Canberra, 5 March 1963
27. Secret
Following is record of conversation which Critchley had with President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio on 27th February. This report is for background information only and is not at this stage to be passed to the Government to which you are accredited. You may discuss its broad lines but make clear that even in this we are limiting its distribution as shown above.1 Critchley is making further visits to Djakarta and we are anxious that these should not be prejudiced by British and Americans passing out garbled versions to other countries.
Begins:
Malaysia—Indonesia/Malayan Relations
On February 27th with Shann I called on Subandrio. Later on the same morning, without Subandrio, we called on President Sukarno. The following summarises the main points of discussion and our agreed conclusions on the significance of the talks.
Subandrio
2. Subandrio said he wanted to speak freely because he was concerned about Indonesia’s deteriorating relations with Malaya. He himself was exercising restraint and doing everything he could to dampen down Indonesian reactions but the Tunku’s provocations were intolerable. He developed the theme of Malaya’s present hostility to Indonesia on the same lines as in earlier discussions with Shann.
3. Subandrio stressed the importance of improving relations between the two countries and the need for restraint on both sides to create a better atmosphere. However, he had no positive suggestions to make other than that the Malayans should make a gesture and stop provoking Indonesia. He referred to recent broadcasts in the Indonesian language beamed to Indonesia from Malaya and to the use the Malayans were making of P.R.R.I. rebels2 (Des Alwi)3 as announcers. He admitted he was making arrangements for Indonesia to retaliate from broadcasting stations in Sumatra.
In the course of Subandrio’s argument, and in reply, I made the following points:—
(a) Australia was gravely concerned about the deteriorating relations between Indonesia and Malaya because we wanted to maintain close friendship with both countries. I stressed the close ties already established with Malaya and our desire, now that West Irian was out of the way, for even closer relations with Indonesia.
(b) I pointed out that the charge that Indonesia had not been consulted about Malaysia was not quite correct. I reminded Subandrio that he himself had admitted in the General Assembly when I was at the United Nations in 19614 that Indonesia had been consulted.
(c) I explained that the Tunku’s intervention on West Irian had been made with the genuine desire to settle the issue by transferring the territory as soon as possible to Indonesia. I thought there could have been a misunderstanding over the question of interim sovereignty5 but it was unfortunate if such a misunderstanding had resulted in any serious dissatisfaction with the Malayans or the Tunku.
(d) I pointed out that the Federation had been correct in its dealings with the P.R.R.I. during the rebellion. Rebels had not been allowed to operate from Malaya. Sumitro and others had only been allowed to settle in Malaya when the rebellion ended, and on condition that they did not engage in political activities. The Federation had no territorial ambitions or intention to support irredentist or separatist movements and I felt sure that the Malayans would be prepared to say so. I also mentioned that the Malayans resented the criticisms that Indonesia was making about their alleged support for the rebellion compared with Indonesia’s friendly approach to the Philippines which had been far less correct in its dealings with the P.R.R.I.6
(e) I answered Subandrio’s claim that a common border with a hostile neighbour was intolerable by pointing out that the Borneo border did not present nearly as many difficulties as the common border now shared in the Malacca Straits.
(f) When Subandrio referred to the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo, I took advantage of it to say that I understand that the Philippines could make precisely the same claim to some of the territory of Kalimantan.
(g) I emphasised in particular that there was a basic goodwill in Malaya towards Indonesia. The Tunku himself had until recently on display in his residence plaster casts of President Sukarno and Kartini.7 One Minister had named his son after President Sukarno and another after Sjarifuddin8 (who was Prime Minister of Indonesia in 1948). Throughout the kampongs in Malaya, Malay houses had displayed photographs of President Sukarno and Dr. Hatta. In short, the Malayans had always looked up to Indonesia for friendly guidance.
(h) It was in Indonesia’s interest as well as Malaya’s to build on the goodwill that had existed in the past. Instead, the present policy of confrontation was dissipating Malayan goodwill and this could only harm Indonesia’s interests.
5. Subandrio made no attempt to argue the points I made. On some, such as my reference to the possibility of Philippine claims on Kalimantan, he laughed. On others he quickly changed the subject. I concluded my comments by saying that I was convinced that Malaysia would come into existence on August 31st. This, in contrast to my other statements, brought an immediate sharp reaction. Subandrio said Indonesia would consider this a warlike gesture and implied that Malaya would have to accept the consequences. A cold war situation would be created. He also implied that if Malayans depended on British and American help, Indonesia, despite the serious implications, might have to look to her own friends for assistance. I again stressed that it was not in Indonesia’s interests to react in this way and that Indonesia should seek to project her leadership constructively in the interests of the region as a whole. Indonesia and the Federation should negotiate about barter trade, smuggling and fishing matters as well as the many economic problems they had in common, such as the market for rubber and tin. I stressed again Australia’s interest in good relations between the two countries and the fact that our security interests were similar to those of Indonesia and Malaya.
