Port Moresby, 6 June 1967
Chapter I
Introduction
1. The Select Committee was appointed by resolution of the House of Assembly on 19th May 1965, ‘to consider ways and means of preparing and presenting, and to draft for the consideration of the House, a set of constitutional proposals to serve as a guide for future constitutional development in the Territory.2
2. Two interim reports have been presented. The first, on the 26th November 1965, gave details of the Committee’s progress to that time, and of its future activities.3 The second, on the 30th August 1966, recommended changes in the composition of the House of Assembly to be elected in 1968.4 These recommendations were adopted by the House, and the necessary amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act were subsequently made by the Commonwealth Parliament.
3. While the first part of the Committee’s work was related to the legislature, the second part referred to the executive arm of the government, and to what changes, if any, should be made to enable greater local participation in the government.
4. Your Committee believes that the pace of constitutional change should be dictated by the people of the Territory, and that no changes should be proposed without the people’s support. Accordingly, the Committee Recently visited all District headquarters and sought views on the next steps to be taken in the constitutional development of the Territory and whether members of the House should participate more fully in the executive government.
5. Many varying views were submitted: one large sector of the community was against any change and wanted the present position continued, at least until 1972. A small group put forward far reaching recommendations amounting to limited self government.5 The majority maintained an intermediate position. They desired a further step forward so that members of the House could participate more in the government.
6. In addition to obtaining an indication of the degree of constitutional advance desired by the majority of the people, many valuable ideas on how the elected members could participate more fully in the executive government were expressed, and these have assisted the Committee in reaching its conclusions. The Committee was pleased to receive many written submissions. These were all carefully considered, and were of considerable assistance.
Chapter II
The Administrator’s Executive Council
7. The Committee appreciates that until the people of the Territory determine their own political and constitutional future, the duty and responsibility of administering the Territory rests with the Administrator acting on behalf of the Australian Government. Subject to this, the Administrator’s Executive Council should be the principal instrument of policy of the Executive Government of the Territory.
8. The Administrator’s Executive Council (referred to as the ‘Council’) should consist of the Administrator, three official members of the House of Assembly and seven persons who are Ministers. In addition, the Administrator should have the right to nominate one additional elected member in accordance with the following paragraph.
9. There will probably be men in the 1968 House who, though well qualified for ministerial positions, may consider they are not able to afford the necessary time. The advice of such men could be of benefit to the country. The Administrator should therefore be able to nominate for appointment one additional member of his Executive Council from among the elected members of the House.
10. Each member of the Administrator’s Executive Council, other than the Administrator, should be appointed by the Minister for Territories on the nomination of the Administrator and would hold office during the pleasure of the Minister for Territories. A member of the Council, other than the Administrator, who wished to resign from the Council should deliver a written resignation to the Administrator for transmission to the Minister for Territories and such resignation would become effective upon acceptance by the Minister for Territories. A member of the Council who was a Minister and who resigned his ministerial position, or had his appointment terminated, would cease to be a member of the Council.
11. The Administrator’s Executive Council should also exercise all the functions now carried out by the Administrator’s Council, and these are set out in the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949-1966 and the Administrators Council Ordinance 1960. At present, where an act or thing is to be done by the Administrator in Council, it is to be done by the Administrator, but in such cases he must seek the advice of his Council. This position should be continued.
12. Because he is charged with the duty of administering the government of the Territory, the Administrator is now not bound to act in accordance with the advice of his Council. In cases where he is required by Ordinance to consult his Council, and he does not accept its advice, he must, at the first opportunity report the reasons for the non acceptance of such advice to the House of Assembly. Your Committee considers that these provisions should be maintained.
13. The Council should, at its first meeting, consider the rules of procedure it will follow, and should make such amendments to the rules now applicable to the present Administrator’s Council, and such additional rules, as it thinks necessary.
14. In view of the recommended increase in the scope of the Council’s activities which require that it should be the principal instrument of policy of the Executive Government of the Territory, and should have the final responsibility within the Territory for advising the Administrator on budget policy and planning, and in view of the ministerial personnel on it, the Administrator’s Council should be renamed the Administrator’s Executive Council.
