian recognition later to the general public. They would already have swallowed implicitly British bases;
(c) Indonesia needed trade with Singapore. When Ghazali asked why not trade with Singapore without recognition, Malik replied that there was no revenue to the state from barter trade;6
(d) There were quite a number of ‘trading’ Generals and Admirals creating pressure for trade with Singapore.
4. On Singapore, Ghazali told Malik that one of the main reasons for Malaysia’s sharp reaction7 was because prior recognition of Singapore would make the end of confrontation more difficult. He told Malik that if they recognised Singapore first (saying it was part of confrontation) Malaysian leaders would remain suspicious of Malik’s sincerity. Ghazali said that politics in Malaysia and Singapore were interrelated and that it would undermine Malaysian/Singapore relationships for Indonesia to recognise Singapore first. It would make Lee appear to be cleverer and more successful than the Tunku and thus Malik would be undermining Kuala Lumpur’s leaders. A further point made by Ghazali was that Malaysia and Singapore have a common immigration policy. Prior recognition would force Malaysia to put up barriers on the causeway. The blame would be on Malaysia and Djakarta—thus driving the two protagonists further apart and making it harder to talk. Ghazali told Malik that Indonesia must recognise both Singapore and Malaysia together. Malik said he understood but could not abandon the idea altogether. He would try to postpone recognition but a trade agreement with Singapore was being negotiated now and he could not postpone recognition too long. Ghazali then asked about talks between Indonesia and Singapore with Lee on military aid, water supply etc. in the event of a Malaysian attack. Malik said categorically that he had given nobody authority to do this but admitted that numerous emissaries from Lee were active and confessed that they may have been talking with some of the ‘trading’ Generals. In any case, said Malik, where was the water that Indonesia would send to Singapore?
5. Turning to the problem of confrontation, Malik admitted that he himself had no strong political backing but said that the Army Generals were genuinely anxious to end it but were lost in finding ways and means. Ghazali said the difficulty was the Army had not abandoned their designs on Sabah and Sarawak, to which Malik replied, ‘take no notice’ and, in answer to a direct challenge by Ghazali as to his stand, Malik said—
(a) ‘I have always been against confrontation’;
(b) I, Adam Malik, want to see Sabah and Sarawak remain in Malaysia because otherwise they will fall into Chinese hands. Ghazali made him repeat this and in answer to the question, ‘Can I quote you on this?’, Malik replied with a definite ‘Yes’;
(c) Malik had said that he had already told the Generals that a solution for confrontation could not be found by thinking of taking over Sabah and Sarawak. That it just would not work;
(d) That Indonesia must end confrontation because of her need for foreign economic aid and economic construction;
(e) Malik asked for the Malaysian solution, emphasising that he wanted an end quickly.
6. Ghazali’s first answer was ‘You started it, you fix it’. Malik suggested a referendum in the two states saying ‘It is a foregone conclusion. So how would it harm you?’ Ghazali told him that this was a non-starter; if it had been, Malaysia would have agreed to it when Sukarno asked but it would mean that Malaysia would be giving away to interference in its sovereign domestic affairs. This would undermine Kuala Lumpur’s leadership and if the present Government was undermined, who would Indonesia negotiate with then? There were also real constitutional and legal difficulties. The Central Government does not possess the constitutional power to hold a referendum. It is therefore a residual power of the states and thus non-negotiable by the Federal Government. Any attempt to bargain on this point would be treating Sabah and Sarawak like children and would be bitterly resented.
7. Malik said that he now understood and again asked what could be done. Ghazali’s answer was ‘Just let confrontation fizzle out’, but Malik rejected this saying that it had to be done quickly.
8. Malik then asked about an Afro-Asian commission and again Ghazali rejected this saying that it was too late for this and it was open to the same objections of domestic interference as a referendum. At this point Ghazali said that he had offered as a personal suggestion the idea of some sort of commission but ‘fixed’ beforehand – both its terms of reference and its conclusions. Ghazali said that this was an Indonesian idea. Both of them, however, after some talk agreed there were too many risks in it.
9. The meeting ended with the two of them agreeing to meet again soon or through intermediaries. Three other points emerged in the conversation—
(i) Malik had told Ramos8 not to recognise Malaysia immediately after Malik’s return because it would make Malik’s position untenable and Ramos agreed to wait a few weeks. Ghazali, however, believed that the real reason for the Filipino delay was to await Lee’s return to Singapore at the end of this month. Wee Kim Wee (the ‘Straits Times’ journalist who interviewed Suharto in Djakarta last Sunday)9 was Lee’s main contact man and was now in Europe reporting to Lee. Ghazali believed that an Indonesia/Singapore trade agreement, Indonesian recognition of Singapore and Filipino recognition of Malaysia, would be synchronised. Despite this, he hoped for meaningful contacts with Indonesia within a matter of days.
(ii) Malik told Ghazali that he had been able to persuade the Generals to withdraw the troops in Borneo 10 kilometres behind frontiers and he hoped Malaysia would do likewise. Ghazali gave no undertaking and said that it was not important—he would prefer the two lots of troops to meet across the frontier, join up and chase the C.C.O. More seriously, he told Malik, that it would be better if the Generals ordered the troops to be friendly instead of fighting.
(iii) Ghazali asked for a cessation of the propaganda war—Why must Djakarta go on talking about crush Malaysia? Malik agreed he would discuss this with the Generals on his return.
10. Ghazali, apologising that he did not put us fully in the picture earlier, said that he had had to spend two days with the Tunku in Alor Star reporting. The Tunku was happy but fully agreed with Ghazali’s rejection of a referendum or the Afro-Asian commission. The Tunku threw out an idea of which Ghazali obviously approved. The idea is to seek the mediation of two friendly countries interested in peace and stability in the area—the Tunku mentioned Thailand and Japan. Expanding on this thought, Ghazali believed that mediators would in no way detract from Malaysian sovereignty but could travel to Borneo and talk to various leaders and produce a report which might sketch out events since Manila—without apportioning too much praise or blame in any direction and merely confirm that the people of Sarawak and Sabah had always wanted to be in Malaysia. This could be presented by Malik as an impartial judgment and proving that confrontation had been a Sukarno/Subandrio communist plot. Ghazali said that this idea would only work if the Indonesians were really sincere and if Malik’s views on not wanting Sabah and Sarawak were backed up. At a minimum it would test this.
11. I was left with the impression that Ghazali (and by implication the Tunku and Razak) was most optimistic and that Malaysians would press mediation idea in the near future. It may not have been coincidental that the Japanese ambassador left just before we arrived.
[NAA: A6364, KL1966/04]
1 See footnote 2, Document 360.
2 Sir Michael Walker, British High Commissioner to Malaysia.
3 An official of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4 See footnote 2, Document 360.
5 Not published.
6 See editorial note, Barter Trade.
7 See footnote 3, Document 356, and Document 357.
8 Narciso Ramos, the Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
9 1 May.