371

Cablegram from Eastman to Canberra

Kuala Lumpur, 20 June 1966

1539. Secret

Disengagement of Forces

If formula reported in para 4 my 15301 is accepted by Malaysians and settlement on that basis is ratified by both Governments we may expect that drive for economy will lead British to urge Malaysians to press ahead with disengagement without waiting for exchange of diplomatic missions. This may suit the Malaysians but it could be at least two or three weeks before their own preferences are clear.

2. In recent weeks, as we have already reported, several Malaysian leaders have reacted very sharply against ‘negative’ British attitude on aid.2 Although prospects of rapprochement and subsequent co-operation with Indonesia hold out promise of a reduced dependence on Western defence support, these same leaders have nevertheless resented what they regard as indications that timing and scale of withdrawal of British forces will be determined by economic and other policies of Whitehall regardless of wishes of Malaysia and needs of situation. British pressure for early disengagement is likely to be regarded as part of this pattern and so aggravate Malaysian resentment.

3. I would see no difficulty about supporting C-in-C in efforts to obtain agreement of Malaysians on pattern which disengagement should follow. I recommend, however, that I dissociate Australia clearly from any British pressure on Malaysians either to negotiate disengagement with Indonesians or to put it into effect before, in each case, they are clearly ready to do so. Even tacit association with such pressure could earn Malaysian resentment and with no advantage to ourselves. Disengagement, as such, would seem likely to involve few economies from our point of view. Furthermore, for all practical purposes, our Air Force is ‘disengaged’ already. Of our forces in Borneo itself, 2 SAS Squadron is due for withdrawal at the end of July3 and 4 RAR should return to Terendak4 on ‘roulement’ in about September.

[NAA: AI209, 1966/7358]

1 Document 370.

2 See footnote 8, Document 366.

3 2 SAS Squadron had deployed to Borneo in March.

4 4 RAR had replaced 3 RAR as the Australian battalion with the CSR (see footnote 9, Document 139) in September 1965 and had deployed on rotation to Borneo in April.