Kuala Lumpur, 3 June 1966
1391. Secret Immediate
Malaysian/Indonesian Talks
Razak and party returned late yesterday afternoon. Ghazali gave briefing at noon today to Wade, Walker and myself.
2. Ghazali said that in their own ministerial talks Razak and Malik kept to civilities and generalities and left substance of negotiations to meeting of officials in which Ghazali led Malaysian side. Indonesian delegation was diverse in both composition and ideas. Ghazali had firm impression that two troublesome members had a direct line to Sukarno but the military representatives obviously knew who they were and, except for one isolated occasion, they were excluded from the actual negotiating team.
3. Ghazali said that Indonesian spokesman at first meeting was Secretary of Cabinet (Sani).1 He launched out on familiar Subandrio line of opposition to concept and method of establishment of Malaysia and put forward hard line on reascertainment and on deferment of recognition until reascertainment had been completed to Indonesian satisfaction. Military representatives sat stone-faced and silent. Ghazali was at first dismayed at this reversal of prior understandings on the Suharto net but, as he got no help from Indonesian military representatives, he responded in terms which even he described as rough and rude. The Indonesian spokesmen looked stunned, as well they might.
4. During a tense lunch hour, Ghazali queried one of military members about sharp difference between the line taken by delegation and the prior understanding on the Suharto net. An assurance was sent back to him from Admiral Shaaf,2 the senior Service officer, telling him not to worry but to carry on as he was doing: he was doing fine: if a real deadlock arose, Shaaf would move in and take over.
5. After lunch the Indonesian team returned to the talks ‘spoiling for a fight’ with Diah now as spokesman. Ghazali handled him more gently than he had done Sani but still maintained insistence of integrity of Malaysia, on rejection of referendum or other unacceptable ‘reascertainment’, and on implementation of cease fire and diplomatic recognition immediately on settlement. If Indonesians wanted an immediate end to confrontation, only formula which he could accept would be one providing for immediate cease fire and immediate recognition in return for a Malaysian undertaking to ‘afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak the opportunity to reaffirm through general elections as soon as practicable their previous decision about their status in Malaysia’. If the Indonesians wanted to defer a settlement for three, six or twelve months, Ghazali would be happy to propose a separate formula appropriate for each of these cases. The Indonesians said they would have to seek further instructions.
6. Late that night, Malik sent for Ghazali and said he was in trouble as the Army representatives were objecting to the first formula proposed by Ghazali. Ghazali showed Malik a slip of paper with a passage in Indonesian which Malik agreed was an exact translation of the English-language formula proposed by Ghazali in the meeting. At Ghazali’s suggestion, Malik sent for one of the senior Army officers who (after others had been sent out of the room) confirmed that this formula was acceptable to Suharto. (Ghazali explained to us that the slip of paper had in fact been written out by a senior Indonesian officer before the goodwill military mission came to Kuala Lumpur on 27th May in confirmation of the understanding which the Malaysians had reached with Suharto.)
7. Next morning Indonesian delegation looked suitably sheepish but the meeting got down quickly to business on basis of Ghazali’s formula. Ghazali accepted two or three minor amendments to make the mixture a little easier for the Indonesians, for example, insertion of phrase ‘in a free and democratic manner’ in connection with elections and reference to cessation of ‘hostile acts between the two countries’ instead of earlier wording which referred only to Indonesian hostilities.
8. Ghazali pointed out that agreed formula did not oblige people of Sabah and Sarawak to answer any questions: only undertaking was that Malaysia would afford them an opportunity of reaffirmation so if they wished.3 It would be open to various political parties to include in election platforms, if they wished, expressions of view on incorporation in Malaysia, but vote would be taken not on this question but on candidacy of various nominees of parties concerned. Ghazali’s own view was that it would be beneficial for Malaysia itself that reference to this subject should be included in party platforms for what would be the first general election to be held after formation of Malaysia. Ghazali pointed out, nevertheless, that agreement did not require Malaysian Government to afford this opportunity at the next elections if it did not regard this as ‘practicable’. Ghazali explained that, in drafting formula for the agreement (which is in English), he was careful, while not endangering substance of terms on which Malaysia was prepared to agree, to use a form of words which would give Indonesians as much flexibility as possible in representing settlement domestically as an acceptance of various demands and slogans which Indonesian Government had been using in the past.
9. Ghazali said he had received word that Indonesian Presidium had already accepted agreement. Question now was how soon Suharto would feel ready to present it to Sukarno and Indonesian people. This might possibly trouble some areas, organisation of student demonstrations, etc. Suharto had told Malaysians he would greatly prefer to soften up Sukarno to point of public endorsement of agreement but that, in last resort, he was prepared to tell him to go to hell is he refused to yield. Ghazali could not guess how soon Indonesians would be ready to ratify but expected to have fairly early indication of how long process would take.