15. In accordance with generally established practice, the members of the Council would not publicly oppose the advice of the Council and the policies laid down by it.
Chapter III
The Ministers
16. The Under-Secretary system was instituted to give members of the House an opportunity to participate in the government, and to enable the Under-Secretaries to learn the work of government. The time has now come for elected members to take a more active part in the government, and it can be anticipated that there will be members in the next House of Assembly who will be capable of exercising more executive authority.
17. Seven Ministers should therefore be appointed from the elected members of the House, and this number could include members from both the open and regional electorates, without racial qualification.
18. As those selected for ministerial positions will have had at most only limited experience in governmental work, and will need time, experience and assistance in order to become proficient, the Committee thinks it would be wiser for the Minister to share responsibility with the Departmental Head.
19. Each Minister should be responsible, with the permanent Departmental Head, for departmental policy and for the overall activities of the department. The Minister would represent the department in the House by answering questions, introducing and carrying legislation concerning his department through all stages of proceedings, and by giving the departmental view on resolutions and motions affecting the department.
20. In the event of a disagreement between the Minister and the Departmental Head, the matter should be referred to the Administrator for decision.
21. The Director of a department represented by a Minister could be appointed to the House, but as an official member only and not as representative of the department.
22. It is realised that at this stage of the Territory’s development, conditions could alter considerably over a four year period. Therefore the framework of any proposals adopted now should make allowance for changing circumstances. The capability of a Minister could develop to the extent that he is able to assume sole ministerial responsibility for the department. Also, the needs of, or situation within, a department could warrant an increase in the Minister’s authority. Accordingly, the powers and duties of Ministers should be reviewed by the House after a minimum period of two years.
23. It is not proposed to suggest now which departments should be represented by Ministers. This can be decided at the time of their appointment.
24. Recommendations concerning the appointment, retirement and termination of appointment of Ministers are set out elsewhere in this Report.
25. The failure by the House to pass legislation sponsored by a Minister should not be regarded as a vote of no confidence in the Minister or as a cause for his resignation.
26. The principle set out in paragraph 15 should also apply to Ministers.
Chapter IV
The Assistant Ministers
27. In departments not represented by a Minister there should be an Assistant Minister appointed from the elected members to work with the Departmental Head. In this position the appointee would be able to undertake work of a ministerial nature within the department. Responsibility for the department would remain with the Departmental Head.
28. Elected members would therefore in some way represent in the House each of the Administration departments.
29. In the past there has been some confusion amongst members of the House and the general public as to the duties carried out by Under-Secretaries and what was expected of them. This point was frequently expressed on the Committee’s recent tour. For this reason the duties to be performed by Assistant Ministers should be specified.
30. These duties should embrace the following:—
(a) To assist during preparation of Bills within the department,
(b) To represent the department at official functions,
(c) To represent the department and answer questions in the House,
(d) To meet official visitors,
(e) To participate in departmental conferences,
(f) To participate in preparing budget estimates,
(g) To participate in departmental policy formation,
(h) Liaison with representative public bodies,
(i) Such other duties or responsibilities as are determined from time to time by the Administrator.
31. Recommendations concerning the appointment, retirement and termination of appointment of Assistant Ministers are set out elsewhere in this Report.
32. The principle set out in paragraph 15 should also apply to Assistant Ministers.
Chapter V
Appointment of Ministers and Assistant Ministers
33. The Committee considers that the responsibility for nominating Ministers and Assistant Ministers should be shared by the House of Assembly and the Administrator.
34. A ministerial nomination scheme involving the House and the Administrator will require close co-operation, and discussions and consultation, between the parties. These discussions would best be carried out on behalf of the House by a committee of the House.
35. At the first meeting of the 1968 House, a standing committee of five elected members, entitled the Ministerial Nomination Committee, should be appointed. This committee would have the duty of consulting with the Administrator, and, with him, agreeing upon a list of nominated appointees. The Committee would then submit these nominations to the House for approval. When approved, the House would make the necessary recommendation through the Administrator to the Minister for Territories who would make the appointment. As the committee would be a standing committee, this procedure would cover any casual vacancy in the position of Minister or Assistant Minister occurring during the life of the House.
