Canberra, 18 March 1963
73. Secret
Following1 for your background information, is record of Minister’s conversation with Subandrio in Manila on 13th March.2
Begins:—
‘Following is a record of my discussions with Subandrio yesterday and today. At my encouragement Subandrio led off with a rehearsal of the Indonesian arguments against Malaysia. We have already heard all of them from Djakarta and through Critchley. He complained bitterly of the behaviour of the Malayans and in particular the Tunku. The Indonesians had known from their intelligence reports of Malayan attitudes towards Indonesia, but these had now become public documents and common knowledge. Subandrio gave me a largely inaccurate account of Indonesian behaviour which was, he claimed, one of restraint in the face of provocation. The Malayans were trying to encourage anti-Sukarno forces; they accused the Indonesian Government of being dominated by the P.K.I.; they had supported the rebellion in 1958; they harboured and subsidized Sumitro; and they used Des Alwi in their propaganda machine. As far as propaganda is concerned, the Indonesians have not yet so far retaliated, but they are now preparing to mount direct propaganda from Sumatra bases. He said that very recently forged Rupiah notes had been circulated in Kalimantan and he saw quite clearly they had come from Malaya.
2. The objective of the Indonesian Government was the building of a unified society. Their economic problem which, according to Subandrio, was not a big one, would now be tackled. He reiterated that the first task—before economic tasks—was the creation of their social structure and their national ideology. They had been through bad times and their situation was quite unlike that of a country like Australia which was stable. They could not afford the distraction of hostile forces around their borders.
3. He showed particular resentment, at the manner in which Malaysia had been pushed through, and heat3 that it was being said it would be pushed through if need be by force without any consideration of the feelings or views of Indonesia. There had been no proper consultation. It was for this reason that Indonesia favoured a conference between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines to start afresh. Maybe this would result in the formation of a Malaysia with similar borders but it would be an ‘improved’ version. He conceded that China was always in the back of Indonesian minds as a long-term threat and that it was the basic long-term problem of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Indonesia. He did not think that Malaysia would make any contribution to the meeting of this threat.
4. I did not interrupt his voluble and often illogical exposition, but I then put to him several points on which I thought we could establish agreement as the basis for our discussion of the problem of Malaysia—
(a) We were agreed that the long-term threat to the area was China—China in any case, but worse if under control of Communists;
(b) We could agree that there was a pressing need for stability in the area and a cooling-down of what I described as ‘intra-Malay’ disputes;
(c) He must understand that Australia in no way wished to disturb the unity of Indonesia. We wanted a strong Indonesia and we would have no part in any plans to promote its disintegration.
5. Then, and on a number of occasions thereafter, I indicated that I did not regard Malaysia as negotiable. It would happen and could not, in our view, be put into the melting-pot. Australia had carefully considered the whole question and had firmly made up its mind that it was in our best interests, even if support for it had possible military implications. There might well be something to be said for a conference between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, but not a conference to discuss whether or not Malaysia should happen or should appear in a ‘revised version’, or should be delayed. The Indonesians must understand the logic of the Malaysia entity. One of their basic arguments over West Irian, and one which Australia had in the end accepted, was the unity of Indonesia as a country developed from the whole of the area of Dutch rule. In an entirely similar way Malaysia was a sensible method of dealing with the British area of colonialism in South East Asia, with its common administrative and other traditions. We in Australia were satisfied with the processes of consultation and that there was an acceptance in the Territories of the concept of Malaysia.
6. I told Subandrio that we realized fully Indonesian national interest in this question, but I queried whether Indonesia would like a prolonged discussion of self-determination or the holding of referenda in North Borneo in the context of what had happened and apparently what they hoped would happen in West Irian. Our view at the time of the dispute over West Irian had been that the Dutch and the Indonesians had the right to deal with New Guinea and to do so without consultation of the local people. He was well aware, I said, of our view-point on Dutch sovereignty, and their legal right to deal with West Irian by negotiations with the Indonesians. This applied with equal force to British sovereignty in the area and British rights to deal with Malaysia in a comparable way, though in the present case there had been extensive consultations with the local people. It was easy to explain why Malaysia was a correct and proper way of dealing with a Chinese communal problem especially as regards Singapore. Philippine claims could be dealt with after Malaysia had come into being and the Malayans had made it clear that they were prepared to let the matter come to the ICJ4 and if the decision went against them hold a referendum.
