Canberra, 10 February 1966
Top Secret
Review of defence situation in Papua/New Guinea
The Defence Committee noted the amended Review of the Defence Situation in Papua New Guinea, a copy of which is attached.
2. The Committee agreed that the amended review be used as a basis for the preparation of a Defence Committee paper to summarize defence views on the importance of Australia retaining responsibility for the defence of the Territory and the implications for defence of any changes in the constitutional status of the Territory. The summary would be intended for use by the Minister for Territories in a paper for Cabinet on the future of Papua/New Guinea.
Attachment
REVIEW OF DEFENCE SITUATION IN PAPUA/NEW GUINEA
Introduction
In 1963 the Defence Committee submitted to Cabinet an assessment of the Strategic Importance to Australia of New Guinea (Minute No. 4/63).1
2. Since that time:—
a. Indonesia has assumed administrative control of West New Guinea (West Irian).
b. Indonesia has implemented a policy of military confrontation of Malaysia.2 Arising from our support of Malaysia, Australian forces in Malaysia have been in conflict with those of Indonesia.
c. Indonesia has withdrawn from the United Nations.
d. Political advancement in Papua/New Guinea has given the indigenes a greater. influence in the conduct of government.
e. A new Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy dated 15th October, 19643 which takes account of the events indicated in (a) to (d) above has been approved.
3. The purpose of this paper is to provide, in response to a request from the Department of Territories, an up-to-date appreciation of the defence significance of New Guinea and related considerations. For convenience in this paper, the following definitions have been adopted:—
a. Papua/New Guinea (PNG) = The Australian Territory of Papua which is in administrative union with the Trust Territory of New Guinea including the major islands ofNew Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville.
b. West Irian = The Territory of West New Guinea.
c. New Guinea = The island ofNew Guinea as a whole and major islands associated under the Australian/New Guinea administration i.e. (a) and (b) above.
International Political Forecast
4. It is a major objective of Australian policy to influence events in New Guinea to ensure that the Australian Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea will become one country with a population and administration well-disposed towards Australia. A further objective is to ensure Papua/New Guinea is not left in a position of vulnerability to the expansionist aims of any foreign power, particularly Indonesia. In this latter regard the Australian Prime Minister in presenting a Ministerial statement on the Defence Review in May 1963 stated:—
‘ …4 We have made this recent review in the light of our treaty arrangements, but particularly in reference to the security of our own country and of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. We will defend these territories as if they were part of our mainland; there must be no mistaken idea about that.’
5. For geographical reasons it is to be expected that both Australian and Indonesian influences will be dominant in Papua/New Guinea and West Irian respectively as New Guinea develops. The differences in outlook between ourselves and Indonesia will lead to major differences in the rate, form and scope of development taking place in the respective territories and some conflict of interest between the two administering authorities is likely to become evident from time to time.
6. As the number of ‘colonies’ diminish, the attention of the United Nations with its very large anti-colonial majority will be increasingly focused on those that remain. As the administering authority of Papua/New Guinea, Australia is likely to be criticized and subject to pressures both external and internal. Our allies, in particular the United States, may not always support us on these questions and may even counsel compliance with demands of foreign countries in order to retain harmony and influence with those countries. External influences including communist pressures, are also likely to be directed towards the inhabitants of Papua/New Guinea, aimed at creating disaffection with the Australian administration. Internal pressures to hasten self government will develop as sections of the indigenous population become more nationally conscious.
Indonesia’s interest in the Territory
7. The Joint Intelligence Committee has stated in its paper JlC (Aust) (65)56,5 dated August, 1965 that Indonesia’s interest in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea is based on the following:—
‘a. Desire for regional hegemony. There is evidence that the region over which Indonesia desires hegemony includes the Territory. This is reinforced by formal Indonesian statements in 1963 that any change in the status quo of dependent territory in Indonesia’s area of interest should be understood not only by the people concerned but also by neighbouring countries and that, if necessary, such changes should be the subject of discussion between the neighbouring countries. This statement taken together with Indonesia’s self–declared leadership of the “New Emerging Forces”,6 suggests that the Indonesian Government will wish to play an influential role in the future course taken by the territory.
