Manila, 12 March 1963
181. Confidential
Malaysia
The Minister was received this morning by President Macapagal with whom he talked for about 40 minutes.
Minister told Macapagal that Cabinet had recently given serious thought to the future of Malaya and Borneo Territory and had come to the conclusion that from the point of view of Australia’s interests, Malaysia should come into being without delay. This decision had been reached after consideration of all aspects of the problem, including the possibility that it might involve some military commitments. As far as we could see, there was no alternative to Malaysia. The British could not remain in Singapore and Borneo Territory. An independent Singapore would fall easy prey to Communists, while a separate Borneo State had little chance of survival. We had been greatly concerned by development of conflict over this issue between neighbours with whom we sought friendly and stable relations, and we hoped that it would be possible to tone down or contain this conflict so that Malaysia could come into existence without hostility from its neighbours.
2. Macapagal did not go through usual list of Filipino complaints against Malaysia. He said he and his colleagues had become worried at developments of the conflict and believed everything possible should be done to reach a basis for agreement between the three countries concerned. If Malaysia were rammed through, categorically ‘launched complete’ against the declared opposition of the Philippines and Indonesia, there could be no stability in the area. For the Philippines part, they asserted a legal claim to portion of North Borneo and they felt it would strengthen their security to administer this territory. (He tried to draw a parallel here between Australia and East New Guinea.) They would like to be assured that whatever rights they might be entitled to would not be prejudiced. On the other hand, Indonesian opposition to Malaysia was based principally on their view that Malaya was hostile to them. The Philippines considered that these were differences which might be eased by discussions between the three countries, and they had, therefore, proposed the tripartite talks announced in the press that morning (see telegram 174).1 The President said that he felt very sure that these talks would have a good effect, in removing impressions that views of Philippines and Indonesia were being unceremoniously brushed aside.
3. The Minister agreed that talks between the three countries on matters of common interest could be useful provided they were not [intended to]2 delay the formation of Malaysia. The Philippines wanted to pursue dominant claims by convincing means and not by force and, even if successful, would not wish to take over territory without a plebiscite. This could be discussed as could Indonesia’s apprehensions and possibly the Malayans could give certain assurances. However, the processes for the formation of the new federation had advanced s of ar that only harm could come from delay in implementing them. Delay would intensify opposition, undermining the position of the Singapore government and in the final analysis weaken Malaya which would be against the interests of us all. He felt that the 3 nations should draw closer together and that a strong Malaysia was in their common interest as well as in Australia’s.
4. Macapagal agreed that Australia’s security interests were the same as those of the other three countries. History had determined this by making them neighbours. He said that the proposed talks were not intended to delay formulation3 of Malaysia. The proposed time table would permit them to be concluded in April. They might not produce agreement, indeed he was not optimistic that they would, but in any case he believed that they would be valuable in relieving frustrations by permitting all to express their views.
5. The Minister said that he thought there was wisdom in the proposal to hold talks at a lower level before they took on a ‘summit’ which would pose special queries and would have to be most carefully prepared. Macapagal confirmed that this was the intention of the ‘three level’4 arrangements for the talks which they had proposed.
6. The Minister enumerated numerous steps which had been undertaken to consult public opinion in the Borneo territories and said that he did not believe that anything more could usefully be done in this direction. He felt there was ample demonstration of factual support for Malaysia. Macapagal did not dispute this. The Minister went on to point to the degree of autonomy which would be enjoyed by the Borneo territories under the proposed distribution of power. Macapagal listened to this without comment.
7. The Minister said that he expected to talk to Subandrio later in the day and would attempt to find out the precise basis of Indonesia’s objections to Malaysia. It might then be possible to consider what might be limitations to meet these without delaying the formulation of Malaysia.
8. Canberra please pass to other addresses.5
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 12 March. It set out the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department statement of 11 March, which announced the possibility of ministerial tripartite talks and advised that Macapagal had first broached the suggestion in a conversation with Razak and Subandrio on 9 March.
2 Text corrupted in original here. See reply in paragraph 4.
3 Presumably, ‘formation’.
4 Macapagal’s plan for tripartite talks between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines proposed initial talks at the level of senior officials from the respective foreign ministries, followed by talks at ministerial level and finally a summit between the three leaders.
5 Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.