36. Should it become necessary for the appointment of a Minister or Assistant Minister to be terminated, other than at his request, a similar procedure could be employed. The Ministerial Nomination Committee and the Administrator would make a recommendation to the House that the appointment be terminated. If the House agreed, it would make its recommendation, through the Administrator, to the Minister for Territories who would terminate the appointment.
37. A Minister or Assistant Minister wishing to resign his position should deliver a written resignation to the Administrator for transmission to the Minister for Territories; such resignation to become effective upon acceptance by the Minister for Territories.
Chapter VI
Budget proposals
38. In the Second Interim Report, it was stated ‘The Committee regards it as desirable that the elected members should, as far as practicable, assume some control over locally raised revenue’. (paragraph 48)
39. Following the adoption of the Interim Report by this House the Administrator informed the House that, in future, members of the Administrator’s Council would be brought more fully into budget discussions.
40. The Committee also said that it would study further how this control should be exercised and report on it at a later stage.
41. Two principal alternatives have been suggested. Firstly that the House, or selected members of it, be responsible for the preparation of a separate budget in respect of revenue raised within the Territory, and secondly, that members of the House and the Administration be jointly responsible for the formulation of a single budget covering both internal revenue and the Australian grant.
42. It became apparent that whichever of the two alternatives were adopted, there would need to be a high degree of consultation between the Administration and the members of the House. In the case of separate budgets, both would have to complement each other.
Achieving this could only be brought about by close co-operation and consultation. This being so it is considered more desirable to have a combined effort directed to a unified result.
43. In the Committee’s opinion the ordered development of the Territory would be best served at this stage by a single budget covering all aspects of government spending.
44. It is thought preferable for members of the House to gain experience in the planning of a budget covering all income and expenditure. Members responsible for preparation of a local budget only would probably obtain some experience in the distribution of the balance of receipts, but such experience would certainly be more limited than in the case of one all–embracing budget.
45. Bearing in mind that most of those who gave evidence before the Committee were in favour of members of the House participating more fully in the government of the Territory, the Committee believes that involving members in the planning of a budget which includes both internal and external revenues goes further towards providing greater participation in the government.
46. There were several views on the way the House could participate in budget planning. Some thought that there should be a special budget committee elected by the House from within the House. Others thought that the members of the House on the Administrator’s Council should carry out this.
47. In keeping with your Committee’s concept of the important role oftheAdministrator’s Executive Council, it is considered that the members of this Council, the majority of which will be elected members of the House, should have the final responsibility within the Territory for advising the Administrator on budget policy and planning.
48. The Committee feels that the elected members on the Council by virtue of their executive duties in the government, would be in the best position to understand, and give informed advice on, budget matters.
49. Ministers and Assistant Ministers will also participate more fully in detailed departmental planning and through this will play a greater part in preparing departmental budget estimates.
50. Your Committee believes it would assist elected members if there was some additional link between the House and the government in budgetary matters. Therefore a Budget Standing Committee of the House should be appointed, comprising five elected members not occupying ministerial or assistant ministerial positions. Members of the House could, if they wished, channel any budget proposals through this committee which would refer them to the Administrator’s Executive Council or the Minister or Assistant Minister representing the department concerned. This committee would not have executive authority, but could, in appropriate circumstances, make recommendations.
Chapter VII
Conclusion
51. Your Committee has studied certain matters in the nature of existing rights and privileges and basic constitutional principles such as the protection of fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Principles such as these spelt out in a constitutional document are, in your Committee’s opinion, most desirable, and are referred to a succeeding constitutional committee.
52. Constitutional development is a continuing process. The Committee therefore suggests the appointment of a further constitutional committee, which would continue the study of the constitutional advancement of Papua and New Guinea, including the question of a constitution and system of government best suited to the Territory. Some of the written submissions considered by your Committee dealt with these questions, and these would be of assistance to any future committee.