b. Anti-colonialism. Indonesia declares herself to be the leading opponent of colonialism in all its forms and wherever it may occur. Her exposition of anti-colonialism now extends to any instances of not “standing on one’s own feet”, i.e., any degree of dependence, military or economic, on a Western State. Because the Territory will continue to be dependent on Australia both militarily and economically for some time to come, Indonesia is likely to criticize this dependence and classify Australia as colonialist. For reasons of policy, however, Indonesia remains cautious about publicly describing Australia as colonialist vis-a-vis the Territory.
c. Support of dissident movements. Indonesia is committed in principle to support indigenous dissident movements against colonialist or neo-colonialist rule. She might well seek to foster such a movement in the Territory in order to provide her with an excuse for her open interest.
d. Fear of encirclement. Australia’s military presence in the Territory is seen by Indonesia not only as a form of neo-colonialism, but also as part of British Commonwealth “encirclement”. While there is no doubt some measure of sincerity in the “encirclement” argument, it is for the most part a cover for the pursuit of regional hegemony.
e. Proximity and ethnic similarities. Since West Irian and the Territory have a common border and the indigenous people on both sides are ethnically similar, an Indonesian interest in developments in the Territory is inevitable.
f. Sensitivity to world opinion. Indonesia is anxious that she should not appear to be lagging in the eyes of the rest of the world in her development of West Irian in comparison with the development of the Territory.’
West Irian
Political
8. Indonesia assumed administrative control of West New Guinea on 1 st May, 1963. Under the agreement of 15th August, 1962, between the Netherlands and Indonesia,7 the inhabitants of West Irian should, not later than 1969, be given an opportunity to exercise ‘freedom of choice’, under arrangements in which representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations Organisation will participate. Indonesia appears unlikely to honour this agreement.
9. From 1 st May 1963, all political parties in West Irian were proscribed but in April, 1965, the ban was lifted and delegations from all the major Indonesian political parties including the PKI8 visited West Irian with a view to extending their activities into the area. The effect of the recent upheavals in lndonesia9 on the ability particularly of the PKI to carry out this aim is not clear.
10. Since this transfer of administrative control there has been some movement of West lrianese seeking asylum in Papua/New Guinea and some cases of dissident action in the Manokwari and Biak areas.
11. Australia has taken diplomatic initiative to survey and mark the border but as a result of procrastination by Indonesian authorities little progress has been made.
Indonesian forces in West Irian
12. Navy. There are no Indonesian naval units stationed permanently in New Guinea although occasional visits are made by ships. Limited maintenance facilities exist at Biak and Manokwari.
13. Groundforces.
a. Two infantry battalions (each approximately 700) (one contains 4–500 Papuans trained in Java).
b. Small marine detachments on administrative or security duties.
c. One Police Mobile Brigade battalion (approximately 1,000).
d. A number of engineer teams employed on civic action tasks (each probably platoon strength).
14. Air force. There are no air force units stationed permanently in New Guinea but detachments of the AURI10 visit from time to time. The airfield at Biak is capable of operating all types of aircraft and Sukarnapura and Merauke could be used for all transport and piston engined aircraft but would impose limitations on the operation of medium bomber and jet fighter types. A number of smaller strips could be used for short range transport operations and operations by piston engined aircraft.
Australian/Indonesian relations over West Irian
15. Friction between Australia and Indonesia in respect of West Irian could develop in a number of ways, for example:—
a. If as seems likely, Indonesia failed to give effect to the act of self-determination provisions of the agreement of 15th August, 1962.
b. If significant numbers of West Irianese were to seek and were granted asylum in Papua/New Guinea.
c. lf Indonesian suppression of the indigenous people caused adverse public reaction in Australia or in Papua/New Guinea.
d. If active encouragement or propaganda support were to be given from West Irian to disaffected or critical elements in Papua/New. Guinea or vice versa.
e. Because of possible difficulties in the control and demarcation of the border and because of the danger of human, animal and plant diseases being introduced into Papua/New Guinea.
f. Minor covert penetrations such as military aircraft overflights and patrols crossing the border either accidentally or deliberately.
The Australian reaction in such situations as the above might well have to give expression to strong views by Papua/New Guinea leaders as well as purely Australian considerations.
