Canberra, 21 February 1963
606. Priority Secret
Malaysia
British High Commission has sought our agreement to brief which Tory would use in Kuala Lumpur when informing the Tunku about the recent Washington talks (British Embassy Washington telegram 495 to London and British High Commission Kuala Lumpur telegram 275 to London refers).1 We understand that Harriman agrees with the proposed account of the talks but does not wish impression to be given that the United States is a sponsor of Malaysia. He also reacted against Tory’s idea of presentation of a piece of paper to the Tunku preferring an oral briefing only.
2. We have in mind that both the British and ourselves will be continuing to speak separately to the Tunku. British for example have just been warning the Tunku against agreeing to a conference with the Philippines and Indonesia before Malaysia and we are both currently speaking to him about the advantages of continued restraint in the face of Indonesian provocation.
3. We also wish to avoid giving Tunku the impression that nature of the West’s support for Malaysia is such that he can assume our support on all aspects of the formation of Malaysia and his relations with neighbouring countries. Because of the delicate issues involved, it is important that he realise he cannot assume unqualified Western support.
4. While we agree with the United Kingdom warning to the Tunku about the dangers of a conference with the Philippines and Indonesia before Malaysia we want to have the question kept quite open of having a conference after Malaysia. We also see scope in the meantime for bilateral talks by the British not only with Manila but with Djakarta.
5. We expect early consultation with us by the United Kingdom on the role, if any, of the United Nations in the Malaysia question. Their coming talks with Narasimhan in London may provide useful background. While early United Nations intervention, even in the form of a representative of the Secretary-General, might be quite unacceptable, it seems unwise at this stage to close our eyes to what is inevitably going to be a growing United Nations interest. A flexible approach now might ensure that this interest is a helpful one.
6. For the rest we feel that the suggested briefing has been very largely covered by views expressed by us to the United Kingdom and the Tunku in the last few weeks and it should suffice if you would go over the main points again.
7. We agree that Tory’s presentation should be in written form and assume that he will emphasise the highly delicate nature of the material to the Tunku.
For Kuala Lumpur
8. Glad of your comments on recent British reports of growing Malayan Cabinet conflict over Malaysia.2
With reference your 1313 you will see from above that we are still prepared to explore possibilities for a constructive United Nations role in obtaining acceptability for Malaysia.
Your 1344 paragraph 2. You may follow line in paragraph 4 above.
[NAA: A l838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 Not published.
2 Most Malayan Cabinet members were concerned about the formation of Malaysia—in particular what were seen as excessive considerations being given to the Borneo territories. A number of these considerations were being opposed by the Cabinet at the time, including the territories’ generous representation in the Federal Parliament and proposed controls of immigration into North Borneo.
3 20 February, in which Critchley reported a discussion with Tory on encouraging the Tunku to make statesmanlike announcements and his remarks to Tory on avoiding the upcoming visit of Narasinham leading to either compromise or delay on the formation of Malaysia, or UN intervention before it was established.
4 Document 36.