Canberra, 13 April 1963
1273. Secret Priority
Talks in Kuala Lumpur1
We do not have specific suggestions for discussion other than what will be in your mind already and what Critchley may suggest. We have sent message to Kuala Lumpur on smuggling2 and on relations between the Singapore and Federation Governments.
2. There is a strain of uneasiness among the Malayans about the direction of our policies. You may recall a period earlier in the year when the Tunku publicly gave us implied warning against Indonesian professions of friendship. During your absence the Malayan High Commission approached us under instruction from Ghazali to enquire about the strength of our support for Malaysia. There is a group within the External Affairs Ministry which favours a ‘tough’ line with Indonesia and which thinks our attitude is ‘ambivalent’.3
3. This should not be exaggerated nor should it be dismissed. We would imagine that such symptoms of concern can be traced not to our attitude on the defence commitment question but rather to the oversimplified thinking of the Malayans on the great problems in which they are involved. We doubt whether they grasp what we are seeking to achieve with Indonesia.
4. You might consider speaking candidly about Indonesia. You could let the Malayans know that you have assured the Indonesians that we would not be a party to efforts to destroy the territorial integrity of Indonesia. You might explain our view that Indonesia is animated by a strong sense of nationalism which for better or worse is a powerful force; and that Indonesia despite its current weaknesses and failures will profoundly affect the political destinies of the region. This is well understood by the Russians who give very high priority to their relations with Indonesia. We have concluded that:—
(i) We must work seriously and with purpose to draw Indonesia away from the communist powers and the more extreme Afro-Asian elements.
(ii) Indonesia must be afforded a substantial role in the region. This has its risks but a new closer relationship with its neighbours would impose its own restrictions. There are prospects of Indonesia realising that its own future security is linked with the welfare and stability of its neighbours.
(iii) The aggressive and expansionist elements both inside and outside the Indonesian Government must be firmly checked by clear and unmistakable awareness of where our national interests lie and of the consequences of their intrusion into these areas.
(iv) Relations with Indonesia must be a major part of the foreign policies of Australia and Malaya.
5. Critchley will have views about how strong a dose of this medicine can be administered. We hope it would assist realistic discussion of matters relating to the tripartite talks and even more sensitive matters like the importance of able Malayan representation in Djakarta.4 The Malayans have long neglected their relations with Indonesia.
6. You will find that the Malayan appreciation of Indonesian internal politics is seriously deficient although the Tunku believes his own intelligence on Indonesia is of a high order. You may wish to foster processes which will allow us to keep them informed of our appreciation of trends within Indonesia.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 10]
1963 Tripartite Talks
During the ECAFE Conference in Manila, 12–13 March 1963, President Macapagal of the Philippines sought a rapprochement between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines and proposed a series of tripartite talks. These talks began with a sub-ministerial conference held in Manila 15–22 April. The officials drew up a provisional agenda for a Foreign Ministers’ conference, expected to be held in mid-May, and agreed in principle on a meeting of Heads of Government.
The anticipated ministerial meetings did not take place as both the Indonesian and Malayan Governments continued to issue statements highly critical of the other. In late May, however, while Sukarno was meeting with President Macapagal in Manila, an invitation was extended to Tunku Abdul Rahman to meet privately with Sukarno in Tokyo, where the Indonesian President was next due to visit. The Tunku agreed and the two leaders met on 31 May and 1 June 1963. At the conclusion of their talks, they announced that their respective governments would endeavour ‘to refrain from making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other’, and that they had arranged a tripartite ministerial conference to be followed in due course by a summit meeting.
Tun Abdul Razak, Dr Subandrio and Senor Pelaez met in Manila 7–11 June. They discussed the problems arising from the formation of Malaysia, including the Philippine territorial claim, and sought common ground on the maintenance of regional stability and security. The Manila Accord resulted, which put forward the Maphilindo concept of a loose confederation of the three states, first proposed by Macapagal in July 1962. It was agreed also that there would be no opposition to the inclusion of Sarawak and North Borneo in a Malaysian federation, if an independent and impartial survey ascertained that this was the will of the people of these territories. This effectively postponed the date for the establishment of Malaysia until the results of the survey were published. The Foreign Ministers also recommended that a summit conference to endorse these agreements be held by the end of July.
However Sukarno’s adverse reaction to the setting of the date fo r the establishment of Malaysia as 31 August, with the initialling of the London Agreement on 9 July, put the summit in doubt. On 23 July Macapagal issued invitations to Sukarno and the Tunku to attend a summit conference in Manila opening on 31 July. The Tunku accepted immediately, but Sukarno only agreed to attend after a last minute appeal by Macapagal. After six days of talks the summit ended on 5 August with the ratification of the Accord reached the previous month by the Foreign Ministers, and the issuing of a Manila Declaration and Joint Statement. The Declaration set out the basic principles for the eventual formation of Maphilindo on the basis of regular and frequent consultations. The Joint Statement requested the UN Secretary-General, as an independent and impartial authority, to ascertain whether the electorate had indeed exercised free choice at the elections held in North Borneo, December 1962 – June 1963, and in Sarawak, May – July 1963. All parties pledged to abide by the Secretary-General’s decision. It was agreed that the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo should be settled by negotiation, and should not be prejudiced by the territory s inclusion in Malaysia. A paragraph in the Joint Statement that caused concern to Western observers stated that the leaders agreed that foreign bases should not be allowed to be used to subvert the national independence of the three countries, and that the three would abstain from using collective defence arrangements to serve the particular interests of any of the major powers.
1 See Document 62.
2 A reference to the smuggling trade that operated across the strait between Singapore and the southern states of Malaya.
3 See footnote 1, Document 59.
4 The Malayan Ambassador to Indonesia, Dato Kamaruddin Al-Haj bin Haji Mohammad Idris, had been recalled at the end of January (see Document 20). He returned to Jakarta c. 19 April.