6. Subandrio cooled down noticeably. Although there was no intention to reduce the size of Indonesia’s defence forces, he claimed that there was no intention to expand them. He would be happy to see an expansion of Australian forces which could be in the interests of the region as a whole. Indonesia would like to see the region’s defences strong enough to deter aggression even if the United States withdrew its protection from the area. In this connection he would like to see Australian and Indonesian defence forces carry out joint exercises.
7. Subandrio also thought that Australia could make a special contribution to easing tension between Indonesia and Malaya. He hoped that I would tell President Sukarno about the feeling in Malaya and about the plaster cast and photographs of the President. He thought that the President would listen to me.
Appreciation
8. Both Shann and I agree on the following conclusions:—
(a) Subandrio was primarily concerned with giving a plausible and well rehearsed presentation of why Indonesia was adopting a hostile attitude towards Malaya and Malaysia.
(b) The appeal for moderation was mainly concerned with fostering Indonesia’s long term objective of subverting the Alliance Government9 and in particular the Tunku’s leadership.
(c) Some impressions had been made on Subandrio that the confrontation policy might not be in Indonesia’s interests.
(d) If Sukarno would change his attitude, Subandrio personally, need not be an obstacle to rapprochement with Malaya.
President Sukarno
9. The President’s greeting was warm and friendly. He was slow in raising the subject of Malaya and it only became the topic of conversation after prompting by Shann. (I was anxious to avoid the impression that I had come with a brief on Malaysia.)
10. President Sukarno spoke heatedly about the public hostility of the Malayans and in particular of the Tunku, towards Indonesia. He especially resented the criticism of himself and he contrasted the Tunku’s outbursts with his own restraint. He referred to a recent statement by Perti, one of the three legal Muslim parties attacking the Tunku and the Federation. The Tunku would be sure to think he was to blame but he had nothing to do with the statement and thought it stupid.
11. The President also obviously resented Malayan allegations that he was controlled by the Communists. He relished our agreement that he had been one of the few who had successfully controlled and manipulated the Communist Party.
12. The President also showed his resentment about the P.R.R.I. rebels, Sumitro’s presence in Malaya and the use of Des Alwi in broadcasts to Indonesia. I repeated the arguments that I had used with Subandrio that the Malayans had been carefully correct during the rebellion and that this contrasted with the known attitude of the Philippines at that time.
13. I went on to develop the argument that Malaya wanted friendly peaceful relations with Indonesia and had no wish to interfere in Indonesian affairs. I added that the Tunku, when he heard that I would be passing through Djakarta, had told me that I could make this clear in his name. I went on to develop the theme that the Malayans had always in the past looked up to Indonesia and to the President’s leadership. I repeated what I had told Subandrio about the plaster casts of the Tunku, the names of the Ministers’ sons and the photographs in the Malay homes. The reference to the photographs especially pleased the President. He said with pride that he had heard about them.
14. I then suggested that it was a pity that the present misunderstanding was destroying the goodwill that the Malayans had for Indonesia and the tendency of Malayans to look to Indonesia for guidance. I added that it was unfortunate for Australia too because now that West Irian was no longer a problem we had been hoping for a new era in Australian/ Indonesian relations and it would be a great pity if this were shadowed by Malayan/ Indonesian tension over Malaysia.
15. Sukarno said I should tell the Tunku to ‘keep quiet’. I explained I had been doing this practically everyday until I was hoarse and in terms that left me surprised that the Tunku remained friendly with me. The President laughed and said he knew the Tunku was a tough man. He recalled in terms that were not unfriendly the Tunku’s visit to Indonesia when he had spent a week travelling with him. He endeavoured to recall the name of the Finance Minister who had accompanied the Tunku (Tuan Sir Henry Lee). As I gathered the not surprising impression that the President had not found Lee congenial, I explained that he had since been ‘retooled’. The use of the word ‘retooled’ delighted the President who said ‘Ah, you won’t find that word in the dictionary, you know my language’. I asked Sukarno specifically whether, if the Malayans stopped talking against Indonesia, his attitude towards Malaysia would be more favourable. The answer was a categorical ‘no’. This was something different. He was opposed to Malaysia because it was neo–colonialist, a project designed to protect British economic interests and an attempt to contain communism.
