Jakarta, 6 March 1963
224. Top Secret Immediate
I have suggested to Moodie1 that Critchley should extend his visit to Djakarta on his way back to Kuala Lumpur by a day or so [so] that I can arrange some function at which he can meet some of his old buddies. This would be pleasant for him, very useful for me, and of some relevance to our relations with these people.
2. After thinking carefully about this I have concluded that it would be better if he were to return via Manila with the minister. I suspect that the Indonesians, especially Subandrio and, after his talk with Critchley, the President himself are beginning to see that a very active policy of ‘confrontation’ over Malaysia could be detrimental to their long term interests. I do not consider that they would give up altogether their opposition to Malaysia but I believe that they can be persuaded to tone it down enough so that we will not be forced to choose between Indonesia and Malaya.
3. There have been some odd and, in the context of the controlled Indonesian press, clearly inspired references to Australia’s anxiety to ‘mediate’ in the dispute between Malaya and Indonesia. I am sure that we can do something to cool this business down and Critchley is the only person I can think of who has the confidence of both sides.
4. Subandrio, accompanied by a pretty formidable wife and a galaxy of aides and seven press officers, proposes to go to Manila for an ‘indefinite’ visit on 8th March. He is said to be seeing Macapagal, Pelaez and Lopez2 on Malaysia. Much as he will dislike the suggestion, I think Critchley should be there too. What is more, our genuine concern over the gravity of the situation would be underlined by the attendance of the Minister and Critchley. It would impress the Indonesians even more were I to go too. Moreover I can probably do something with the Filipinos being on Christian name terms with both the President and Vice-President. I would also like the chance to talk to the Minister about the future of Australian relations with Indonesia which are of increasing concern to me.
5. Critchley might get over to the Filipinos the idea that the Malayans will genuinely entertain a claim to North Borneo after Malaysia is a fact. The Filipinos fear and dislike the Indonesians. Per contra the Indonesians despise the Filipinos as American stooges. It should not be a part of our policy to throw them into each others arms over something which the Filipinos are only serious about because the British and Malayans have angered them, and over which the Indonesians are using the Filipinos for their own ends.
6. It would be essential in any such exercise to make it abundantly clear that we do not (repeat not) wish to mediate in this matter. To begin with, the Minister would, I hope, think it wise to make our sympathy for the idea of Malaysia quite manifest—perhaps in a press statement on his departure or in Manila. What we must avoid is any appearance of neutrality in the affair. A policy of ‘no policy’ on West Irian may have been well enough3 but a policy of ‘no policy’ on Malaysia is no good. The Indonesians have the impression that we are afraid of them and that we would fear the results of a Malayan/Indonesian ‘confrontation’. But I do not believe that we will disabuse them of this idea (and of a tendency to seek to capitalise on it by drawing us into a position of equivocation) by simply making public statements in support of Malaysia. I believe that we have to drive home to Subandrio, and through him to Sukarno, the notion that Indonesian policy, if carried to its logical conclusion, would be regarded by Australia as being directed at our vital interests. This argument should not be presented in terms of a reluctant willingness on our part to choose between Malaysia and Indonesia but rather as stemming from our conception of the measures which we need to take to contain the threat of Chinese expansionism. In other words what we would say to the Indonesians would be that a principal aim of our policy is friendship with Indonesia. But a more important objective is containment of the Chinese threat and that if securing this latter objective is going to lead to a deterioration in Indonesian/Australians relations then we will just have t of ace that prospect. I am convinced that while they would not like this it is an argument which would greatly influence them.
7. As well, and in order to convince the Indonesians that they themselves are not faced with a simple choice between opposition to Malaysia and the enmity of Australia, we should develop the theme that a policy of active ‘confrontation’ against Malaya would not be in Indonesia’s own best interests. Critchley did a superb job here in sowing seeds of doubt in the mind of the originator of the anti-Malaysian idea, who is Subandrio. The Minister could develop further this notion that the respect with which Sukarno is regarded in Malaya could be irrevocably damaged by a policy of ‘active confrontation’. While this argument might be expected to appeal to Sukarno’s personal vanity it ought as well to have a significant impact on Subandrio’s sense of real politik. It is Indonesian policy to undermine the Tunku but I think they can be brought to realise that the extravagant pursuit of this ambition could simply create strong opposition to Indonesia among Malays who had previously looked to Indonesia and Sukarn of or leadership and guidance.
8. While the Indonesians probably cannot be brought to abandon a formal public position of opposition to Malaysia and covert operations against it, an approach along the lines I contemplate should mean that we will not be presented with the kind of challenge that we simply cannot ignore. For obvious reasons this would be disastrous. If we have any sort of spunk we must plump for the Malayans, and the long term result, in terms of our relations with Indonesia, would be pretty awful and indeed eventually suicidal.
[NAA: A1209, 1963/6637 part 1]
1 Colin Moodie, Assistant Secretary, Administration, DBA.
2 Salvador Lopez, Philippine Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
3 On 12 January 1962, Menzies had stated that Australia was not a party principal to the West New Guinea dispute, and would recognise a Dutch–Indonesian agreement freely reached.