Canberra, 26 May 1967
Secret
Local defence forces in Papua/New Guinea
The following is the text of a minute dated 25th May, 1967 from the Acting Secretary, Department of Defence on the above subject:—
‘The attached are letters dated 13th and 23rd March by the Minister for the Army and the Minister for Territories respectively which, in broad terms, raise the following questions concerning the local defence forces in Papua/New Guinea:
(a) The general political, social and economic relationships between the local defence forces and the civil power and the community.
(b) The optimum size and rate of build-up of the local defence forces.
(c) Standards for the local defence forces in relation to housing etc., but excluding rationing which is already being looked at by an inter-departmental committee.
(d) The effect on the Works Programme of any changes proposed as a result of the above consideration.
The correspondence is forwarded for consideration by the Defence Committee.’
[matter omitted]
Attachment A
LETTER, FRASER TO FAIRHALL
Canberra, 13 March.l967
Secret
You will recall that, as a result of Cabinet Submission 573 and Decision 653 of December 1964,1 the expansion of forces in Papua and New Guinea was approved to be increased from the existing figure of 185 Europeans and l,188 Pacific Islanders to a strength of 650 Europeans and 3,640 Pacific Islanders by the end of 1968.
Since that time the build-up has proceeded to the extent of some 440 ARA and 2,000 Pacific Islanders. Following the introduction of National Service in 1965 and the increased build-up in Vietnam, with consequential demands for more experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, difficulty has been encountered in providing European staff of the desired calibre to raise 3 PIR and complete the programmed expansion within the time.
Now that Indonesian confrontation has ended and the urgency for a build-up in Papua and New Guinea has lessened, it would be unwise to continue a recruitment rate of Pacific Islanders without adequate staff to ensure their effective assimilation into the Army and their training and subsequent employment.
It is most desirable that the Army expansion rate within the Territory should match the available2 of ARA staff for it. On current indications, it appears that the approved strength cannot be achieved until December 1970 approximately, without seriously under-staffing the ARA element.
It is proposed that, progressively during 1967, detachments of l and 2 PIR occupy the new barracks at Lae, thereby providing security for the area and forming the nucleus of the third battalion which then could be expanded to its full strength by December 1970, as more ARA officers and non-commissioned officers become available.
No changes to the works programme approved by Cabinet are proposed.
Your approval to an extension of the expansion period from December 1968 to December 1970 is requested.
Attachment B
LETTER, BARNES TO FAIRHALL
Canberra, 23 March 1967
Secret
I wish to raise with you some questions concerning the local defence forces in Papua and New Guinea and in particular what we should regard as the optimum size of those forces both now and as the time comes closer for the Territory to exercise self-government.
As I understand it, when the Government decided in 1963 to expand the Pacific Islands Regiment to a force of three battalions of a total strength of 3,500 soldiers, Ministers had a variety of considerations in mind.
A report by the Defence Committee at that time drew the attention of Ministers to the fact that Cabinet had earlier accepted the view that the standard and standing of the P.I.R. were of significance to Papua and New Guinea well beyond its purely military significance. The Defence Committee report went on to suggest that in the transitional period and when the Territory has attained self-government or independence ‘the presence of an adequate, efficient and loyal armed force will provide valuable backing for the civil authorities’.
The Defence Committee’s report also referred to the stabilising influence of the P.I.R. arising from the fact that its members receive an education and a disciplined training which enables them to exercise a useful influence as leaders and administrators in their villages on completion of their service.
Again, the 1963 decision was taken against the background of a possible threat from Indonesia after it had taken over the administration of West New Guinea.
Leaving aside defence considerations as such, and leaving aside also the various helpful side effects, so far as the Territory is concerned, of the establishment of an efficient indigenous military force, I am aware that in general attempts are being made by the Australian officers of the P.I.R. to identify the Army with the community, notwithstanding certain problems in this regard.
I should add that it is not the purpose of this letter to question the value, indeed the necessity, from the point of view of the civil authorities of a loyal and efficient military force. There may be an especial need for such a force in the early stages of self-government.
However, the role of a military force needs, I suggest, to be kept in perspective if indigenes now serving—presumably the future leaders of the force—are not to be imbued with an attitude or develop a frame of mind which is in conflict with our present and long range political and civil objectives in the Territory.
