Canberra, 22 July 1963
497. Confidential
Reference your telegram No. 424.1
We were pleased, of course, to hear of the position adopted by U Thant.2 However, we think that a simple policy of ‘leaving it to him’ at the summit might not work and that the Malayans should be thinking about the kind of things we suggested. Subandrio gave the impression at Manila that the problem could be left to Narasimhan but it has become evident since then that the Indonesians need more ratification than that if they are to modify their emotional approach to Malaysia. Subandrio has stressed this with us strongly. He has also argued that the Manila language about a common approach to subversion in the region can only have value if there is an agreement that Malaysia represents the will of the people. Accordingly, we would not like the Malayans to think that U Thant is on side and all is well. Rather, they should gain confidence from U Thant’s attitude and be encouraged to think about procedures which, while they have at their core the part that the elections were satisfactory evidence, are at the same time designed to be as persuasive as possible with the Indonesians. The latter have committed themselves emotionally as well as politically on the self-determination issue and we should try and make the most of out it.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 9]
1 20 July 1963, in which Critchley reported a further conversation with Razak on 19 July about Malaya’s representations to U Thant (see also paragraph 8, Document 85).
2 Razak had said that U Thant had agreed that the Sarawak and North Borneo elections were satisfactory evidence of popular support for Malaysia, and had suggested that Malaya’s policy at the summit meeting on how the ascertainment process in the Borneo territories was to be conducted should be to have the matter left with him.