16. I explained at length that Malaysia was not an anti-communist plot. Basically it was an attempt to deal with the communal problem of the Chinese. He had already had experience of the difficulties of assimilating the Chinese, who insisted on retaining their own language, education, culture and loyalties. Indonesia, under his leadership, had successfully dealt with the problem but it was much more difficult in the Federation and Singapore. The Federation Government, controlled by Malayans, looked to Malaysia as a means of assimilating the chauvinistic Chinese in Singapore. I emphasised that it was the Malays who looked up to Indonesia and the President personally, whereas the Chinese were critical of Indonesia and things Indonesian. I said I believed it was in Indonesia’s interests to help the Malays in their efforts to assimilate the Chinese into a Malaysian community. Indonesia could make a contribution by a more friendly approach to and cooperation with Malaysia: in particular, the President could do a great deal by projecting his own leadership. This was in the interests of the Indonesians as well as the Malays and I had hoped that he might be able to act as a midwife for Malaysia. This reference amused the President. He recalled that Australia had been, in a sense, one of the midwives of Indonesia. He had listened to what I had been saying about the Chinese problem most carefully and then thoughtfully said, ‘Yes, this is another angle and has to be considered’.
17. Jokingly he asked why the Malayans did not let Indonesia take Singapore. Singapore was a great source of trouble and Indonesia could easily control it. In the same vein I replied that the Tunku would probably welcome it if she did. More seriously, I added that I was sure there were opportunities for mutually useful talks between the Indonesians and the Malaysians on barter trade, smuggling, and the general relationship of Singapore to Indonesia.
18. Sensing that there had been a considerable softening in Sukarno’s attitude, I asked whether he felt Indonesia could adopt a more favourable attitude towards Malaysia. The President replied that the people were now heated and it would take some time for them to cool down. Both Shann and I suggested that he could cool them down quickly. He laughed implying agreement, but insisted that it could not be done overnight.
19. The audience ended when he was called to attend one of his weekly economic committee meetings. Describing himself as a ‘kampong economist’, he said, ‘People say there is too much inflation. I don’t think there is too much inflation. What do you think?’ I avoided a direct answer by saying that I had only just arrived in Djakarta. He then suggested that I should stay longer and revealed a considerable degree of sensitivity about my failure to visit Indonesia since 1951. When I told him that I would like to stay longer but had to leave for Australia the same evening, he specifically asked that I should return on my way back to Kuala Lumpur.
Appreciation
20. Our agreed conclusions on the interview with the President are as follows:—
(a) Sukarno’s animosity towards the Tunku is important but not as virulent as we expected.
(b) Hurt pride appears to be more important factor: Sukarno specially resents that he and Indonesia are being criticised and that the Tunku accuses him of being controlled by the Communists.
(c) Sukarno’s basic opposition to Malaysia could be influenced by this hurt pride, but is expressed in terms of neo-colonialism and anti-communist phobia. I believe Sukarno genuinely distrusts the prospect of a pro-Western Malaysia which he regards as a Western anti–Communist plot that could be used against himself.
(d) An appeal based on Malay goodwill and readiness to look to him for leadership, as well as on the common interest of Malays and Indonesians, made a much greater impact than either Shann or I had expected.
(e) We are both convinced that this exercise has been well worth the effort and that by continuing to plug our concern at the deterioration of relations there is a possibility that we may be able to make a contribution to creating a breathing space before Malaysia and some relaxation of tensions.
(f) Neither of us can see the possibility of good relations between the two countries with their different ideologies in the foreseeable future.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 Addressed also to London EA.45; Washington SAV.61; Wellington SAV.22; and New York SAV.37.
2 See footnote 7, Document 29.
3 Des Alwi (Abubakar)—former Indonesian broadcaster and radio expert and member of the Indonesian foreign service. He had actively supported the separatist movement in 1958, for which he was exiled. He subsequently lived in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia.
4 Malaya officially informed Indonesia of the plans for the proposed Federation of Malaysia on 20 November 1961. Subandrio said in the General Assembly on 9 December 1961 that Indonesia had no problems with the proposals (see paragraph 4, Document 29).
5 See footnote 3, Document 30.
6 The Philippines cooperated with aspects of US support for the PRR1 rebels conducted in and through the Philippines.
7 Raden Adjeng Kartini is honoured as Indonesia’s first women’s emancipationist. She was a Dutch–educated Javanese princess, 1879–1903, who struggled against the restrictions imposed on women by feudal Javanese customs.
8 Amir Sjarifuddin. Prominent Republican leader in Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the Dutch, 1945–49.
9 The Alliance Party was the major political organisation in Malaya formed in 1952 to promote racial unity. It was a coalition of UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).