Strategic importance of West Irian
16. The strategic importance to Indonesia of West Irian lies mainly in its potentiality as a base for the conduct of activities or operations prejudicial to our interests. The strategic implications of Indonesian administration of West Irian are as follows:—
a. Indonesian naval and air facilities in West Irian, particularly the air facilities at Biak, could extend the threat to the Australian mainland and our lines of communications with South East Asia in time of war.
b. In the event of hostilities between Indonesia and Australia, enemy operations against Papua/New Guinea would be improved by the base facilities now held by Indonesia in West Irian.
c. The incomplete control and inadequate definition of the border in some areas between West Irian and Papua/New Guinea could make it difficult for Australia to prevent infiltration across the border directed toward creating disaffection with our administration.
Papua/New Guinea
Political
17. The Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 provided for the government of the Territory of Papua in an administrative union with the Territory of New Guinea, as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. The Act provided for a Legislative Council, a judicial organisation, a public service and a system of local government. In 1962–63 the Act was amended to provide for the creation of a House of Assembly. The nature and timing of further political advancement now depends on the House of Assembly.
18. The majority of the politically conscious people of the Territory appear to accept at present that Australia’s presence is an assurance of their right to decide their own future as they develop greater national unity when they so choose and is not an obstacle in the way of their aspirations.
19. Papua/New Guinea could beyome a source of increasing international interest and controversy with which Australia will be directly concerned. Although the Indonesian Government itself has not so far issued any official pronouncement specifically relating to ttie future of the Territory, during the past three years statements both public and private have been made which have been hostile towards the Australian presence, and reflect Indonesian interest in the Territory. In this context the Prime Minister’s statement in paragraph 4 above that ‘we will defend these Territories as if they were part of our mainland’ is of particular importance.
20. Papua/New Guinea is geographically well placed as a source from which unsettling influences, particularly communism, could be extended into other Pacific Island territories, e.g. the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides. However at present Papua/New Guinea is virtually free of communism.
The threat from Indonesia
21. The threat from Indonesia to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea up to the end of 1970 is assessed by the Joint Intelligence Committee as follows (JIC Paper (Aust)(65)(56))11:—
‘General
32. Indonesia will look to extend her influence over the Territory but her plans are long term and will be subordinated tb her more immediate objectives.
Threat In A Situation Short Of Limited War
A. Confrontation of Malaysia continuing
33. If Indonesia seeks to maintain her relations with Australia at the present level she will probably limit her activity to the following:—
(a) seeking to influence international opinion and opinion within the Territory against Australia’s administration;
(b) becoming increasingly non-co-operative on matters affecting the common border;
(c) engaging in psychological warfare directed against the administration and aimed at the indigenous population;
(d) encouraging covertly the formation and operation of dissident groups, and supporting other deniable disruptive activities such as student demonstrations and criticism of the Administration’s activities.
34. A greater threat would be posed in the event of relations between Australia and Indonesia deteriorating, in which circumstances Indonesia could:—
(a) step up the scale of her subversive activities;
(b) carry out border harassment; and
(c) attempt to encourage the development of insurgency (although insurgency itself is unlikely within the period).
The threat would also be increased in the event of the growth of widespread anti-Administration feeling in the Territory. We consider that such a situation is unlikely to arise in the next two years; we have no basis for assessing its emergence subsequently.
B. Confrontation ceasing
35. If for some reason Indonesia were to decide to cease her confrontation of Malaysia leaving her forces intact, she might pursue more actively her ambitions in respect of Portuguese Timor and the Territory. The extent to which she would pursue those ambitions would depend on the state of her residual relationship with Malaysia, on the continued presence or otherwise of Commonwealth forces in Malaysia, and on whether she gives prior attention to Timor. Although she would wish to avoid a limited war situation, Indonesia might be tempted to engage in confrontation activities against the Territory of the type employed in Borneo, but confined to a scale which she judged would not result in U.S. intervention under the ANZUS Treaty.12 While we are unable to say how far Indonesia would judge it safe to go we believe that any military activity across the frontier would probably not require more than small parties drawn from two battalions deployed in the border area.
Threat in limited war situation resulting from confrontation in Malaysia
36. In the unlikely event of limited war, overt military attack is improbable, but the possibility cannot be excluded of sporadic air and naval attacks against important bases, as well as against lines of communications in the area. Attacks by land forces would probably be small in scale and limited to the border region.