10. Ghazali said that, separately from exchange of notes to cover ending of confrontation, Indonesians had agreed, as indicated in press in last twenty-four hours, to join with Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines in a regional grouping which would in fact be an extension of A.S.A. but, to make it easier for Indonesians, would be called something else.4 Ghazali said that agreement had also been reached on immediate establishment in the two capitals of liaison teams which would have no executive function but would be communication channels to permit further continuous consultations between Governments. Ghazali denied that any agreement had yet been reached on dispatch of teams to Borneo border areas (as reported by Bangkok ambassadors from their briefing by Razak).5 Ghazali said that something of this sort might well be decided later but no agreement had yet been reached on it: but he had emphasised to Indonesians the urgent need to set up liaison teams and to proceed to rapid ratification and implementation of settlement because of dangerous situation created on the borders by presence and further infiltration of C.C.O. personnel with Indonesian arms and uniforms. If any of these were picked up the public would take them to be Indonesians and Indonesian Government would be vulnerable to charges of ill-faith.
11. When asked whether subject of British bases had been raised, Gahzali said that one of the Indonesian Brigadiers (one of the two suspected Sukarno agents) had made a harsh statement about Nekolim6 and British bases and Indonesian requirement that these should be liquidated: Ghazali had dealt with him rudely and had enquired, amongst other things, why Indonesia had agreed to recognise Singapore without raising objection to substantial bases there. The Brigadier was dropped from Indonesian team at later meetings.
12. I expressed some puzzlement at Ghazali’s indication that not only civilian spokesmen, but also Malik, had been ignorant about prearrangement with Suharto: I had been under the impression that Ghazali had to clear his lines directly with Malik at their last meeting.7 Ghazali said that Malik and he had certainly agreed on objective of retaining Borneo territories in Malaysia but had not discussed full detail of formula for settlement. In reply to another question, Ghazali said that Malaysian Government did not now care whether Indonesia recognised Singapore or when. This mention of Singapore provoked a bitter outburst about the perfidy of Lee in his earlier protests about not having had traffic with Indonesians, his public welcoming of proposal for Indonesian recognition notwithstanding his promise the previous day to Tunku to say nothing, and now Lee’s latest statement that neither he nor any of his colleagues had had any ‘talks’ with the Indonesians. This outburst was also coupled with a frontal attack on Walker for the British decision, not only to withhold defence aid from Malaysia,8 but also for allowing this to be used by Singapore as a stick to beat Kuala Lumpur on common market issue. Walker made a spirited reply.
13. Walker asked again whether Britain might now agree to supply Rolls Royce engines for Garuda Fokkers,9 suggesting that Malaysia might regard this as an appropriate encouragement to Indonesians. Ghazali suggested that any encouragement might more appropriately come from Malaysia at a time of its choosing: pending a confirmed settlement, Malaysia did not want to drop its guard and would prefer British to defer question.
14. Ghazali stressed extreme delicacy of briefing which he had given us. Leakage of terms of agreement could jeopardise Suharto’s delicate plans to set stage for Indonesian ratification. In particular, the curious way in which military had withheld the full story from the civilian negotiators and even Malik himself, and had allowed them to play out the ‘Subandrio line’ before admitting to the prearrangement with Suharto, could be a most acute embarrassment to Malik (and to Malaysian relations with him) if any breath of it were to reach Djakarta.
15. In conclusion, Ghazali expressed hope that our Government and any commentators whom we could influence should use greatest restraint in commenting on outcome of the Bangkok talks. Any public comments as to what our forces would or would not be doing pending a final settlement could enable Sukarno and his supporters to start talking again about Nekolim. At this delicate stage, he hoped we would be prepared to leave any talking to Malaysians themselves. In this latter connection, you might like to consider whether it might be appropriate to give me twenty-four hours’ notice of any intended governmental comments so that Malaysians will not only have advance notice but would also be able to comment on any particular wording which might seem unexceptionable to us but which might carry some risks in Malaysian eyes.10
[NAA: A6364, KL1966/04]
1 Anwar Sani Chaidir, Head of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2 See footnote 1, Document 363.
3 Possibly, ‘if they so wished’
4 The genesis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
5 See Document 365.
6 See footnote 3, Document 362.
7 See Document 361.
8 The British defence review at the end of 1965 had decided that military expenditure for the Far East would not exceed £185 million per year by 1969–70. The freezing of defence aid to Malaysia, made possible by the proposed ending of confrontation, was seen as a means of achieving the savings necessary for UK defence to function within its financial resources.
9 See footnote 4, Document 363.
10 At the time this cable was transmitted, the High Commission in Kuala Lumpur was unaware of Holt’s statement of 2 June on Cabinet’s consideration of economic assistance to Indonesia the previous day, in which he also mentioned Malaysia—Indonesia relations. He said Australia welcomed ‘the hopeful signs of a favourable outcome’ of the talks and that the Government had ‘taken a close and informed interest in developments leading up to the meeting in Bangkok and [was] encouraged in the hope that peaceful relations will be fully restored between the two countries’.