Canberra, 11 July 1963
Secret
Secret
Future Australian Defence Arrangements with Malaysia
While not taking a decision on the matter, Cabinet seemed dissatisfied with the recommendation that we should seek an association with the British–Malaysian Treaty which would be identical to the present association with the British–Malayan Treaty.2
2. The objections were that the commitments and undertakings were obscure and difficult to explain publicly and perhaps not strong enough. The Opposition has criticised the lack of precision. There are now some reports that the moderates in the Opposition would press for a change in the existing policy of calling for the withdrawal of forces from Malaya if their presence was regulated by a clear, unambiguous and public treaty.
A Separate Treaty
3. This note examines various forms of possible arrangements,3 starting with the idea of a separate Australian-Malay sian Treaty, the terms of which would accurately reflect the realities of the position. That is to say, an agreement which derives from our wish to station forces within Malaysian territory. The agreement would give us the right to continue to station forces in return for the assumption of negotiated and commensurate obligations. (The contract would lapse if we withdrew our forces.)
4. At first sight this seems an attractive idea, but there may be basic obstacles. While we may acquire the right to station forces in return for some general understandings about Malaysian security, it seems unlikely that we would easily acquire the right to deploy our forces freely for operational purposes; to make our own decisions about what constituted a threat to security or an act of aggression in South East Asia and to act unilaterally. This whole issue came to public notice over the question of the use of the Singapore bases. In November 1961, when the British and Malayan Governments agreed that the existing agreement should be extended to embrace the Malaysian Federation, as regards the base facilities in Singapore it was decided that Britain was to be permitted ‘to make such use of the bases and facilities as Britain may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of, and for the preservation of peace in, South East Asia’.
5. In so far as Australian forces in Malaysia are part of the Commonwealth Reserve they can be said to come within the scope of this language. While ‘Australia’ is not given these rights, the exercise of them extends to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve includes Australian Forces.
6. We very much doubt whether the Malayans would agree to give Australia the same rights as Britain negotiated in 1961 in a separate Malaysian-Australian agreement. What was done for Britain was explained as an extension of existing rights and as part of the negotiations whereby Britain’s sovereignty over Singapore was to be transferred to Malaysia. The Tunku’s acceptance of this language aroused great domestic interest in Malaya at the time. The open granting of the same rights to another country is something we could scarcely expect the Malayans to entertain. Viewing it from their side, the bargain would seem a thin one. There is also the British position to consider. We could expect them to obstruct our acquiring separate rights to what have been historically their bases, when the point of acquiring those rights would be to engage in operations to which they were not a party. Some things we could do now (e.g. withdraw air and naval forces). Whether or not we could move ground forces would probably depend more on political and logistic factors than treaty rights.
7. A second possibility is full signature of the British-Malaysian Defence Treaty, thereby converting it into a tripartite or, with New Zealand, quadripartite instrument.
8. The Treaty does not seem to be cast in a suitable form for this. It is basically a bilateral Treaty, with Britain accepting a very categorical commitment (which only a Great Power could properly undertake) to defend Malaysia and a whole series of responsibilities for staffing and financing the Malaysian Forces.
9. The undertaking of an unqualified commitment to defend Malaysia would hardly make sense for a relatively modest military power like Australia except perhaps under a broadly based collective security arrangement; hitherto we have regarded it as essential for the U.S. to be a party to such an agreement. It could leave us in difficulties if the British reduced their effort. It might aggravate our dealings with the Indonesians. Broadly, there seems no compelling reason why we should accept coextensive obligations with the British who have distinctive historical connections and commitments.
10. Moreover, a proposal along these lines could raise practical, political difficulties. The Federation Government has stressed all along that the existing Treaty should not be renegotiated but simply extended to cover Malaysia, subject to any necessary interpretative comment. The Federation Government has said that there would be real political risks in reopening the Treaty for parliamentary attention. No matter how ingenious a method of our adhering to the Treaty was evolved, it would appear that public and parliamentary discussion in Malaya of questions of substantial Treaty significance could not be avoided.
Letter of Association
11. If the above reasoning is accepted, we should concentrate our study on what we can do to improve the device of the letter of association.
12. Basically we think this is a sound device. The formula of the ‘Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’ has really brought us considerable practical benefit. It is true that there are several obscurities as to precise rights and obligations but as a whole the system has worked well over a number of years. We appreciate that from the Australian parliamentary aspect the removal of all obscurities might be deemed desirable, but some elements of vagueness have to be accepted as necessary for the Malayan Government.
13. While acknowledging some limitations, we think that the most fruitful course is to examine whether the wording of the letter of association could be improved upon and clarified in a way which would be welcomed by the Australian and Malaysian Parliaments. In his written reply to a question in the House on 27th March, 19634, the Minister said:— ‘… there is no formal military alliance between Australia and Malaya. But the security of Malaya is of direct concern to Australia, a circumstance which would undoubtedly influence the Australian Government in deciding whether or not the Australian component of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve should assist in the performance of the obligations incurred by the United Kingdom under the agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance….’5
14. The new letter of association might build on this statement (which would help Parliamentary explanation) and incorporate something along the lines of the following:—
15. The presence of Australian Forces in Malaysia is to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the area for the defence of the region. The security of Malaysia is of direct concern to Australia and in the event of a threat to Malaysian security the Australian and Malaysian Governments would consult together concerning the employment of the Australian component for the defence of Malaysia.
16. Alternatively, SEATO type language might be used in view of Australia’s implicit readiness under SEATO to assume defence obligations towards Malaysia. This is to the effect that one Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack against another Party would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in the event act to meet the common danger in accord with its constitutional processes.
16. We feel this declaratory-type language is not the most suitable in the circumstances. It was formulated with Chinese communism in mind and it lacks the careful restraint necessary in this context. As SEATO language it may not be attractive to the Malaysians still less to the Indonesians.6
17. Another objection is that we would prefer language which is closer in spirit to the Manila agreements of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. Following on from the first formula suggested above, the letter of association might include such further ingredients as:—
(i) An understanding that Australia, with the Federation’s approval, might carry out courses and programmes in the areas occupied and used for military purposes for the training of service personnel of Malaysia, other Commonwealth countries and other countries in the South and South East Asia region.
(ii) Some general wording to the effect that should the Federation enter into a regional grouping with neighbouring countries with defence and security aspects, the question could be examined of the regional obligations which might be incurred by Australia at the request of those countries and discharged through Australian Forces and facilities situated in the Malaysian Federation. (This, of course, would require very careful development not only as to the commitments that the Government could contemplate, but from the parliamentary and public aspects as well.)
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 13]
1 This paper was prepared for Tange’s discussion with Barwick on Australia’s future defence arrangements with Malaysia. The paper was then to be discussed with DD, and sent to Critchley for comment, in preparation for Cabinet’s reconsideration of the submission on this issue (No. 582—see Document 60) which had been deferred until after Malaysia was established.
2 See Documents 60 and 74.
3 DEA believed that the existing submission needed ‘some refinement and elaboration so as to embrace all the factors in this very complex question’.
4 Fred Chaney, the Government Whip, had asked the Minister to inform the House of Australia’s current defence obligations to Malaya, and whether any commitment had yet been made to Malaysia. See CPD, H. of R., vol. 38, 27 March 1963, pp. 130–31.
5 Ellipses in original document.
6 Malaya and Indonesia did not join the SEATO alliance when it was organised in 1954.