7. During yesterday’s conference I asked Subandrio, I think on five occasions, the following question—if something could be done about securing Indonesian worries about Malaysia as a threat to Indonesia, along the lines of undertakings by the Malayans not to engage in activities directed against the Indonesian Government, against the unity of the country, against Sumatra, and to declare a policy of non-aggression and non-interference in Indonesian affairs, would Indonesia be prepared to accept Malaysia on time? Australia believed that Malaysia was right and it believed that all of our interests would be so much the better served if it came into being without Indonesian opposition and hostility. We would be prepared without in any way condoning any idea of delay, or revision or abandonment, of the project to assist in solving the intra-Malay dispute if we only knew on what conditions the concept could be acceptable to Indonesia. Conferences as envisaged at official, ministerial, and summit levels would be worse than useless if what was to come out of them was not clearly conceived in advance. We might also be prepared to use our influence with the British in this regard if we only knew exactly what it was that would reassure the Indonesians about Malaysia and enable them to accept it. I stressed again that this was a matter for the exercise of British sovereignty by act of Parliament (as in the case of the Dutch) and their minds and ours were firmly made up. We had reached a careful judgment that this was in the best interests of the whole area which would at some day face a common threat.
8. Subandrio would not be pinned down yesterday to an acceptance of unrevised Malaysia in clear terms. Pinning this chap down is no easy task. He did, however, at one point admit that he would, under the conditions of certain clear undertakings from the Malayans, accept Malaysia, but that I could not expect him to say so publicly at this stage. He also fully accepted the position about the Chinese which was ‘in the back of the minds of Indonesia’ always, and he returned to the idea of joint military exercises between Australia and Indonesia and the growing up of trust and understanding between people who in the end would form a natural grouping, and finally, although no alliances could be contemplated at present, might one day be brought together by ‘agreements’.
9. I stressed again the need for us to know what it was about Malaysia which bothered the Indonesians, in clear and precise terms, if we were to help in solving problems which arose out of policies which had been adopted and which I frankly told him would run Indonesia ‘on the rocks’, and which would destroy its relationship with Malayans generally, and its role of leadership in the Malayan world. I got in response a great deal about public excitement and opinion in Indonesia, the attitude of the Army, and the difficulties which Subandrio would have in dealing with them or in advocating a change in present policies. I told him I did not think President Sukarno would have too much of a problem in leading his people away from the present course.
10. We returned to the idea of a conference between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines and the need for a clear purpose for such discussions in the context of knowing that Malaysia was a fact that would come into being. Subandrio then and on a number of other occasions stressed that a change in Malayan behaviour (their statements, their harbouring of rebels etc., and an exposition by them of the real reasons lying behind the formation of Malaysia) would be a ‘really important first step’ in making the idea acceptable.
11. Subandrio is clearly wedded to the idea of delaying the formation of Malaysia, thereby encompassing if possible, the destruction of the idea. He can no longer be in the slightest doubt of where we stand and why. I warned him against summit meetings on this question because of the personalities involved, and suggested that at ministerial level, given a clear purpose, this thing could be fixed up and that we would be happy to help if only we knew how. He must understand above all that disunity, toppling of the Government, and a weak Indonesia were not any part of Australia’s policy. We would not and did not support rebellions against the Indonesians. As far as yesterday was concerned, we left it at that; I suggested he might like to think about it and talk again today. This he readily agreed to do. It is interesting to note that he conceded the British right to bring Malaysia into being as proposed—and said, as I knew to be a fact, that he had so informed Home5—that at no stage did he offer the argument about neo-colonialism or unacceptability of Malaysia in any event because it was only a neo-colonialist device.