37. If Indonesia’s offensive capability were substantially reduced as a result of limited war arising out of confrontation, the Indonesian threat to the Territory would be negligible for a considerable period.’
Strategic importance of Papua/New Guinea
22. Economic. Apart from the provision of about 13% of current Australian natural rubber requirements, Papua/New Guinea does not produce any strategic materials in significant quantities and from that point of view its loss would not be serious. Surveys are proceeding in the Territory for oil and minerals and their discovery in commercial quantities and exploitation could considerably increase the economic importance of the Territory. The expanded production of tropical commodities such as timber, copra, coffee and cocoa could be of value in time of war.
23. Lines of communication. So long as Australia maintains her policy of forward defence in South East Asia it will be essential to maintain secure lines of communication for the maintenance of the forces committed in support of that policy. The most direct strategic sea and air routes between Australia and South East Asia lie through or across the island chain which comprises Indonesia. The facilities which have been developed in Papua/New Guinea are essential for Australian Defence forces to bypass this area.
24. The use of these direct routes would be most advantageous in any Australian involvement in hostilities in South East Asia such as has occurred in Malaysia and South Vietnam. However, present policy for strategic movement is generally to avoid the territory of Indonesia and West Irian, together with the territorial waters and air space to which Indonesia lays claim.
25. In accordance with this policy RAAF aircraft staging to South East Asia use Cocos Islands as a refuelling base, but in the future should Cocos become unavailable due to enemy action, there would be a requirement to use airfields in Papua/New Guinea as staging points. Military shipping proceeding to South East Asia is in most cases now routed via Papua/New Guinea waters and Manus Island. There is a continuing requirement for unrestricted passage through this area whilst a forward defence posture is maintained.
26. An actively hostile Indonesia would make it more difficult, in the event of our operating in South East Asia, to maintain communication with United States forces in the areas of the Philippines and the North Pacific. Papua/New Guinea would be an important link in this communication chain and its denial would make necessary the use of a circuitous east-about route.
27. Value to Australia of base facilities in Papua/New Guinea. In addition to the value of the facilities in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, including Manus Island, in the maintenance of communications between Australia and South East Asia and between Australia and United States bases in the Pacific as discussed in paragraphs 23 to 26 above, the following factors are relevant:—
a. Base facilities would be required for the conduct of defensive operations in the event of Indonesian covert or overt operations being initiated against Papua/New Guinea as assessed in the Strategic Basis and in JIC (Aust) (65) (56).
b. In the event of a limited war situation involving Australia and Indonesia, our possession of base facilities in Papua New Guinea would have the following advantages:—
(1) They would assist in the neutralization of enemy base facilities in West Irian and in conducting operations west of the border.
(2) They would be useful to our anti-submarine forces in defending sea communications.
28. Value to Indonesia of base facilities in Papua/New Guinea. The possession of base facilities in Papua/New Guinea would assist Indonesia in the event of limited war with Australia as follows:
a. They would be useful in connection with the employment of submarine forces against Australia’s eastern seaboard.
b. They would considerably improve their capability for air attack on Australia.
c. They would deny an important link in our communications.
d. They would expose Australia’s important trade routes with Asia to interruption.
e. They would assist in further expansion into the Pacific Islands chain to the eastward.
Defence Measures In Papuainew Guinea
Expansion of forces
29. Plans are being put into effect to expand the defence forces in the Territory, particularly the indigenous forces. This expansion will give the forces some improvement in capability for surveillance of the border area and coastal waters, the defence of key points, maintenance of internal security, and limited defensive operations. Defence forces under the various service plans will continue to be based on direction, leadership and training by Australian Services personnel.
Navy
30. Headquarters of the Naval Officer-in-Charge, New Guinea, Sub-Area and a small maintenance depot, HMAS TARANGAU, are located at Manus and a recruiting office has now been established at Port Moresby. HMAS BANKS, a General Purpose Vessel, is based on Manus.
