Canberra, 30 May 1967
SECRET
Refugees from West Irian
[matter omitted]1
5. We obviously face a continuing and difficult problem. While the great majority of refugees are being returned because they are simply seeking better economic prospects, there is a continuing movement of persons who can make a claim to asylum on political and humanitarian grounds. Appendix II gives the breakdown of these people over a period of time and attempts some analysis of the pattern.2 The conclusion is reached in this analysis that large numbers are unlikely to be involved in further border crossings; but two things need to said about this conclusion. First, even small numbers cumulatively can create serious problems, as will be discussed. Secondly, it is difficult to foresee what will happen as the time for the act of self-determination approaches, or during its aftermath.
Australia’s moral and political right to take a restrictive attitude towards the granting of asylum will be somewhat strengthened if the act of self-determination takes place and is reasonably conducted, but this in itself will probably not dispose of the problem.
6. Appendix II shows that some 120 persons, with their dependents, have been granted permissive residence since 1963. This does not include any approvals for 1967, and it is evident that this year’s intake will be higher than the average of the last three years.3 Nearly all these people are politically motivated, and the more that come the greater is their capacity for trouble. When, for example, the Indonesian Ambassador visited Port Moresby recently he was met by a demonstration of 50 West lrianese. And, moreover, while each refugee is obliged to enter into an understanding that he will not engage in any political activities while in T.P.N.G., this obligation becomes more difficult to police as the numbers grow; we must assume that clandestine activities are going on and will develop. Some evidence is at hand in another submission of today’s date on ‘Correspondence from a West Irian Nationalist Organization’.4
7. As numbers grow, Indonesia’s attention is bound to be increasingly attracted. We know already that elements in the Indonesian Administration in West Irian are saying that their troubles are due to the fomenting of disorders from the other side of the border. We have been successful up to now in ensuring that matters are looked at rationally in Djakarta. But, while both Governments want to handle matters quietly and sensibly, there are difficult basic issues. Even if the Indonesians accept the fact that the internal dissidence in West Irian is not assisted from across the border, they could resent the fact that T.P.N.G. at present represents a sanctuary for those enaged in dissidence in West Irian; they could argue that the members of the dissident movement enjoy advantages because of the possibility of escape and refuge in T.P.N.G.
8. You have directed that we study the possibilities of recourse to the good offices of the United Nations High Commissioner.5 This might be a useful step. The present High Commissioner is well-placed to help with the Indonesian Government and it might help with Australian public opinion if the Government could point to his role. On the other hand, application of international principles and practices may not be in the interests of the Australian and Indonesian Governments. Application of international principles could well push Australia in the direction of accepting quite substantial numbers, not, it should be noted, into Australia itself but into a dependent territory—and thereby bring future problems for the Territory. If substantial numbers qualify for residence, we might in fact have to consider offering them residence in Australia and not T.P.N.G. At Appendix III is a note on the international position.6 It seems that there could well be a conflict between Australia’s interests over West Irian refugees and Australia’s adherence to the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. For us, it is not a question of the occasional refugee who has managed to evade a system of tight internal controls. Adherence to the Protocol might oblige us to take unlimited numbers of anti-Indonesian West lrianese who make their way across an unpoliced border. This question of adherence to the Protocol is at present a matter of inter-departmental consultation.
9. In the High Commissioner’s discussions with you the suggestion was made that the High Commissioner might send from Geneva to Port Moresby an appropriate senior officer of the Commission to discuss any particular cases that might be brought under his notice by the Administrator and to take responsibility on behalf of the Commission for accepting them as refugees. One practical difficulty here is the time factor. Procedures are already too slow. This new step could mean the lengthy passage of time during which the West Irianese refugee was allowed to stay in T.P.N.G. and in the nature of things ‘build up’ his right to remain. More important than this, however, is the problem of the High Commissioner’s representative seeking to apply formal standards of eligibility. The Australian and Indonesian Governments may have common interests in being rigorous and avoiding international scrutiny. For these reasons, we favour a careful, step by step development of our relationship with the High Commissioner. He has already been given statistical detail of the position. This could be continued. The step after that might be to discuss with him on a confidential basis and without commitment the special problems that we see and to invite any helpful suggestions he might have. However, before putting this before you as a recommendation we should prefer to await the outcome of the interdepartmental discussions on Australia’s attitude to adhering to the Protocol.
