Canberra, undated
Papua and New Guinea—Select Committee on Constitutional Development
NOTES FOR MINISTER’S DISCUSSION WITH COMMITTEE AT PORT MORESBY ON 17 JANUARY 1966
Situation
The Select Committee will meet on 17th–19th January to sort out views and points which the Committee desires to discuss on an exploratory basis with the Government and also what transitional provisions they may wish to raise.
Brief to official members
2. The brief to official members is that they should raise in the Committee the implications involved in recommendations from the Committee as to the ultimate status of the Territory; and the difficulties involved in considering long-term constitutional arrangements at this stage of development. This is to prepare the ground for your meeting with the Committee.
3. Official members have also been asked to use their influence in persuading the Committee to defer any decision to approach the Government on possible special arrangements between Australia and Papua and New Guinea until after the discussions with you.
Ministers discussions with Committee
A. RECOMMENDATIONS ON ULTIMATE STATUS
4. It is suggested that your opening approach on the question of the Committee considering and making recommendations as to the ultimate status of the Territory be on the following lines—
(i) The Committee appears to have concluded that it should approach the Government so as to avoid a situation in which it raised false expectations by inviting the people’s views on possible outcomes for the Territory which involved Australia in a way unacceptable to the Australian Government.
(ii) This shows a responsibility which should not be discouraged.
(iii) The view that the Committee cannot usefully help about constitutional matters unless it first finds out the people’s views on fundamental questions such as whether Papua wishes to join with New Guinea is understandable.
(iv) On the other hand, debates in the House of Assembly, as well as indications from various gatherings of the people (e.g: Administrator’s tour of Southern Highlands) suggest that the predominant opinion is that self-government or independence ought to be deferred for a long time.
(v) This raises the question whether it is of value for the’ Committee to attempt to discover present attitudes towards the ultimate outcome at this time.
(vi) Any opinions expressed now will not be the determining ones—those held at the time of self-determination are the opinions that will determine the outcome. This applies to opinion at the Australian as well as the Territory end.
(vii) There are very important questions involved for people in deciding what their ultimate future should be. There is more involved than being able to put to them the alternatives to sovereign independence which the Australian Government, at this stage, might consider acceptable. The people must be capable of understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative if they are to make a proper choice.
(viii) Factors which now might influence the people into one way of thinking will change over the years before a decision on ultimate status must be made. A choice made in the present situation of the Territory might commit the people to a particular line of development which they may not have wanted to take if a decision had been left to a later date.
(ix) The Committee’s activities over choosing a name, flag, and anthem for the Territory have aroused considerable concern among the people. If the people were asked to choose what their ultimate status should be at this stage, emotions and conflicts would be aroused and this would have an adverse effect on development generally.
(x) A decision of the House of Assembly as to long-term constitutional development would lead to pressure on the people for advancing the rate of political development. This pressure which would be internal as well as external would be difficult for them to resist. At the same time undue haste in determining their future is contrary to the views of the overwhelming majority of the people.
(xi) Evolving a constitution is a matter requiring a great deal of consideration. It is too easy to simply study developments of other emergent countries and apply the results of that study to Papua and New Guinea or any other country. The most important thing is to have a constitution which has been designed to meet the needs and circumstances of a particular people and country. The needs and circumstances are necessarily those of the country at the time the constitution is drafted.
5. It might be put to the Committee therefore that—
(a) Despite the apparent need to look at fundamental issues first, the validity of basing the course of constitutional development on opinions expressed now about what the outcome should be is extremely questionable;
(b) the Committee should also look at the desirability and practicability of asking the people, at this stage of development, for their views on the ultimate status of the Territory;
(c) if the Government were asked to discuss possible forms of association between Papua and New Guinea and Australia, the Government, which has the responsibility for the government of the Territory, might quite possibly wish to discuss with the Committee the question of whether this sort of issue should be raised with the people at this stage;
(d) there are definite indications that the majority of the people would be disturbed if they were asked to make a judgement now on what their future should be. There is always the major consideration of timing when raising constitutional questions anywhere. If the climate of the electorate is against considering questions of future status of the Territory at this stage, then the Committee should consider whether these questions should be deferred until the people have had more experience in government.
(e) There is a great deal of work which the Committee should do even if it decided that the question of ultimate status of the Territory should be deferred. The Committee could—
(i) enquire into interim changes;
(ii) give its views on the pre-requisites to self-government: what is involved in the various forms of Government, and possible ways in which a constitution can be determined (e.g. by a constitutional convention);
(iii) examine and recommend principles which might be included in the constitution, without going into the broader question of what the form of constitutional arrangements might be;
(iv) suggesting ways in which the work which the Committee has started might be carried on in later years.
B. INTERIM PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES
6. Any questions regarding the Government’s views on possible interim changes might be answered by referring to the principles within which proposals for changes short of self-government should operate as set out in the Cabinet Submission on interim changes.1 In the absence of Cabinet consideration of this question, your answer might be put in the form that in view of the Commonwealth’s responsibilities in the Territory at this stage of development, it might be expected that any proposals would have to be in harmony with the following principles, to be acceptable—
(i) though the Commonwealth would progressively devolve its authority, in practice it would, short of self-government, retain final responsibility in the same sense that it remains accountable for the administration of the Territory; and the Minister would retain the right to direct policy or to question any action;
(ii) this devolution would not apply in relation to certain ‘reserved’ subjects-internal security, external affairs, defence, constitutional advance, law and information;
(iii) the need for a reasonable pace of constitutional development has to be balanced with the difficulty of maintaining standards of administration; progress needs to be evolutionary and educational but cannot await the availability of persons with full capacity to operate at normal standards of developed countries;
(iv) the extreme economic dependence of the Territory and the fact that a substantial part of the Budget is met by Australia must be recognised; in these circumstances the Commonwealth must determine the strategy of the Budget;
(v) the Commonwealth Government’s control over the conditions of service of the Australian members of the Territory public service must be preserved; and
(vi) the final constitutional pattern for self-governing territory should not be unduly determined by the interim arrangements.
General
7. It is considered that the Committee should be given every encouragement to seek discussions with the Government even if these do not involve seeking the Government’s view on possible forms of relationships with Australia in the long term. These discussions, which might only be exploratory in the first instance, will enable the Government and the Committee to understand each other’s views. The discussions might usefully cover all matters referred to in paragraph 5 (e) above if the Committee wishes to raise them.
[NAA: A452, 1965/3192]
1 Document 5.