June 1963
Secret
Agenda Item V
Malaysia
Sir Garfield Barwick introduced this item, saying that Australia had declared publicly and privately its support for Malaysia. Malaysia was the best solution for the territories concerned. Our statements had been made against a background of known Indonesian hostility to Malaysia. Australia’s strong support for Malaysia was based on objective factors, i.e. none of the territories could survive independently but each territory had sufficient background in common (currency, British traditions of government, etc.) to make federation a working possibility. Federation was a useful form of self-government.
In discussing the question of consultation, Sir Garfield said that there had been adequate consultation, although some people appeared to want more. There had been the Cobbold Commission, the Lansdowne Committee and the North Borneo elections (where Malaysia was an issue). In fact there had been a high degree of consultation and there was no room for more. Narasimhan probably did not appreciate the difficulties in his ideas for a plebiscite. A choice which included ‘independence’, an emotional issue, would prevent proper consideration of the practical issue. Loyalties to Malaysia would grow over time, but if a plebiscite were outstanding it would be an encouragement to subversion. Sir Garfield said he had tried to discourage Narasimhan but with what success he did not know. Australia had tried to take a hand with Indonesia despite the prospect of difficulties. Indonesia obviously had fears about Malaysia (the future of Sumatra, the possible success of Malaysia and the fear that Malaysia might be a gimmick to maintain the former colonial status).
Sir Garfield said he had therefore supported proposals for talks, not to negotiate Malaysia, but to provide for exposition and assurances. He thought the talks between the Tunku and Sukarno in Tokyo a promising step in Malayan-Indonesian relationships although he was not sure what the motivating force behind the meeting had been. It was important that the Indonesians should understand that there should be no military action in the area. Primarily, the bringing into being and supporting of Malaysia was a matter for the British and the Commonwealth but it was fundamental that the Americans be firm and that the Indonesians know it.
He thought that the Russians might foment division between neighbouring countries if the American position appeared uncertain. When the Federation came into existence there would probably be some trouble and he did not think that the Tunku and his Ministers fully realised the political arts and the administrative problems involved in government of areas which were not adjacent. There would be need for economic aid and for trained men from other Governments. There might be room for American economic aid to Malaysia. Defensive arrangements would be the concern of Britain and the Commonwealth, but he hoped the U.S. would be mindful of the need diplomatically (and at the end point militarily) to play its part.
Mr Holyoake said that New Zealand was very much in favour of Malaysia. Australia and New Zealand could well be involved militarily and this was not a good prospect.
Mr. Harriman answering Sir Garfield, said that he had explained to Razak in Washington that the United States could not take on another aid country but that there were other things, such as Export-Import Bank loans, which could be done outside an aid agreement. He hoped Australia and New Zealand would extend their military association with Malaya to Malaysia. If their forces were attacked openly in engagements in the Malaysia area then the ANZUS treaty commitments of the U.S. would come into play (he sought and obtained confirmation from a legal officer in the delegation on this point). Sukarno and Nasution said they had no direct military intentions and would not organize volunteers, but they were not wholly satisfactory on the subject of internal subversion. British and Commonwealth forces in Malaysia should be a deterrent to subversion.
Sir Garfield Barwick spoke of the need for firmness in dealing with Sukarno on the question of Malaysia as well as on other issues. Moral consequences did not matter with Sukarno but he did respect firmness. He understood the American position and was grateful for the President’s statement in support of Malaysia, but nothing should be done (or left undone) which would allow the feeling to grow up in Djakarta that the Americans were not absolutely firm.
Note:
The American delegation accepted a strong Australian draft in support of Malaysia in the ANZUS communique with one drafting change. The draft referred to the territories gaining and exercising their independence ‘as self-governing units of a federation, committing agreed areas of power to a central government in which they have appropriate representation’. The Americans baulked at this on the grounds that they had not concerned themselves with the internal structure of Malaysia and they suggested a simple reference to independence. Sir Garfield Barwick explained that this would be inadequate. He wanted it recorded that membership of a federation was a valid means of acquiring independence. Agreement was reached on the phrase ‘independence as constituent members of a federation’.
[NAA: A1838, 270/1/1 part 1]
1 See footnote 1, Document 73.