Canberra, 8 August 1963
I have been giving some further consideration to the terms of the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement. In the result my anxieties are increased. I feel that Sukarno has had a very marked success and that the United Kingdom has been put in a highly embarrassing position. Once more Sukarno has succeeded in his policy of threats. Once more the United Nations Secretariat is being used (as in fact it was in West New Guinea) to make Sukarno’s victory respectable.
The third paragraph of the Declaration successfully lines up the Tunku with the current cant about ‘colonialism and imperialism’.1 In the context of the Declaration this is clearly directed at Great Britain, the former Colonial power in the case of Malaya and the present Colonial power in relation to Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. There is nothing to suggest that the criticism is being directed at the Communist Powers. I would have thought that it clearly was not, having regard to Sukarno’s continuing practice of putting himself under obligations to those powers.2
Paragraph 4 of the Statement puts it within the sole power of the Secretary-General to direct a plebiscite if in his opinion that is necessary to ensure ‘complete compliance with the principle of self-determination’. True the paragraph goes on to indicate certain matters which he has to take into account but I do not understand these to limit his general discretion.
When I look at the matters to be taken into consideration, it is quite clear that they require an investigation which in some ways will be prolonged.3 There will undoubtedly be allegations made that the electoral registers were not properly compiled. It will not be difficult to secure some alleged evidence of acts of coercion. The investigators are even to ascertain the views of those who were in gaol for political offences or were absent at the time of the poll from North Borneo or Sarawak.4
To make quite certain that dilatory tactics will be observed, paragraph 75 authorises Indonesia, etc., to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task by the working teams.6 All this time, Sukarno will maintain his pressure and make mischievous allegations.
By all these provisions Sukarno has successfully asserted his ‘interests’ in the internal affairs7 of two British colonies moving towards independence. I do not doubt that this will turn out to have grave consequences, the first of which will be that the establishment of Malaysia will be postponed, not for a few days or weeks but for a sufficiently long time to imperil the whole concept.8 The prompt establishment of Malaysia, with all its inherent weaknesses, would have been a great step in the direction of stability. Its postponement, while all the investigations and propaganda go on, will produce positive instability.9
I now turn to Paragraph 11 of the Declaration.10 Whoever suggested11 that British and Commonwealth military installations in Malaya and Singapore would be used to subvert the independence of Malaya or Singapore or the Philippines? It is notorious that their purpose is exactly the opposite. Why then has the Tunku lent himself to a statement which contains such a singular suggestion under the pretext of rejecting it. I can understand Sukarno’s position. He wants it established that these bases are not to be used against Indonesia whatever Indonesia may do in relation to its neighbours. I know that if it came to some form of war against Indonesian aggression, the purpose of the war on the British and Australian side would not be to subvert Sukarno’s independence; but he would certainly say so with, I gather, the strong support of the Afro-Asian Bloc.12
The final part of Paragraph 11 seems to me to be a direct blow at S.E.A.T.O. so far as the Philippines is concerned. Why should Great Britain, France, and the United States (‘the Big Powers’) join in S.E.A.T.O. except to resist the expansion of the Communist Powers? And while this resistance is a ‘particular interest’ for the South-East Asian nations, it is also a ‘particular interest’ for the ‘Big Powers’.13
I can very well be answered by the proposition that the paragraph is ambiguous and it may turn out to mean something quite different from what I feel it to mean. But if it is ambiguous Sukarno will unquestionably use it to proclaim his own interpretation and to make some mischief.
I think we are in great danger in taking and encouraging too soft a line with Sukarno. Like all the dictators he will get what he can by threat and bluff. Each concession made to him increases his appetite.
In short, I fear that the conference has resulted in
(a) a substantial success for Sukarno, and encouragement to him for the future;
(b) a clear retreat by the Tunku;
(c) a substantial and perhaps fatal postponement of Malaysia Day;
(d) no genuine basis for peace and friendship in the region.14
Perhaps you would turn over in your mind these observations and when I see you next week give me the benefit of your necessarily greater knowledge of the background of these events.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 10]
1 Paragraph 3 states ‘that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular and the world in general’.
2 Barwick highlighted the latter portion of this sentence.
3 The considerations were: ‘(i) the recent elections in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak, but nevertheless, further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether — (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue, (b) electoral registers were properly compiled, (c) elections were free and there was no coercion, and (d) votes were properly polled and properly counted, and (ii) the wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for political offences or absence from Sabah or Sarawak’. Barwick’s marginal note here read: ‘See actual outcome—earlier discussions my visit’.
4 Barwick here noted ‘window dressing—not many, if any’.
5 It read: ‘In the interest of the countries concerned, the three heads of government deem it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams, and the Federation of Malaya will use its best endeavours to obtain the cooperation of the British government and the governments of Sabah and Sarawak in furtherance of this purpose’.
6 Barwick’s comment: ‘Matter discussed perhaps not yet suitably settled’.
7 Barwick here wrote ‘NO’.
8 Barwick’s note: ‘Tunku agreed 16th deadline’.
9 On this point, Barwick wrote: ‘Has always been my view. Always made time [word indecipherable] essential’.
10 Paragraph 11 stated: ‘The three heads of government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers’.
11 Barwick highlighted this point and noted: ‘Earlier Indonesian experience’—a reference to the use of Singapore and the Philippines for British and US aid to the PRRI/Permesta rebels in 1958.
12 Barwick highlighted this last point and contended: ‘Not at present’.
13 Here Barwick commented: ‘Philippines deny’.
14 Against (a) Barwick wrote ‘NO’; (b) ‘NO’; (c) ‘NO’; and (d) ‘–’.