This point is perhaps illustrated by the following passage in a draft J.I.C. paper relating to Papua and New Guinea which recently came to my notice:—
‘As in most newly independent under-developed countries the senior officers of the armed services (including the police) of an independent T.P.N.G. can be expected to play an important if not predominant role in the political life of the country.’
It is, of course, true that in a number of countries during the past ten years the armed services have taken over control. In some cases the judgement may be that having regard to all the circumstances this has been for the benefit of the country. Nevertheless, this is not the sort of pattern we would wish to see develop in Papua and New Guinea and indeed such a development would mean that our efforts to promote stable democratic government there had failed.
Another aspect of the P.I.R. situation is that there have been occasions where we have seen signs of dissatisfaction among its members which have raised doubts whether they could be relied upon even at the present time as an instrument of the civil power to help deal with an emergency situation, for example one arising out of general industrial unrest. You may have seen that in a submission to Cabinet last year regarding pay and service conditions for the P.I.R. the Minister for the Army referred to disturbances that had taken place among the P.I.R. and reported that the Commander in the Territory expected ‘serious trouble’ if a decision on pay rates were to be further delayed.3
That particular matter raised the whole difficult question of the standards of rationing, housing etc. for members of the P.l.R. in relation to the standards enjoyed by several sections of the indigenous community.
The rationing question is, of course, in the process of being reviewed, pursuant to a Cabinet direction, by an interdepartmental committee, but it occurs to me that other aspects of the question of standards such as housing might usefully be looked at having in mind the relationship of the P.I.R. to the rest of the community and the prospective Territory capacity to pay.
Another matter which I suggest it would be useful to examine is the size of the defence force which the circumstances of the Territory might justify, including the size of the force Territory revenues could reasonably be expected to support after the attainment of self-government.4 In this connection the position in some newly-emerged countries seems to suggest that the present target for Papua and New Guinea of a military force of 3,500 may be disproportionately high in relation to the Territory’s population and prospective resources. Apart from military and economic considerations there may be considerations affecting Australian/Territory relationships that ought to be taken into account in decisions about the size of the Territory defence force.
Whether the present target is still valid in the light of the present outlook on Indonesia is an aspect which I hope would also be considered.
I do not attempt in this letter to take into account technical military considerations. You will see that I am largely concerned with the problem of the political, social and economic relationships at present and in the future between the Army in Papua and New Guinea and the civil power and the community in general. I would entirely agree that military aspects must be given all due weight in consideration of these matters. I have, however, come to feel that in the light of changed circumstances since 1963 some re-examination of policy in relation to the Pacific Islands Regiment which embraced both military and civil issues would be valuable now.
Somewhat similar considerations, though on a much smaller scale, apply to the size and standards of the Papua and New Guinea Division of the Navy, and to its relationship to the Territory community.
Following this train of thought, I would like to suggest that a confidential review might be carried out by a small group of senior officials reporting in the first instance to you and me. Initially I would think the review should concern itself primarily with Army matters, and the group could perhaps consist of the Secretary to the Defence Department, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Chief of the General Staff, the Secretary to the Department of Territories and the Administrator of Papua and New Guinea.
I would be grateful if you would let me know whether you agree that such a review should be made. If so, we might then, with the Prime Minister’s concurrence, discuss the objectives of the review and the particular arrangements by which it should be carried out.
I have not raised this matter with our colleagues the Minister for the Army and the Minister for the Navy,5 assuming that you will consult them as you think appropriate.6
[NAA: A452, 1966/4989]
1 Not printed.
2 Presumably, this should read ‘availability’.
3 See Document 63.
4 In conversation with Fraser on 1 May, Hay ‘touched on the question of the optimum size of the future army and mentioned … that perhaps we ought to consider the economics of the size of a future army bearing in mind that one day, presumably, it would have to be paid for by the people of the Territory themselves’. Fraser ‘noted this point and although we did not discuss it in detail, he did indicate that he felt there were military judgements on this matter which could only effectively be made in Canberra’ (memorandum, Administration (Hay) to DOT, 12 May 1967, NAA: A452, 1966/4989).
5 Don Chipp.
6 Fairhall wrote to Barnes on 25 May, suggesting a review by the Defence Committee, which could ‘As is customary … co-opt the Secretary of your Department … and as desired the Administrator’. Warwick Smith noted in the margins of the letter: ‘Too cumbersome. Also the civil side would be outweighed’ (NAA: A452, 1966/4989).