Kuala Lumpur, 4 July 1962
Secret
Minister’s Talks with the Tunku and Tun Razak
While in Kuala Lumpur on June 29th, the Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, had friendly discussions with the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak.1
2. The Minister’s discussions with Tun Razak were mainly concerned with the Federation’s Rural Development programme. Tun Razak took the Minister into the Rural Development Operations Room and explained the Plan in detail.
3. Tun Razak is Minister of Defence and the Minister took advantage of the meeting to discuss also the presence of Australian Forces in Malaya under the Defence Agreement. He pointed out that it was sometimes argued that the Federation Government would like the Forces to be withdrawn. This, of course, was not true. Their presence in Malaya was in the mutual interests of both countries and in the circumstances the Australian Government did not intend to withdraw them. Tun Razak agreed.
4. Following his meeting with Tun Razak, the Minister went to the Residency where he talked informally with the Prime Minister for approximately one hour. The Tunku told Sir Garfield that he had spent the previous evening reading the Cobbold Report. At first he had been angry; but as he read on he had become more and more disgusted and at the end could only describe the attitude of the British members of the Commission as ‘laughable’.
5. The Tunku criticised the views of the British members of the Commission along the lines reported in my telegram 283 of the 30th June.2 He said that with four of his Ministers he would be considering the Report in detail but he had already made up his mind that unless there was a change of British policy and agreement on the basis for Malaysia, there would be little point in his going to London. The Tunku emphasised that the major issue was that the British wanted to retain their present colonial structure under the British Governors. Even if Malayan sovereignty were conceded the Tunku pointed out that if he accepted a colonial structure it would irreparably discredit both him and his Government. The Tunku considered it essential that, after Malaysia, Governors should be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong3 and the Chief Ministers established for each State. He agreed that the Chief Secretary could continue as State Secretary and guide the new State Governments.
6. In addition to the points in my telegram, the Tunku ridiculed the proposal of British members of the Commission that the Federation should finance the rural development of the Borneo Territories.
7. The Tunku said the bulk of the Borneo people wanted independence. The opposing group were immigrants (Chinese). Similar fears to the Chinese fears in the Borneo Territories had been expressed by Chinese in Penang and Malacca when the Federation had got its independence.4 The British could see for themselves how well the Federation Government had done since independence and they would have to trust it to cope with the Borneo Territories under Malaysia.>
8. In the course of the discussion on Malaysia, the Tunku went on to criticise the British refusal to take strong measures against the communists in Singapore. He said the British wanted him to take over Singapore to clear up the mess but this was not fair and they should take action before Malaysia so that it could get off to a good start. For Malaysia to have to use the strong measures that were needed to deal with the Singapore communists would impose a heavy strain on the new state.
9. The Tunku stressed that his Malaysian proposals were designed to prevent communist subversion and to help the British. However, unless the British changed their policy, the task would be impossible. In that case Malaysia would have to be postponed.
10. When the Minister confirmed that he was going to Djakarta, the Tunku sympathised with him in his task ahead. The Tunku recalled his own efforts to mediate on the ‘West Irian’ problem.5 Senu6 (the Malayan Ambassador to Djakarta) had told him that Soekamo7 had approved his suggestions which were basically the same as the Bunker proposals.8 Subsequently the Indonesians had rejected them without even an opportunity for discussion. It was true that his proposals had not been accepted by the utch, but if Indonesia had accepted them he would have been in a position to tell the Dutch that unless they also agreed, the Federation would take the strongest stand against them.
11. No doubt smarting under the recollection of his own failure, the Tunku went on to warn the Minister that it would be a mistake to believe Soekamo would accept a peaceful solution of the ‘West Irian’ issue. The Indonesians wanted a distraction from their increasingly serious economic problems. Even if they got West New Guinea, they would not be content but they would turn their attention to other areas such as the Borneo Territories to divert the people from their domestic worries.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/10/11/4]
1 Barwick had spent 28 June — 1 July 1962 in Malaya as part of his first tour of Southeast Asia after assuming the External Affairs portfolio in December 1961.
2 Cablegram actually sent 1 July. Critchley reported that the Tunku had told Barwick that if he accepted the British views in the report, ‘he would lose his own self-respect as well as respect of his people’. He had claimed the British ‘wanted to use him to solve subversion problems while they continued in Administration of Borneo as before*. In particular, the Tunku had criticised the planned retention of the Governors as Chief Executives and regarded the suggestion to replace retiring expatriate Civil Servants with officers recruited in the UK as ‘impudence’
3 ‘Paramount Ruler’—Head of State. Like Malaya, Malaysia was to be a constitutional parliamentary monarchy with the position of king rotated every five years and elected by and from the traditional rulers of the states. The role was largely ceremonial, and included being nominal head of the armed forces, and being required to assent to all laws and cabinet appointments.
4 31 August 1957.
5 The dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the control of the territory of West New Guinea.
6 Senu Bin Abdul Rahman.
7 President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia.
8 Proposals put forward by former US diplomat, Elsworth Bunker, to broker a settlement between the Indonesians and the Dutch.