Kuala Lumpur, 6 August 1966
1843. Confidential Priority
Confrontation
Our 1833.
Walker, Wade and I have since seen Ghazali.
2. Ghazali said that in proposed secret exchange (supplementary to ratification of Bangkok Accord) Malik would write to say—
(a) that Indonesian understanding was that implementation of Article II would take place immediately after reaffirmation provided for in Article I; and
(b) that in meantime Indonesians would propose that the two countries maintained direct and regular contact with each other.
Malaysians would reply confirming understanding in (a) and agreeing to contacts proposed in (b).
3. Ghazali said that this was fourth change of mind which Indonesians had suffered since Bangkok talks; he hoped they would not change their minds again. Since Bangkok, Ghazali had pointed out to Suharto more than once that idea of secret exchange to accompany formal public agreement was an untidy arrangement. Whatever secret letters might say about diplomatic relations being deferred until after reaffirmation, very ratification of agreement would constitute immediate recognition and proposed exchange of liaison missions would constitute de facto working relations. Proposed secret letters presented no particular problem from Malaysian point of view but they clearly carried risks of embarrassment for Suharto himself; Sukarno would be tempted to publish or leak the secret letters in order to make Suharto look foolish. Suharto had replied that he was not worried about this; if Sukarno did publish secret exchange this would produce final showdown and Suharto had no doubt who would win. Suharto argued, however, that he did have an immediate and temporary need for secret exchange in order to get Bangkok Agreement past Sukarno without a prior showdown. Ghazali commented that Suharto might be presumed to know his own business best and for that reason Malaysian Government was prepared to agree to secret exchange. Ghazali added that Moerdani, who had brought latest Indonesian proposals back to Kuala Lumpur on 1st August, had repeated Suharto’s previous assurance that, once agreement was ratified, problems with Sukarno would be virtually over; thereafter if everything went according to schedule Suharto would be ready to ignore secret letters and proceed to full diplomatic relations and exchange of diplomatic missions as soon as it suited the two capitals and without waiting for reaffirmation.
4. Ghazali added that proposed secret exchange would also complicate Indonesian negotiations with Singapore unless Suharto felt able to tear it up soon after ratification. If diplomatic exchange with Malaysia was deferred until after ratification Indonesia would have choice of (a) postponing exchange with Singapore for similar period and so straining relations with Lee, or (b) proceeding to earlier exchange with Singapore with consequent breach of faith with Malaysia by both Indonesia and Lee. When asked whether Djakarta might see profit in using this to make more trouble between Malaysia and Singapore, Ghazali refused to speculate. He pointed out that in Indonesian–Singaporean discussions each party was speaking with several voices and he did not pretend to know which meant what.
5. I asked Ghazali whether there was any possibility of misunderstanding with Suharto as to exact method by which Malaysia would provide opportunity to reaffirm (i.e. inclusion of point in general election manifestos and not a specific question to electorate). Ghazali said there had been no specific discussion on this. Suharto’s concern had been to find some plausible device for ending confrontation. He had shown no interest in details but seemed happy for Malaysians to do something along lines proposed. Given Suharto’s premise that reaffirmation formula was just a gimmick to get Sukarno to call off confrontation now , he would not much care what happened about reaffirmation when the time came; Sukarno might still care but would probably no longer matter.
6. I asked Ghazali whether he was confident that, on ratification of Agreement, Indonesians would call off not only overt aggression but also covert mischief in Borneo states. He said he had no doubt Indonesians would continue to infiltrate agents for intelligence purposes; Malaysia would not mind this as it would be doing the same thing itself in Indonesia. Ghazali would not, however, be dogmatic about continued infiltration for political purposes. Malaysia would need to maintain strict vigilance. He did believe that Suharto himself was utterly sincere in wanting to stop all forms of interference but he did not exclude that some subordinate commanders or other agencies might try to continue covert mischief despite Suharto. This would, however, cost money and funds might soon dry up without Suharto’s backing. Interference would be difficult to conceal and this would jeopardize ‘aid’ drive. Furthermore Djakarta had publicly ‘dumped’ the governments-in-exile.1 All in all Ghazali was hopeful that ratification would bring end of all aspects of confrontation.
7. In reply to further question Ghazali said Malaysian Government would not be disturbed if Djakarta for domestic purposes represented agreement as ‘larger than life’, e.g. by arguing that opportunity for reaffirmation which Malaysia now promised was the ‘reassessment’ which Indonesia had demanded throughout. Ghazali repeated that Bangkok Accord had been deliberately drafted so as to enable Djakarta to put best domestic face on it. With regard to rest of world they could read the simple English of the Agreement and Malaysia was happy to rest on that.
[NAA: A6364, KL1966/06]
1 See footnote 7, Document 245.