31. Five patrol craft will be deployed in the Papua/ New Guinea area beginning with one craft in January 1967, followed by two in March and two about November 1967. It is intended that the force will eventually be completely manned by indigenous personnel, however, this will not be before 1975 at the earliest. Maintenance facilities will be available at Manus Island from early 1967. The craft will be based at Manus Island, with facilities also being provided to allow them to operate from Port Moresby and Madang.
Army
32. Headquarters Papua and New Guinea Command are located at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby. 1 Battalion Pacific Island Regiment is also located at Port Moresby and 2 Battalion is located near Wewak. A detachment of 1 Division Army Aviation Regiment is based in Papua/New Guinea.
33. A phased build up is planned to a total strength of 3,500 Pacific Islanders by July 1968. These forces will be organised into Headquarters Papua and New Guinea Command, three infantry battalions (the third to be based at Lae), a training depot and a composite logistic company comprising engineers, signals, supplies, transport, watercraft and other minor logistic elements. A small increase in Australian personnel is planned to provide the necessary training and administrative capacity.
34. Papua and New Guinea Volunteer Rifle (PNGVR), a Citizen Military Force Battalion, has its Headquarters at Port Moresby and detachments throughout the Territory. PNGVR is manned by eligible residents of the Territory of Papua/New Guinea regardless of racial origin.
Air force
35. There are no air force units permanently established in Papua/New Guinea but two Caribou aircraft are tasked in the area in support of Army operations. A resident air force officer of Wing Commander rank is permanently stationed at Port Moresby. Helicopters and other aircraft have undertaken training flights in the Territory and air exercises have been conducted periodically.
[matter omitted]13
Defence significance of civil Projects
37. There is no doubt that the general civil development of the Territory will provide improved facilities for defence. This applies especially to communications, where a particular requirement exists now for improved communications between Daru and Port Moresby, and in the border area. The development of road communications particularly in the vicinity of ports and airfields, and the further development of aviation and port facilities are important. Efforts should be made to ensure that priority is given to the establishment of an adequate telecommunications system throughout the territory.
Intelligence arrangements
38. To provide warning of infiltration or subversion, a Local Intelligence Committee, T.P.N.G., was established on the 5th May, 1965, under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the Administration, with representatives of the Special Branch, ASIO and Army as members. Other Services and the Department of External Affairs are represented when they so desire. The Committee was formed to meet the intelligence requirements of the Administrator and JIC (Australia). Its terms of reference include advice and reports on internal intelligence and production of assessments and studies as requisite. Its effectiveness is dependent to a large degree on the provision of the additional communication facilities referred to above.
39. In the light of recent Defence discussions between Australian, British and New Zealand Ministers14 it is clear that New Guinea and the bases located there are likely to become of even greater importance to the future defence of Australia. It is therefore of continuing importance that timely and accurate intelligence be available on such matters as the security of the border, developments in West New Guinea, basic military intelligence, and the activities of individuals and organisations hostile to the interests of eastern New Guinea and Australia.
Contingency plans
40. Joint Service and single service contingency planning is being developed to meet covert activities by Indonesian forces in the border area.
Base requirements
41. The base facilities existing or planned for the Services in Papua/New Guinea are primarily designed to support operations against Indonesian covert activities and to facilitate sea and air movement to South East Asia, and to meet the foreseeable requirements of indigenous forces.
42. In the event of an escalation of covert activities and a Borneo-type confrontation occurring, or overt military operations developing in the event of limited war, the existing and planned base facilities would require further development. However the assessed threat to Papua/New Guinea until 1970 does not warrant action to provide these additional base facilities at this stage, but should be kept under review.
Future defence arrangements
43. ANZUS Treaty. On the question of application of the ANZUS Treaty to the defence of Papua/New Guinea, the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy states (paragraph 61):
‘The ANZUS Treaty does not cover mutual military assistance in the event of a covert situation such as could arise in Papua/New Guinea. The United States will expect Australia to handle any covert situation that could arise in Papua New Guinea with its own resources. The ANZUS Treaty would still cover an overt attack on Australian forces in Papua/New Guinea, but would apply to Papua/New Guinea itself only whilst it remains an Australian territory.’
