Manila, 2 August 1963
497. Confidential
Foreign Ministers met until late last night and will continue this morning. Leaders are scheduled to meet later this morning. Lopez announced last night that the Foreign Ministers had completed for submission to leaders a draft of ‘declaration’ which is ‘a statement of principles to which the three countries subscribed, of their common objectives and of the decision of the Heads of the Governments to establish Maphilindo on the basis of regular and frequent consultations’. Lopez also said that the Ministers had started work on the draft of a joint communique which would be completed at this morning’s meeting. Amongst the questions on which agreement had been reached were those concerned with areas of defence. Though Lopez did not say so, the presumption is that this communique will deal with questions of ‘ascertainment’.
2. Late last night Mackenzie delivered a reply from U Thant to the question put to him yesterday (our number 494,1 paragraph 2). U Thant said to conduct plebiscite or referendum he would need six weeks after receiving mandate from the General Assembly which, unless a special session were called, would not be likely to be obtained before October 15th. He also said a plebiscite would cost 400,000 dollars and that as the United Nations did not have funds for this purpose, cost would have to be borne by the parties.
3. British Charge d’Affaires (Peters)2 yesterday on instructions, informed the Tunku that Britain was not prepared to consider deferment beyond 31st August. Peters informed Mackenzie of this and was also authorised to inform the Filipinos and Indonesians. Tunku asked him to delay doing this and to enquire whether London could agree to limited tactical delay which would permit the Secretary-General’s representative to carry out fact finding mission in Sarawak and North Borneo. He said he was definitely not contemplating a plebiscite. London’s reply is still awaited but Peters this morning delivered message to Tunku from Sandys inspired by enquiry addressed by Summit to U Thant (our 494). Gist was that:
(a) Agreement to establish Malaysia on 31 st August, being multilateral, could not be altered without the consent of all parties;
(b) British could not agree to referendum on British territory, but were willing to accept visit of the Secretary-General or his representative before August 31st;
(c) Any further ‘ascertainment’ after 31st August would be a matter for the Malaysia Government.
4. Peters said the Tunku told him he would make final attempts this morning to get Sukarno and Macapagal to accept a visit by the Secretary-General’s representative before 31st August as representing ‘ascertainment’ agreement. If this were rejected he would tell them that as the United Kingdom would not agree to plebiscite while territory still British, a post-Malaysia plebiscite would be best thing they could hope for. He would cite West Irian and argue, as he did not consider a plebiscite necessary, Philippines and Indonesia should meet the cost. London had feared Tunku might have been weakening but Peters has reported that he appeared to be going into this morning’s meeting in good heart and fighting fit.
5. United States Ambassador3 called this morning to tell me that Washington is disturbed by the British inflexibility and are making representations to London. The Ambassador said reports from various American sources suggested that, but for the British, Malaya would be prepared to be a good deal more flexible, even to the point of accepting delays to permit a referendum. Americans were anxious the countries of the area should have the opportunity of working out their own future without outside interference and they felt that the British attitude, in so far as it might tend to frustrate this would earn them the blame for any break-down with possible damaging consequences for Western interests. I said that I agreed that it should be up to Tunku to decide what concessions he could afford to make provided there was no question of his being bullied into them by a ‘confrontation’. However, I did not think it likely that he would wish or could afford to agree to a pre-Malaysia referendum with delays and other complications that it could entail.
6. The Ambassador said Washington had sought his views on the possibility of a breakdown in the talks. He did not believe that this would occur and I said that I agreed with him. It must be admitted, however, that the talks are at present balanced on a knife’s edge. The approach proposed by the Tunku could lead either to long wrangling or to any early break-down. I am inclined to consider the former the more likely but would not be surprised by anything.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 9]
1 Document 94.
2 Theophilus Peters, First Secretary and Head of Chancery, UK Embassy, Manila.
3 William Stevenson.