Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 1966
1833. Confidential Priority
Confrontation
You will have already heard from the British that the Tunku told Walker yesterday that, despite the fact that he had little faith in Indonesia while Sukarno was still alive, he had decided to take a risk in the interests of keeping present Indonesian Government out of clutches of the Communists. He would therefore accept the Indonesian proposal to exchange secret explanatory letters, making Article II dependent on the fulfilment of Article I of the Bangkok Accord.
2. Zainal Sulong gave us further detail this morning. Moerdani’s counter proposal had originally been that both the Bangkok Accord and the explanatory letters would remain secret. Malaysians rejected this as impossible from their domestic political point of view. The proposal now agreed to by both sides is for a simple exchange of secret explanatory letters which will say no more than ‘the implementation of Article II will be dependent on the fulfilment of Article I’.
3. Zainal said that Malaysians recognised unlikelihood of Indonesians in fact keeping the explanatory letters secret. Specifically, they thought it quite likely that Sukarno would disclose them on 17th August. 1 If, however, he did this, Malaysian ministers would take the line that the word ‘immediate’ in Article II qualifying diplomatic relations had all along meant immediately following reaffirmation.
4. The Indonesians have invited Razak to Djakarta on 11th August for signing ceremony and even offered presidential plane. Tunku is inclined to prefer neutral ground but Razak is prepared to go and final decision will be taken on his return from Bangkok at weekend. Chances are that Razak will go (in Malaysian plane thank you) and return same day bringing, they hope, Malik to Kuala Lumpur for celebration that evening.
5. Zainal said that Malaysian Minsters are being very cautious but feel that signature will achieve two main objectives, i.e., cessation of overt hostilities and implied recognition. With liaison teams established in one another’s capitals, the way would be open for constant contact and discussion (four additional members of Malaysian team including M.F.A. officer would go to Djakarta with Razak and remain there).
6. Zainal said that they were concerned about Singapore/Indonesian relations in that they knew Indonesia was pressing for an embassy in Singapore (contrary to Indonesia’s undertaking to Malaysia) and that Lee was at least considering this (contrary to his undertaking to Malaysia). Nevertheless, Zainal conceded that the establishment of a consulate in Singapore was something Malaysians could accept.
7. High Commissioner will be seeing Ghazali later this morning and further comments will follow.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7]
1 That is, during his annual Merdeka Day address.