Manila, 9 June 1966
526. Top Secret
Reference Committee Minute 33/1966.2 Copy No. 19 being returned by safe hand.
I think we have to be exceptionally careful that discussions of disengagement and reciprocal rundown of forces after end of confrontation are kept completely separate from any question of withdrawal of forces of any kind from the theatre. It seems to me that Defence Committee has not (repeat not) stated this strongly enough in paragraph 4(a) and our High Commissioner should be specifically instructed that he only takes part in discussions with Commander-in-Chief on narrowly defined questions of disengagement and reciprocal rundown. In saying this I am not (repeat not) thinking of what it is proper to discuss with Indonesians but of what we can discuss with our allies in this particular context. Any questions relating to withdrawals from theatre should be lifted out of any discussions at Commander-in-Chief/High Commissioner level and dealt with as part of broader consideration of Britain’s role in Far East and Anglo-Australian cooperation for security throughout the whole region.
2. I share concern expressed in paragraph 2(b) about publicity3 and think this needs careful watching.
3. A subsidiary but highly relevant aspect of any discussion of withdrawals from the theatre is the future relationships of Malaysia and Singapore in respect of Defence Agreements. While paragraph 5 of telegram 1536 (Annex B to Defence Committee Paper)4 refers to Singapore, it appears that Singapore Government is not being regarded as a principal party to the projected discussions. This might be understandable if discussions concerned only movements from East Malaysia but we surely cannot consider redeployment without considering future role of Singapore. This is another reason for narrowly restricting scope of projected talks.
4. In general I feel same disquiet about procedure contemplated. While recognizing need for contingency planning of reciprocal military arrangements to be made if and when confrontation ends, I think we have to be careful to ensure that any such steps are taken as a consequence of an Indonesian decision and do not become mixed up with any bargaining prior to such decision. While our hopes are high we may have to wait some time for Indonesia to endorse and apply Bangkok Agreement. There are few things as slippery as a half-landed fish.
[NAA: A1209, 1966/7358]
1 Hasluck was en route to Taiwan for an official visit prior to attending the Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Co-operation in Seoul from 14 to 16 June.
2 See footnote 2, Document 367.
3 Paragraph number should read 4(b), which stated: ‘ Publicity. Execution by the United Kingdom of the principle “to obtain maximum capital out of any withdrawal of forces by the judicious use of publicity” could involve some differences of opinion from an Australian viewpoint. There will probably be a strong natural tendency in the United Kingdom to overpublicise any move by the United Kingdom in this respect which could have adverse implications in the United States and South East Asia. For this reason the Australian approach should be to emphasise the word judicious in any publicity for British Commonwealth force reductions.’
4 CRO telegram, dated 3 June. In response to the progress made at the Bangkok talks towards ending confrontation, it requested UK representatives in Canberra and Wellington to speak ‘urgently’ to Australian and New Zealand authorities about the need ‘to set in hand arrangements for effecting an orderly military disengagement of the Commonwealth and Indonesian forces, in order to facilitate speedy conclusion of a final settlement’. It also advised that CINCFE had drawn up a plan for reciprocal disengagement which was considered ‘to be a sound and practicable basis for negotiation with Indonesia, subject to some modifications’. Paragraph 5 remarked: ‘In order to get this process going, we hope Australian/New Zealand authorities will instruct their High Commissioners to concert with C.-in-C. and with British High Commissioners an early approach to the Malaysians, and also to the Singapore Government, for information and consequential action for Singapore’.