10. In the meantime, we suggest that the present pragmatic course be pursued, and:—
(a) With respect to Australia’s administration of the problem, it is recommended that with your authority the Department put the following points to Territories:—
(i) Procedures for handling refugee cases be greatly speeded up;
(ii) Every effort should be made to prevent the building-up of a West Irian element in T.P.N.G.; permissive residence should be granted as sparingly as possible;
(iii) Firm warnings should be given in the event of breaches of the undertaking not to engage in political activity; the warnings could include the threat of return to West Irian.
(b) With respect to Indonesia, it is recommended that we continue to keep the Indonesians broadly informed of the Australian policy of keeping the border crossing problem in low key and of returning as many West Irianese as is practicable. If the Indonesians start to show signs of asking for individuals to be sent back, our answer might be to counsel them against raising what could become difficult, formal issues affecting public opinion, inter-governmental relations and international agencies. We could point out that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is already displaying an interest and that we are seeking to have him understand the special nature of the problem. We could remind the Indonesians that Australia has avoided concepts and principles like ‘political asylum’ and ‘persecution’ and that it is not in the interests of our two Governments for Australia to be put in the position of arguing its right (and even its duty) to grant political asylum.
[matter omitted]7
[NAA: A 1838, 3036/14/l/6 part 7]
1 Matter omitted includes the comment that the purpose of the submission was, inter alia, to ‘identify some of the underlying issues in the West Irian refugee problem as a whole’.
2 Not printed.
3 In a submission to Hasluck of 10 May, Jockel had written that 594 West lrianese crossed the border into PNG during the first four months of 1967, of which 389 had arrived in March. Fifty-three of the 594 had been permitted to remain pending decision on their applications for permissive residence (NAA: A 1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 5).
4 Not printed.
5 That is, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. The Prince had visited Australia in April.
6 Not printed.
7 A handwritten note indicates that the Minister approved the recommendations without comment. Subsequently, the Australian Embassy in Djakarta was asked to remind the Indonesian Foreign Ministry of Australia’s ‘general approach’ to the refugee problem ‘without being drawn into the justifications set out [in paragraph 10(b )] if this can be avoided’. The Embassy was instructed to say that ‘the Australian Government does not want the refugee issue to mar our relations with the Indonesian Government and therefore wishes to state frankly its attitude towards this problem which is in no sense of Australia’s making. Australia has in the past accepted a very small number of refugees from West Irian … after checking their claims as thoroughly as possible. This should in no way be interpreted to mean that the Australian Government sympathises with or supports the aims and activities of the Free Papua Organisation. Each refugee is obliged to give a written undertaking that he will not indulge in political activities in the Territory of Papua–New Guinea and steps are taken to ensure that this undertaking is honoured’. For the Embassy’s information, the memorandum added: ‘You will doubtless appreciate that we regard the problem of refugees from West Irian as essentially a product of Indonesian administrative policy and practice in that Territory. If Indonesian administration is such as to attract the loyalty and support of the people of the Territory, there will be decreased likelihood of any significant flow of refugees to TPNG and of consequential difficulties for us and for Indonesia. In seeking to play down the refugee problem our concern is to avoid its becoming a matter of public comment in either East or West New Guinea. To do this, however, is not to affect the existence of the problem or its origins. Only the Indonesians themselves can bring about its elimination. Our hope is that our own policy of handling the matter as quietly as possible will not divert the Indonesians from eliminating the reasons for their people to seek refuge, in our Territory … We recognise that this analysis would commend itself to few, if any, Indonesians. Nevertheless, it may be possible for you to influence Indonesian thinking delicately in this general direction as opportunity offers’ (memorandum, DEA (R.N. Hamilton (Assistant Secretary, Europe, Africa, Middle East and Commonwealth Branch, DEA)) to Djakarta, 8 June 1967, NAA: A1838, 3036/14/l/6 part 6). A further memorandum from Canberra to Djakarta noted ‘fears in Indonesian army circles that Australia has not given up hopes regarding the possibility of a united New Guinea’ and emphasised the ‘importance of attempting to remove fears of this nature should opportunities of doing so present themselves’ (memorandum, DEA (Starey) to Djakarta, 3 July 1967, NAA: Al838, 3034/1011/4 part l).