Canberra, 29 March 1963
Top Secret Personal
I refer to the Cabinet Submission by the Minister for Defence and the Minister for External Affairs on the subject of Australian Association with the Malaysia Defence Agreement.2 The Submission is No. 582.
This paper was before the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence at its meeting last night. The formal minute of the discussion is to the effect that the Committee has deferred decision as to Australia’s defence relationship with Malaysia until Malaysia is in being, or in other words until the issue comes up in a more concrete way.
However, I feel that I should let you know something of the tenor of the discussion for your background purposes. There was a view, which appeared to me to be strongly held, that Australia should be prepared to undertake a more direct responsibility for the defence of Malaya. I qualify that immediately by adding that this was in no sense to be the major responsibility. It would expect other partners, namely the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Malaya—and the United Kingdom particularly—each to bear its full part. I took it, although this was not said directly, that the Ministers would think in terms of becoming a party to a Malaysian Defence Agreement with specific responsibilities, rather than in terms of merely associating ourselves with a United Kingdom/Malaysia Agreement. Or if not that, at any rate in terms of having some arrangement of a firm and committing sort. It was felt that the more definite relationship would have advantages, including some inhibiting implications for Indonesia if it should have aggressive ideas towards Malaysia.
On the question of the British share of the Malaysia defence responsibilities, it was agreed that the Minister for External Affairs should take the opportunity, when he is in London during the next week or two, to speak to his opposite numbers in the British Government with the objective of stiffening the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia.3 For this purpose he may exhibit a readiness on our part to recognize our own interest in the defence of Malaysia, and therefore to assume some responsibility. But the main objective will be to stress British interest and commitment and our expectation that they will meet their defence responsibilities in full.
I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Hicks.
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 13]
1 Sir John Bunting, Secretary, PMD.
2 The joint submission from Townley and Barwick, dated 4 March, set out the three possible courses open to Australia: ‘(i) to become a party to the United Kingdom-Malaysian Agreement; (ii) to decline to associate ourselves with the new arrangements; or (iii) to associate ourselves with the revised United Kingdom- Malaysian Agreement on a similar basis to our present association’.
3 Barwick was to have talks with the British Prime Minister and senior UK Government officials in London, commencing 4 April, before attending the SEATO meeting in Paris on 8 April.