44. As long as Papua/New Guinea remains Australian Territory, Australia has a responsibility to defend it. Should Papua/New Guinea become politically independent, for reasons stated in this paper Australia’s special defence interests must be safeguarded in order to ensure the external defence of the Territory and also to protect Australia’s national security, therefore Australia would require to negotiate suitable defence arrangements. These arrangements should include definition of the following:
a. commitment to defend the Territory against overt or covert aggression
b. retention of present and planned base and transit facilities in the Territory; and
c. the right to maintain forces as required in Papua/New Guinea.
45. The significance of the above arrangements for the protection of Australia’s national security emphasises the importance of developing and maintaining in the Territory a cohesive population and administration which will remain well disposed towards Australia after full self-government or independence is achieved. In this connection it will be necessary in anticipation of any final political decision in Papua/New Guinea to ensure by periodical review that the indigenous forces are in the best possible defence posture to meet their future requirements.
Interrelation of civil and defence policies
46. Morale and goodwill. There is a strong defence interest in the vigorous prosecution by the Australian Administration of policies which will develop good relations generally between Australia and the indigenous population of the Territory and in particular in preserving the morale of the armed services and the police in whom will eventually be vested responsibility for the defence of and the preservation of law and order within the Territory. The Committee considers it especially important that the respective policies affecting civil development and defence measures within Papua and New Guinea are so aligned and implemented that anomalies are least likely to arise. This is particularly the case in regard to social conditions affecting for instance housing, pay, rations and leave within civil industry, the civil administration, the armed services and the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary. Experience over the last five years has shown that while every effort is being made to improve the standard of education and living conditions of the indigenes it is not always apparent to the majority of the relatively unsophisticated people of the Territory that justice is being done in terms of conditions of service as between the various employment groups, e.g. civil administration and Pacific Islands Regiment. The result has frequently been confusion in the mind of the individuals and, in some cases, group violence and defiance of authority. In attempting to harmonise policies affecting conditions of service of indigenes vis-a-vis expatriates the difficulties are recognised, particularly when the two categories work together, but by close consultation between Departments concerned and by co-operation in preparing the minds of those concerned the difficulties might be alleviated.
47. Physical developments. Considerable constructional work on essential defence projects is proceeding or is planned in Papua and New Guinea, (vide para 36 above) and a significant proportion oflocal resources of manpower and material have been apportioned to this activity. The stage has been reached where civil contractors on defence projects are forced to import labour from Europe to supplement the local work force. Simultaneously a requirement exists for large scale developmental works of a civil nature in the form of housing, schools, roads, communication systems and transportation facilities and although some physical progress on those projects is apparent it may seem to many local inhabitants that the accent on defence works is disproportionate and in the interests of civilian morale it may be necessary to increase the tempo of construction of civil facilities. In this context it is noteworthy that the armed services are at present assisting in development of the Territory in such operations as road construction, topographical survey, mapping, airfield construction and port facilities for civil use. From the above considerations it follows that the optimum balanced use of available resources will require co-ordination of Administration, Defence and other works programmes within the Territory.
Conclusions
48. The Defence implications for Australia of New Guinea may be summarised as follows:
a.
Political significance (paragraphs 17–20 above)
The Territory of Papua/New Guinea is of political significance to Australia because:
(1) Under the existing mandate Australia has a responsibility to develop the Territory to the betterment of the indigenous population. In so doing she is under the scrutiny of international bodies and is subject to criticism particularly from communist countries and by the so-called ‘newly emerging forces’.
(2) It is important that the Papua/New Guinea Government remains friendly to Australia especially in view of the potential Indonesian threat.
(3) It is most important that communist influence should be excluded from the Territory and that it should not become an area from which unsettling influence could be extended into other Pacific Island Territories.
(4) Australia’s stated policy (see the Prime Minister’s statement in paragraph 4 above) is that Australia will defend the Territory as if it were part of the mainland.
b. Strategic importance
(1) Of West Irian (paragraph 16 above)—The strategic importance of West Irian under Indonesian control lies mainly is its potential as a base for the conduct of activities or operations prejudicial to our interests, in particular,
(a) against the Australian mainland and our lines of communication with South East Asia in time of war;
(b) in the event of hostilities between Indonesia and Australia, against Papua/New Guinea;
(c) because of difficulties in demarcation and control of the border, infiltration is possible at any time which may be directed toward creating disaffection with our administration.
