Canberra, 18 March 1963
Secret
I would like briefly to report on my visit to Manila in so far as it affected Malaysia. I talked with Macapagal, Pelaez and Subandrio. I had in attendance Cutts with the Filipinos and Shann with the Indonesians.
I should tell you that some time before I left for Manila, Suadi presented me with a piece of paper putting Indonesian views against the creation of Malaysia.1 These I had answered orally, of which conversation I have given Suadi a written account2 for transmission to his Minister.
I saw Pelaez after the President had spent two hours with him on the same day. From Pelaez, I heard the Filipinos’ objections to Malaysia and put my answers to them. In all interviews, both with the Filipinos and the Indonesians, I took the stand that we had decided that Malaysia as planned, including its time table, was in Australia’s interest, that we had been mindful of the possible effects of our decision on our relationship with our Asian neighbours and upon our possible military involvement. But we were clearly convinced of the propriety of Malaysia and that both Filipinos and Indonesians should realise the existence of an Australian interest in its coming into being.
The President did not repeat the arguments with which I had dealt in my interview with Pelaez. He took the ground that he believed in their legal claim, that their possession of North Borneo was important for their security, and that there had been insufficient consultation. He also thought that a wider Malayan grouping was desirable. He proposed tripartite talks. I said I could not go along with talks which were designed to delay or frustrate Malaysia but that I could see merit in talks to clear misunderstandings, to remove tension, to provide for resolution of the legal claim and to further Malay co-operation. I obtained the distinct impression that Macapagal realised that Malaysia was going to happen, that he genuinely would like a reduction of Indonesian opposition, that he would be glad to be off the hook himself and would regard the reservation of his legal claims, with the concession that if successful he would submit to a referendum, and the holding of tripartite talks, even if unsuccessful, as warrant for his doing no act in opposition to Malaysia. He is somewhat unpredictable. To my view he is offended that too little credence has been given to the Filipinos’ legal claim (which has been his baby for a long time) and by the evident disdain with which Rahman treats him.
Subandrio did not repeat any of the matters he advanced through Suadi, other than the fear of Malayan subversive activity against Indonesia, particularly in Sumatra. He took the ground that the Tunku had ignored them both in relation to the formation of A.S.A. and the creation of Malaysia, that he had disclosed a deep hostility which promised to translate itself into activity against Indonesian unity and that Malaysia would increase opportunities for such activities. Oddly enough, he conceded to me the British right to create Malaysia—as he had to Alec Home—and did not at any stage or in any form advance the neocolonialist argument. Although a difficult, and perhaps risky exercise, I did conclude that he had come to realise the consequences of his policy of confrontation, that the firmness of the British and ourselves was registering. I also gathered that Indonesia could find a way to live with Malaysia if Malaya offered reassurances that no attempt was being made to dismember Indonesia. I told him that I would not be a party to any delaying or torpedoing of Malaysia, but that I could go along with a conference, preferably at no higher than ministerial level, to reduce tension, receive reassurances—as for example a clear mutual reaffirmation of Bandung principles of non-interference—and to lay some ground for future Malay cooperation after Malaysia had come into being.
Consequently I endorsed the President’s proposal in terms which I think had their effect on the subsequent press interviews which Macapagal and Subandrio gave. You will have seen reports of these much less menacing statements. Since his return Subandrio has received Soekamo’s endorsement of the proposed conference—there being no repetition of the implacable attitude which was expressed to Critchley by Soekamo. But, of course, there is no certainty in these matters.
I sent the Tunku a fairly direct message in the hope that we could induce his silence. So far the effort seems promising and there may be a chance that he will seize the opportunity for talks in which if he is at all adept I think he could repair the damage and see Malaysia bom with less, if not without, hostility.
I hope you are able to write to Kennedy3 to impress on him the danger of allowing the Indonesians or the Russians to conclude that America is indifferent to the creation of Malaysia. American firmness, even without commitment, may yet be pivotal. Harriman’s attitude of treating Malaysia as a British responsibility can be carried too far if it gives the impression of American softness.
Generally I feel Australia has been useful in the matter so far as it has as yet progressed.
[NAA: A1209, 1963/6637 part 1]
1 Presented on 28 February, the Indonesian paper said that Malaysia was being created in the face of opposition of the peoples of the Borneo territories; that political leaders opposing Malaysia had been detained in Singapore; and that consideration should be given to the concept of independent Borneo states. It also referred to the expansionist ambitions of Tunku Abdul Rahman.
2 Not published.
3 Reference to a proposed letter from Menzies to US President John F. Kennedy on US policy towards Malaysia, which in early March Cabinet felt might be sent with good effect. A draft was presented to Menzies on 23 March but was accompanied by advice from the Secretaries of both PMD and DBA against sending such a letter at head of state level. The letter was not sent and the matter assigned to be handled by Beale with the US State Department.