Manila, 13 June 1963
403. Confidential Priority
Tripartite Meeting
I called on Subandrio today at his request. He said he was anxious that the Australian Government should be informed of meeting and Indonesia’s attitude thereto. As he would be in Djakarta very briefly tomorrow, he would probably be unable to see Shann and he hoped I would deliver message. He hoped to have a long talk with Shann shortly.
2. Subandrio said that the Malaysia proposal had initially posed two problems for Indonesia:
First, that of Malaya itself and the fact that, rightly or wrongly, the Indonesians had regarded it as hostile and neo-colonial, and,
Second, doubts whether the proposed Federation could effectively check the Chinese threat.
3. The meeting in Tokyo between Sukarno and the Tunku had removed (at least 80%) Indonesia’s doubts on the first point. They were now satisfied that the Tunku was sincere and that they could have confidence in a Government led by him. While they still had doubts regarding proposed Federation they realized that independence for Borneo territories would not be a satisfactory solution. They would have to be integrated into the area as a whole and in the light of newly-found confidence in the Tunku Indonesia was willing that they should go with Malaya. With Indonesian friendship and support, he believed the Federation of Malaysia could handle its inevitable post-independence problems; by the same token, the Malayans could not hope to achieve a permanent solution (even with British or Australian support) in the face of active Indonesian opposition.
4. The Indonesian objection in principle to Malaysia having been removed by Tokyo Talks (Subandrio went on) there had remained the problem with which the three Ministers at the present meeting had been principally concerned, i.e. the date for Malaysia and the question of popular support. Indonesia would have preferred agreement to postpone the date, but he had not wished to become involved in a head-on collision over this question. As he had told me earlier, if the Malayans had taken an inflexible position on the date, he would have had to be equally firm and agreement would have been impossible. He had, therefore, taken the position that Indonesia would support Malaysia, providing there could be some demonstrated popular support for it within Borneo territories and that date was a secondary consideration. Agreement had been reached on a means of ascertaining the popularity of support which was contained in recommendation to Heads of State (but not in communique). It had been agreed that the Head of State should ask United Nations Secretary-General to advise on measures required to determine popular support and that the whole operation should be completed before the establishment of Malaysia. While it is not specified in the recommendations Subandrio assumes that the Secretary-General will appoint someone like Narasimhan, who will consult with the authorities and parties in the territories. Subandrio also assumes that the results of these consultations will be favourable to Malaysia (and will probably not involve any plebiscite). In that case, they will be prepared to support Malaysia against insurrection (by Azahari or anyone else) or subversion. As far as the date is concerned, if consultations can be concluded by 31st August, the Federation can be formed on that date, but he had put it to Razak (who had agreed) that Malayans should not unduly rush, or otherwise undermine validity of consultation process simply for the sake of proclaiming the Federation on 31st August rather than some days or weeks later.
5. Brief reference in paragraph 6 of communique to the Philippines claims to North Borneo had also (according to Subandrio) been spelt out in recommendation to Heads of State in the following sense—
(a) Malaya recognized the claim as ‘continuing and subsisting’ after the formation of Malaysia.
(b) Agreed that the Philippines was entitled to seek settlement claims by any of the means envisaged in the United Nations charter ‘including diplomatic negotiations, arbitrations, mediation, judicial and other internationally accepted means of settlement of the dispute’.
6. Subandrio said he considered fact that these problems had been dealt with amicably was noteworthy, but it was even more important they had been solved in the framework of an agreement for long range co-operation within the region. This guaranteed permanency of the solution. As far as Indonesia was concerned they were serious about development of machinery for the regional consultations and hoped substantial beginnings would emerge from the forthcoming summit meeting. However, they believed in starting modestly and proceeding cautiously. (Razak had expressed the same view to me.) Ultimate area of cooperation would be enlarged and include, he hoped, Australia and New Zealand.
7. Subandrio said that the most probable date for Summit appeared, in the light of various commitments, to be the middle of July.
8. Subandrio said one of the most satisfying aspects of the conference for him had been friendship with Razak, whom he admired extremely. He was glad Razak would be taking Foreign Affairs Portfolio in the Federation of Malaysia. Subandrio also said he felt Australia’s understanding and …1 were important for the future stability in the area. He asked how I thought the Government would react. I said I believed we would view with satisfaction developments of a sound basis of friendship between the three countries which were our friends and close neighbours.
9. Because of today’s National Day celebrations, I have not had an opportunity to discuss the meeting in detail with the other two participants. Razak told me last night that he was well satisfied with the result. He said he had particularly admired Subandrio’s part in the conference.
10. He considered that a ‘step by step’ approach to the development of regional consultations was most likely to pay off. He did not seem concerned at the possibility that agreed consultations might delay formation, for example, beyond 31st August. He appreciated the importance of the changed Indonesian position in relation to Malaysia’s future prospects.
11. I hope to see Pelaez Thursday or Friday.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/2/1 part 12]
1 Word unknown. Text corrupted in original.