(2) Of Papua/New Guinea (paragraphs 22–28 above)—Papua New Guinea is of strategic importance to Australia for the following reasons:
(a) Economic. The expanded production of tropical commodities such as rubber timber, copra, coffee and cocoa could be of value in time of war. Discovery of commercial quantities of oil or exploitation of minerals could increase the economic importance of the Territory.
(b) Lines of Communication.
i. As long as Australia maintains her policy offorward defence in South East Asia it will be essential to maintain secure lines of communication for the maintenance of forces committed in support of that policy. The most direct sea and air routes between Australia and South East Asia lie through or across the island chain which comprises Indonesia. The facilities which have been or are being developed in Papua/New Guinea are essential for Australia defence forces to by-pass this area.
ii. An actively hostile Indonesia would make it more difficult, in the event of our operating in South East Asia, to maintain communications with United States forces in the areas of the Philippines and the North Pacific. Papua/New Guinea would be an important link in this chain.
(c) Base Facilities In Papua/New Guinea. In the event of Indonesian activities against Papua/New Guinea, Australia would require base facilities in Papua/New Guinea for defensive purposes. In the event of limited war involving Australia and Indonesia, Australian control of base facilities in Papua/New Guinea would have considerable advantages for Australia both for defensive purposes and also offensive activities against Indonesian base facilities in West Irian; conversely, Indonesian control of bases in Papua/New Guinea would pose a threat to Australia.
c. Defence measures in Papua/New Guinea (paragraphs 29—44)
(1) Forces —Plans are being put into effect to expand the defence forces in the Territory, particularly the indigenous forces, to give a capability of surveillance of the border area and coastal waters, defence of key points internal security and limited defensive operations.
(2) Service works projects —A services expansion programme in the Territory covering Naval support facilities, barracks, roads, airfields etc. (see paragraph 36) is underway.
(3) Civil projects —The general civil development of the Territory will provide improved facilities for defence e.g. the development of road communications in the vicinity of ports and airfields and the further development of aviation, port and adequate telecommunications facilities.
(4) Intelligence arrangements —A Local Intelligence Committee T.P.N.G. has been established to provide warning of infiltration and subversion. The likely increase in the importance to Australia of bases in Papua/New Guinea emphasises the need for adequate arrangements to secure timely and accurate intelligence in the area.
(5) Contingency plans —Joint and single service contingency planning is being developed to meet covert activities by Indonesian forces in the border area.
(6) Base facilities —In the event of escalation of covert activities, or overt military operations developing, the existing and planned base facilities would require further development. However the assessed threat to Papua/New Guinea until 1970 does not warrant such action at this stage, but should be kept under review.
d.
Future defence arrangements
Notwithstanding the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty (paragraph 24 above):
(1) As long as Papua/New Guinea remains Australian territory, Australia has a responsibility to defend it.
(2) Should Papua/New Guinea become politically independent, in the interests of national security as well as security of the area, we should endeavour to negotiate defence arrangements to include the rights and responsibilities defined in paragraph 43 above.
(3) In anticipation of any final political decision in Papua/New Guinea it will be necessary to ensure by periodic review that the indigenous forces are in the best defence posture to meet their future requirements.
e.
Civil and defence policies
In the interests of Australian defence, as well as the defence of the area, it is important that access to the Territories and its base facilities be maintained. This is particularly important while there is uncertainty regarding Australian/Indonesian relations. From the Defence aspect therefore policies should seek to ensure the development and maintenance in the Territory of a cohesive population and administration which will remain well disposed towards Australia. In the longer term this could facilitate the negotiation of defence arrangements if Papua/New Guinea became politically independent (para 47(d)2 above). In the shorter term there is a strong defence interest in the vigorous prosecution by the Australian Administration of policies which will develop good relations generally between Australia and the indigenous population of the Territory and in particular in preserving the morale of the armed services and the police.
