Kuala Lumpur, 8 June 1966
1430. Secret Priority
Disengagement
Grandy proposed to Razak late yesterday that he should talk to Osman about programme for disengagement, saying that he had worked out various ideas which Osman might find useful. Razak agreed readily. Grandy then spoke again to Osman suggesting that he might start by giving him piece of paper offering ideas as to who might participate in planning talks with Osman or his staff and subject headings which they might discuss. Osman said this should be very helpful. Grandy did not raise with either Razak or Osman timing of proposed discussions, nor did he question either of them about Razak’s statement to Press yesterday about withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Borneo and about plans for this going ahead.3 Neither Razak nor Osman gave any indication that they had yet developed any firm ideas of their own on the subject.
2. Walker told me today of Malik’s statement to Murray that Ghazali is to visit Djakarta 10th June for discussion with Suharto on implementation of agreement and disengagement of forces.
3. With public holiday and endless royal birthday ceremonials,4 there is no hope today of seeing either Razak or Ghazali or having substantive discussions with Walker and Wade. I am deferring planned departure for visit northern states (my 1385)5 and am hopeful of at least brief Commonwealth meeting tomorrow morning before interview which we will seek with Razak or Ghazali.
4. Subject to any clarification we may receive tomorrow, I do not think Razak’s public reference yesterday to plans indicates that he, Osman and Kadir6 are all concealing from us detailed thinking which they have done on this subject. British will have shown you telegram in which Murray has commented inter alia that Indonesians are unlikely to have thought, or to be prepared to think, of disengagement being handled in the complicated way proposed in Grandy’s submission. I would make much the same assessment of likely attitude of Malaysians. I would expect that it would be very difficult to interest either [of] them in the sort of detailed, step-by-step and carefully reciprocal moves proposed by Grandy, with their provision for verification and heavy overtones of mutual suspicion. I should think that approach of Malaysians would be that, once satisfied of overall agreement, cease-fire and basic good faith of Indonesians, they would proceed at their own earliest convenience with replacement of our forces by their own and would not expect more than broad indications of withdrawals which Indonesians would make at their own convenience. I would not take reference to plans in Razak’s statement (which was probably made as much for Indonesian as Malaysian ears) to mean much more than that they intend to do something about withdrawals when Bangkok Agreement is ratified.
5. I agree nevertheless that however general the attitudes of the two Governments to disengagement may be, talks which Ghazali and any accompanying representatives will have with Suharto might lead to agreement on some point or points which could create difficulties for us. We will do what we can to guard against this tomorrow.
6. I would not expect difficulty in getting Malaysian agreement that negotiations ought to be restricted to disengagement leading to re-deployment and should not extend to question of Commonwealth withdrawals from theatre. Razak’s welcome of replacements for our engineer squadron and L.A.A. battery7 seem a reasonable earnest of this. I cannot of course speak for Indonesian intentions. (Arrangements for-bombers8 would seem to concern Singapore rather than Malaysia.)
7. I would, however, expect substantial difficulty in persuading Malaysians to take no action until you had approved detail of their negotiating position and procedure; and even more in persuading them to consult you before implementing each stage and to reveal their intentions to Indonesians only on a piece-meal and graduated basis. Malaysians recently reacted very sharply to what they regarded as indications that British were trying to take charge of negotiations with Indonesia. While grateful for our help they have made it very clear that they regard quarrel as theirs and that it is for them to make it up in their own way. We can reasonably hope that they will pay broad regard to our views and interests as their allies but I would expect them to be strongly resistant to any complicated procedures which they might regard as unnecessary and as jeopardizing the spirit of any general accord reached with Djakarta.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7]
1 7 June, reporting Grandy’s unsuccessful attempts to commence discussions with the Malaysians on ‘the substance of disengagement or timing or method of co-ordination with Indonesians’. Eastman considered that as the Malaysians retained ‘hopes of some form of co-operation with Indonesian forces against C.C.O.’, they were ‘likely to want us to stay at least until it is convenient for them to replace some or all of us with Malaysian units’.
2 7 June, advising Eastman that the Defence Committee’s report No. 33/1966 of 7 June on planning for the phased withdrawal of Australian forces had been sent for his use in discussions with CINCFE, Walker and Wade. He was to make two points: (i) the importance Australia attached to paragraph 4(a) of the report which stated ‘that the negotiations must be treated as a disengagement leading to a redeployment but not a withdrawal and that the question of withdrawal of forces from the theatre should not be the subject of discussion and agreement with the Indonesians’; and (ii) that once an agreed UK—Malaysia plan on disengagement had been reached, Australia wished to be consulted before each stage in the agreed plan was put into effect and to have safeguards in place to prevent premature disclosures of details of the various stages.
3 Razak had told an ABC correspondent on 7 June that once the agreement was finalised, Commonwealth forces would have to leave Sabah and Sarawak and that plans were going ahead for their early withdrawal.
4 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s birthday is celebrated annually on the first Saturday in June (in 1966, 8 June).
5 Not published.
6 Dato Abdul Kadir bin Shamsuddin, Malaysian Secretary of Defence.
7 The Engineer unit was at the end of its six months’ tour of duty and its replacement unit from Australia was due to commence movement on 8 June. The replacement unit for the LAA Battery at Butterworth, following its two year tour of duty, was to commence movement on 14 June.
8 That is, ‘V’ bombers. Canberra had particularly stressed the importance of paragraph 4(a) of the Defence Committee report (see footnote 2) to the disengagement of V-bombers (see footnote 7, Document 135). Australia wanted to be consulted ‘as to timing and publicity’ should the aircraft leave the area and an assurance that ‘there can be no possibility of their return being impeded if circumstances require their return’.