Manila, 8 June 1963
399. Confidential Priority
Tripartite Talks1
The atmosphere at the outset of the Ministerial meeting is one of unrelieved optimism. From press statement by Razak and Subandrio and opening speeches of the three Ministers success of the talks seems assured. Originally scheduled for one week they have been reduced to four days while arrangements for Razak and Subandrio to stay over for Philippines National Day celebrations on 12th June appears to presume that there will be something to celebrate. In all the statements it has been taken for granted that the present meeting will be followed quickly by summit.
2. This new-found optimism appears to stem largely from the Tunku-Soekarno meeting2 but, when one examines the respective positions of the three participants, it is not easy to discern a basis for decisive agreement.
3. The Philippines position remains basically friendly; they are committed to the success of the talks as an end in itself; their claiming of North Borneo is no longer an immediate issue. Lopez and Pelaez have both told me that they will press strongly for postponement of Malaysia and consideration of a Confederation as an alternative; but I doubt if they would prove obdurate if Malaya and Indonesia were to agree on another formula.
4. Malayans still insist that formation of Malaysia on 31st August is non-negotiable though, following Tokyo talks, they have agreed, publicly, to ‘discuss’ Malaysia and the problems arising from it. Razak told me that he believed the Tokyo talks had revealed a significant shift in Indonesian position and that the Malayans themselves would have to ‘give’ a little, probably in her arrangements for regional cooperation (in other words ‘‘Confederation’).
5. Subandrio told me that Indonesia had not agreed in Tokyo to accept Malaysia on 31st August. If he were faced with an inflexible Malayan position in this regard, he said, he would go home. They had struggled in Tokyo to discuss the whole problem in ‘brotherly’ fashion and he wanted to hear (and possibly be convinced by) Malaya’s case. But the Chinese in the proposed Federation were not solely the Tunku’s problem; they were also a threat to Indonesia. He was convinced that Malaysia could contain problems,3 instancing Indonesia’s own difficulties with fewer Chinese. He said firmly that Malaysia could not be established in face of Indonesian opposition. In answer to my enquiries regards the consequences following this, as he recognised, and regretted, this inevitable effect on relations between Indonesia and Australia.4 However he felt this was an unprofitable view as ‘we want to settle this with Malaya in a brotherly fashion’.5
6. Sometimes it is difficult to forecast where the current talks will lead. The tide of accord is running strong. We should not underestimate the emotional appeals to Pan Malay sentiment that are on everyone’s lips (including Razak’s). I believe the talks will not be permitted to end in disagreement. A formula will probably be found which will dwell heavily on regional and the Pan Malay theme.
7. We must remember that in all references to regional cooperation, it is assumed by all parties that Australia is part of the region. This has been underlined in a number of ways including our inclusion last night in a very small Presidential dinner for the three delegations. It is assumed (quite firmly by the Filipinos and the Indonesians) that we will welcome any move toward greater cooperation between people of the region. Any coolness on our part to whatever agreement might emerge from the current series of talks could lead to some re-assessment.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1 part 14]
1 See editorial note, 1963 Tripartite Talks.
2 That is, the meetings in Tokyo on 31 May and 1 June. The Tunku accepted Sukarno’s invitation to meet with him in Tokyo after the Malayan Cabinet considered the proposal, and decided with the Tunku that every opportunity had to be taken to normalise relations with Indonesia, and maintain peace in the region. The meetings between the two leaders were private with only Subandrio and Ghazali in attendance.
3 The context of this sentence would suggest that this should read ‘could not contain problems’.
4 Presumably, ‘In answer to my enquiries [regarding] the consequences following this, [he said] he recognised, and regretted, [the] inevitable effect on relations between Indonesia and Australia’.
5 Quotation marks inserted here in place of brackets in original document.