[NAA: A 1946, 1968/838]
External Affairs views on constitutional change in PNG
During preparation of the External Territories Cabinet submission on constitutional development (Document 5), the issue received considerable attention in the Department of External Affairs. Its Minister, Paul Hasluck, had been Barnes’ predecessor and therefore retained a strong interest in the Territories portfolio. Before leaving on an overseas trip, he commented on the international implications of the submission:
our strongest position will come from seeking the recommendations of a Committee of the House of Assembly and in ensuring that these recommendations are the considered views of the representatives freely elected by the people; and that they shall be seen publicly to have been arrived at freely and after full study. I would think there would be advantage if, the House of Assembly Committee having made a report and published it, another election should intervene before the House of Assembly makes a decision on the report. Thus the whole electorate would have a chance of expressing a view.1
In passing these remarks to Sir Robert Menzies, who was acting for Hasluck, senior DEA official Malcolm Booker added that while Territories had not argued that constitutional changes would have to be made before 1968, ‘Cabinet might nevertheless wish to bear in mind the desirability of presenting any proposed changes for public discussion during the 1968 election [for the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly] rather than implementing them before it’.2
Booker pursued the issue further in a minute to Hasluck of 14 January 1966.3 Noting that paragraph 8 of the submission quoted the Select Committees expectation that the Australian Government would consider changes before the 1968 elections, Booker wrote that
It seems possible that it might become an established assumption that some changes will in fact be introduced before the elections. It might therefore be desirable for Cabinet to make it clear that this is not a certain assumption.
With regard to the ultimate status of PNG, he expressed similar sentiments, arguing that while Barnes might want to bring a further submission to Cabinet in the near future ‘It might be unwise to assume that decisions on the difficult problems involved, which include important international aspects, could be made in the next few months’. ‘Here again’, he continued, ‘it might be undesirable to allow undue expectations to arise in regard to the extent to which the Australian Government will be able to make commitments as to its long term policies’. On interim arrangements, Booker believed that these could—contrary to the contention in the submission (paragraph 14(vi))—unduly determine the nature affinal constitutional arrangements: ‘Once development has been commenced according to a particular pattern there is pressure both internally and internationally for the rapid completion of the pattern’. It followed that Australia should ‘proceed cautiously’, perhaps avoiding the establishment of indigenous ministerial authority ‘even in limited fields’. But the Secretary of External Affairs, Sir James Plimsoll, had a different view. He commented to Hasluck that Booker was ‘more negative than I would be’; ‘We need some caution’, he maintained,
but not to tie our hands if things develop a momentum of their own. The new confidence of New Guinea peoples is in fact a vindication of what Australia has done over the past fifteen years. If they are going to make some mistakes, it is well for them to do so while we are still there to help patch up again’.4
Hasluck initialled the minute, but made no written comment.
1 Not printed.
2 During Indonesia’s ‘confrontation’ of the proposed federation of Malaysia, Indonesian troops were infiltrated into Malaya and British Borneo. Malaysia was formed in September 1963, and in 1964 took the ongoing problem of confrontation to the UN Security Council. See Moreen Dee (ed.), Documents on Australian foreign policy: Australia and the formation of Malaysia. 1961-1966, Canberra, 2005.
3 Not printed.
4 Ellipsis in the original.
5 Not printed.
6 Coined by President Sukarno of Indonesia, the term referred to the anti-colonial movement as represented by newly independent countries.
7 Known as the New York Agreement (for text, see Current notes on international affairs, vol. 33, 1962, pp. 25–31).
8 Partai Kommunis Indonesia—the Communist Party of Indonesia.
9 A reference to political instability generated by an attempted coup in Djakarta, September 1965. See editorial note, ‘The abortive coup’, in Dee, Australia and the formation of Malaysia, p. 519.
10 Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia—the Indonesian Airforce.
11 Not printed.
12 Signed on I September 1951, the Australia–New Zealand–United States security treaty (ANZUS) committed the three countries to consult and act in response to threats in the Pacific to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the treaty partners. See Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson and Pamela Andre (eds), Documents on Australian foreign policy: The Anzus Treaty 1951, Canberra, 2001.
13 Matter omitted refers to works projects planned, in progress or completed as part of a services expansion program in PNG.
14 Defence talks had been held in Canberra on 1 and 2 February.
1 Cited in minute from Booker to Menzies, 8 December 1965, NAA: A1838, 936/5 part 6.
2 loc. cit.
3 Minute from Booker to Hasluck, 14 January 1966, NAA: A1838, 936/5 part 4.
4 Marginal note by Plimsoll on minute, Booker to Hasluck, 14 January 1966, ibid.