53. Although the Committee has examined long term constitutional matters, including the constitutions of other countries and the relationship between the legislature and the executive in such countries, it has restricted the ambit of its Recommendations to matters affecting the 1968 House of Assembly.
54. In some systems of government the executive is drawn from outside the legislature, while in others, persons occupying ministerial positions must be members of the legislature. The Committee does not see its recommendations as committing the country, or attempting to commit the country to any particular course. in fact, it does not think that a decision as to the system of government best suited to the Territory should be made now. Such a decision will be dependent, to some extent, upon a review after implementation of recommendations in this Report, examined in the light of experience.
Chapter VIII
Recommendations
55. Your Committee recommends:–
(a) An Administrator’s Executive Council consisting of—
(1) the Administrator;
(2) three official members of the House of Assembly;
(3) seven Ministers; and
(4) one additional member of the House of Assembly appointed at the discretion of the Administrator. (paragraph 8)
(b) That the members of the Administrator’s Executive Council, other than the Administrator, be appointed on the nomination of the Administrator, by the Minister for Territories and hold office during his pleasure. (paragraph 1 0)
(c) That the members of the Council, other than the Administrator, be entitled to resign from the Council by delivering a written resignation to the Administrator for transmission to the Minister for Territories, such resignation to become effective upon acceptance by the Minister for Territories. (paragraph 10)
(d) That a Minister who resigned his position as a Minister, or had his appointment terminated should cease to be a member of the Council. (paragraph 10)
(e) That, subject to the Administrator’s responsibility to administer the government of the Territory, the Administrator’s Executive Council be the principal instrument of policy of the Executive Government of the Territory. (paragraph 7)
(f) The appointment of seven Ministers from the elected members of the House, to be responsible with the permanent Departmental Head for departmental policy and for the overall activities of the department. (paragraphs 17, 19)
(g) That the Minister represent the department in the House of Assembly. (paragraph 19)
(h) That disagreements between a Minister and the Departmental Head be referred to the Administrator for decision. (paragraph 20)
(i) That the powers and duties of Ministers be reviewed by the House after a minimum period of two years. (paragraph 22)
(j) That, in departments not represented by a Minister, Assistant Ministers be appointed from the elected members of the House, to work with the Departmental Head, and to undertake specified work of a ministerial nature within the department. (paragraphs 27, 30)
(k) The appointment at the first meeting of the 1968 House of Assembly of a standing committee of five elected members of the House entitled the Ministerial Nomination Committee; such committee to consult with the Administrator and with him to agree upon nominations for the positions of Minister and Assistant Minister, and to submit the nominations to the House for its approval. (paragraph 35)
(l) The appointment of the Ministers and Assistant Ministers by the Minister for Territories on the recommendation of the House of Assembly, such recommendation to be forwarded through the Administrator. (paragraph 35)
(m) That, if necessary, the appointment of a Minister or Assistant Minister be terminated by the Minister for Territories on the recommendation of the House. The House would make its recommendations through the Administrator, after considering the advice received from the Ministerial Nomination Committee and the Administrator. (paragraph 36)
(n) That a Minister or Assistant Minister be entitled to resign by delivering a written resignation to the Administrator for transmission to the Minister for Territories; the resignation to become effective upon acceptance by the Minister for Territories. (paragraph 37)
(o) That the members of the Administrator’s Executive Council have the final responsibility within the Territory for advising the Administrator on budget policy and planning. (paragraph 47)
(p) The appointment of a Budget Committee of five elected members of the House to provide an additional link between the House and the government in budgetary matters. Members could channel budget proposals through this Committee which would refer them to the Administrator’s Executive Council or the Minister or Assistant Minister representing the department concerned. Although this committee would have no executive authority it could, in appropriate circumstances, make recommendations. (paragraph 50)
[NAA: A5842, 440]
1 The report was signed by Guise in his capacity as chairman.
2 See editorial note entitled ‘PNG’s constitution and ultimate status: debate in Port Moresby and Canberra’.
3 See loc. cit.
4 See Document 67.
5 See Document 97.