12. We then had a brief discussion about the need to press on with co-operation over border demarcation; over the need for a clear statement of Indonesian intentions to let bygones be bygones in West New Guinea in the context of political refugees, and over the question of quarantine. I also warned Subandrio about the nature of the Australian Peace Committees,6 and the undesirability of involving Indonesians like Mrs. Chaerul Saleh7 in their activities when, as was likely, the communist nature of the activities of these Committees was exposed. It would be unfortunate for our relations if it could be shown that prominent Indonesians had been associated with them.
13. I saw Subandrio again early this morning. He was quiet and said he had given great thought through the night about what I had said. He rambled at first over part of the ground of yesterday, but I brought him to the point—was the proposed conference merely part of a campaign to torpedo Malaysia at all costs, or was it a genuine effort to find a means of easing tension and of presenting the creation of Malaysia so as to obtain both Philippine and Indonesian acceptance. I reiterated that I could have no part in any endeavour to torpedo Malaysia and reminded him of my already expressed views. But I conceded that I was coming to think—though I had made no decisions—that a conference to ease tensions could be useful. He then adverted and produced as much show of heat as I might have expected to the Tunku’s latest outburst.8 This, of course, was not easy to parry, but I said that he must be careful in reacting to such a statement. He denied any expansionist tendencies on the part of Indonesia, but he could easily say so much in a hot reply as to confirm the suspicions which so many had. He reiterated the absence of expansionist actions or of any desire to have the administration of the Borneo Territories and considered the risks of a warm reply to the Tunku. I then asked him whether an exposition of the Malaysia proposals, exposing the extent of the independence which the Territories would have—much as I had done for him the previous day—and of the reasons for their federation with the existing Malay states, these reasons negativing the suggestion of expansionism of Malaya or of encirclement, together with reassurance as to Malayan adherence to Bandung principles of non-interference9 and of Malayan expression of willingness to explore areas of Malay co-operation in the area generally, would enable him to ‘sell’ Malaysia to his people—notwithstanding the exchanges that have already taken place. He said that this would be a good step and that he was trying to achieve something of this sort. I said I did not understand this reference to a first step. I said talking without some clear idea of where you were going was not quite good enough. But it was clear to me that either the officials who are to meet here have as yet no real instructions as to what courses they are to pursue, and that they are being told to consider points of ‘re-editing’ the Malaysia proposals which might be lifted up to ministerial or even summit level, I could really not get a clear indication. After a good deal of circling round, I told him that I would be thinking through the day about my attitude to the proposed conference. Could I on my thinking assume that he could accept Malaysia in substance as a practical solution of the emergence of the Borneo Territories, if as a result of conferences Indonesian national sensibilities which had been aroused and Indonesian apprehensions as to attacks on her unity could be removed—and that he felt that this was possible as a result of talks between the three countries. He said I could make that assumption. I then ascertained that he would be leaving for Djakarta this evening (5 p.m.). I counselled him against sharp reactions in press statements and to be restrained, giving any conference the best chances. He claimed that he had been restrained, but that the Tunku made things almost impossible for him. I said I would phone him before he left. I should add that I did have a short talk with him on cultural exchanges arising out of a chance remark of his as to dancing.’
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 Barwick’s record of his discussions with Subandrio in Manila was not cabled from that post, and appears to have been carried back to Canberra by the DBA officer, Graeme Lewis, who had accompanied Barwick to Manila.
2 Barwick had held two discussions with Subandrio, the first in the late afternoon of 12 March and the second on 13 March.
3 Possibly, ‘heard’
4 International Court of Justice.
5 Lord Home, Alexander Douglas-Home, UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
6 The Australian peace movement had strong links with the trade union movement in Australia, and organisations and groups belonging to the movement at this time were suspected of being communist ‘fronts’.
7 Wife of Chaerul (Chairul) Saleh, Indonesian Minister for Basic Industries and Mining, who was planning to visit Australia with the Indonesian Peace Committee. On 21 March, Barwick raised the matter of this proposed visit again with the Indonesian Ambassador in Australia, Brigadier General Suadi, and obtained an assurance that he ‘appreciated the Minister’s point of the nature of the Australian Peace Committee, and was in fact planning to steer the visitors away from … [them] as much as possible’.
8 See footnote 3, Document 49.
9 See footnote 3, Document 47.