Canberra, 21 February 1963
Restricted
Malayan–Indonesian Relations
The Secretary sent for the Malayan High Commissioner on 21st February and outlined to him our thinking on Indonesia. He drew his attention to the proposals which Narasimhan had brought to Kuala Lumpur from Subandrio.2 These proposed an ending of the war of words, Malayan assurance that there would be no support for Sumatran dissidents, P.R.R.I. refugees3 (e.g. Sumitro)4 to be dealt with in accordance with international law and talks to be held on incidents at sea5 etc. He said that these seemed to him a useful starting point for some improvement in relations.
2. The High Commissioner said that s of ar as the war of words was concerned, Indonesia had never forgiven the Tunku for his attempted mediation over New Guinea. Unless Sukarno could restrain Aidit6 and Azahari, it was difficult to restrain the Tunku. As for the Sumatrans, it was not the Tunku who wanted Sumatra but the Sumatrans who wanted to join Malaya.
3. The Secretary said it would be wise to discourage all such movements. Nothing could be more dangerous or provocative than a public expression by Sumatra that it wanted to secede. Any taunting of Indonesia by Malayans could only create ill feeling. The Indonesians already believed that Malaya was interested in promoting secession and it would be wise to deny this publicly and to end the war of words which was making it more difficult for Malaya’s friends to help her. It would be perilous for a new state to be created in a growing crescendo of disputation. The Secretary urged that Malaya might show more silence and overlook some of the untrue allegations made about her. Counter accusations, whether true or rhetorical, could escalate. If there were a clash of arms, Malaya would no doubt look to her friends who would stand by their obligations if the circumstances were such that they acted in a good cause. We should not, however, want a situation where the dispute had been sharpened by unnecessary things said in Kuala Lumpur. He instanced Inche Mohammed Ismail’s recent address.7 This was strong talk which brought an inevitable Indonesian reaction. Now was the time, not for indiscretions, but for some statesmanlike act by the Tunku to lower the temperature. This might take the form of a statement that Malaya wanted nothing from Indonesia. This might not divert Sukarno but it would help moderate opinion in Djakarta and be of use to Malaya’s friends in the United Nations. The United Nations aspect was a real problem which we should all have t of ace, especially in the Committee of 24.
4. A somewhat rambling discussion followed in which the High Commissioner argued that any gesture of the kind described would be dangerous for the Government, that Malayan fishermen had been driven from their grounds by Indonesian gunboats, that the Indonesians had pressed for the deportation of alleged rebels captured with arms in their boats and of the difficulty of telling who was who when it was only an hour by outboard motor across the strait.8 The Secretary pressed him as to whether Sumitro had any political role and whether Malaya had ever publicly declared that she would not be a base for dissidents in Indonesia, urging the need to meet Indonesian suspicions and at the same time, meeting possible charges in the United Nations that Malaysia had been created without adequate opportunity for an act of self-determination.
5. The High Commissioner said that a denial that Malaya was a base for dissidents would be taken by Indonesia as an admission of guilt. He had always thought that the Indonesians had regarded Singapore, not Malaya, as the base from which revolutionary activities had taken place.
6. The Secretary again stressed the merits of Subandrio’s proposals and the dangers of a weak Malaysia with a strong Indonesia. He told the High Commissioner that just as we were urging restraint on Malaya, we had instructed our Ambassador in Djakarta to ask Indonesia to cease her attacks.
7. The High Commissioner said that there had been great provocation, instancing the burning of the Tunku’s effigy and the accusations of neo-colonialism which Malaya particularly resented. Malaya was in no position to threaten Indonesia. Her internal political situation was difficult. Twenty–five per cent of the Malays were Indonesian. There was also the Chinese problem. The Chinese felt that they were treated as third class citizens. Conciliatory gestures would be regarded as an invitation for an Indonesian takeover. National unity was still a great difficulty which the High Commissioner found reflected in the attitude of Malayan students in Australia. He promised, however, that he would convey the Secretary’s views to the Tunku and Dato Ismail and said that, speaking personally, he was in agreement with many of them. The Secretary’s words would reinforce his personal views.
8. In conclusion, the Secretary stressed that he was speaking for the Minister and at his request. Malaya was entering into a period where diplomacy, wisdom and restraint were needed and efforts to win foreign friends must be made. If they failed to exercise these qualities successfully, the future was dark. Many questions such as recognition of the new state, its frontiers, etc. would plague them. He urged a policy not only of patience and restraint but a positive diplomatic effort, if necessary by sending special missions round the world to explain their case.
[NAA: A1838, 551/13/11 part 8]
1 Dato Suleiman Bin Dato Abdul Rahman, High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya.
2 See footnote 13, Document 29.
3 See footnote 7, Document 29.
4 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, leading Indonesian economist and former minister in the 1950, 1952 and 1955 governments, wh of led to Singapore (and then on to Malaya) following his involvement with the PRRI in 1957.
5 See paragraph 4 below.
6 Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Indonesian politician and General Secretary of the PKI.
7 See paragraph 3, Document 29.
8 Strait of Malacca between the island of Sumatra and the west coast of the Malayan peninsula.