Port Moresby, undated1
I regret that I have not until now been in a position to respond to your letter of 12th April, 1967 about the Pacific Islands Regiment.2
I now enclose (Attachment ‘A’) some comments on the headings in your letter and the notes, based on these headings, attached to your letter.
In this letter I address myself mainly to the policy aspects—some of which were included in the Minister’s letter to Mr. Fairhall written in March of this year.3
My first concern, affecting both the size and the conditions of service of the Army, is whether they are within the likely capacity of a future self-governing country to sustain. I very much doubt this. I doubt, too, whether it will be acceptable to the future Territory authorities for the Australian Government to continue to command, train and equip the Army, as part of the Australian defence forces. Assistance with diminishing strings attached would be all right. But would this be acceptable to the Commonwealth? In sum, in the absence of a direct threat to the security of the Territory of a kind which requires forces of the size now planned, I consider that the long-term capacity of the Territory to pay should be taken into account in determining the size of the force.
My second concern is the role of the Army in the Territory. This appears to me directed in the main towards meeting an external threat. Its internal security capacity is indirect and potential, though nevertheless, important.4 There is a growing, but minor, community aid emphasis as a by-product of training and image building. If the security situation should permit (as on the face of it, it now does) there would be an advantage in a much greater emphasis on technical and engineering capacity, even at the expense of numbers. There are now some technical units and there is a limited civil aid capacity. Consideration might be given to a much greater emphasis on these aspects. It is realised that this would involve changes in organisation, concept and role.
A further role which the Army could usefully take on (and thus relieve the Administration of a sizeable manpower commitment) is that of civil defence. The Army would be very well placed to assume such a role, and I recommend that this be seriously considered.
A further aspect which concerns me is the relationship between the Army and the future civilian authorities of the Territory. In spite of a vigorous Territory orientation and exemplary attention in training and discipline to the national role of the force, the Army is under Australian command. There is a contradiction in this which must be evident to thinking people.
This causes me to recommend that early attention be given to building up a relationship between the Army and the Territory indigenous civilian authorities. There are constitutional problems involved in this. But I see advantage in, for instance, looking to a Territory Minister having some oversight over the Army in addition to a responsibility for a civilian department. I am led to make this recommendation for another reason. The present concept of the Army is not conducive to teaching the fundamental lesson of civilian control. There is the closest co-operation between the Army command and the Administration. But matters of Army policy and practice are not subject to discussion and scrutiny in the House or to the supervision of an Under/Secretary. I suggest that we need to consider introducing this concept before long in a Territory context. Otherwise we will expose the Territory unnecessarily to the long-term threat of an Army which does not owe its loyalty to the civilian government of the Territory.
I am not myself unduly concerned by the risks which having an Army of any size entails, such as the risk of a future Army takeover or the risk of an Army contributing to, rather than preventing, unrest. These are inseparable from having an Army at all and are counterbalanced by the security and social advantages referred to in Attachment ‘A’.
I am bound to say, too, that I consider the Army well led and well trained. With the kind of modifications I have suggested in this letter and with its size related gradually to economic capacity I feel that its contribution to the future stability of the Territory would be enhanced.
Attachment ‘A’
Law and Order
The role of the Army in law and order is limited to the very rare situation in which the police are unable to cope with the situation. While this would be useful—the immediate advantage, from law and order point of view, is that the mere presence of a well disciplined force is a restraining factor.
It can be argued that there is a risk to law and order in the mere existence of an Army unit since its discipline cannot be guaranteed. I do not regard this as a decisive consideration.
The size of an Army unit is only relevant insofar as there are other armed forces in the Territory, and insofar as discipline in a larger force may be more difficult to maintain than in a smaller one.
Political Aspects
On the whole the Army is a force for unity and a focus of national pride. To an extent this [is] a function of the leadership and discipline and skill of the Army. I am satisfied that this general acceptance of the Army at present outweighs feelings of jealousy and resentment caused by the superior conditions of service of the Army. These feelings are at present held by a relatively small number of public servants and others in the community.
Disposition
It is in my view unfortunate that so much of the Army is concentrated in Port Moresby, the capital. In the event of a future run-down of the Army I believe there should be a reduction in the numbers in Port Moresby. These arguments do not apply to concentrations in Lae and Wewak.
Economic Effects
Manpower. In general the Army training effort may be regarded as a supplement to that of the Administration. It is true that the Army tries to attract leaders from the higher forms in secondary school. To that extent it competes with the Administration and private enterprise. On the other hand the Army recruits from areas in the Territory which are not so well covered by the Administration. The Army has brought a very substantial accretion to the educational effort of the Administration.
Defence Expenditures
Competition for scarce resources is a diminishing factor. It is true that there will be repercussions in the form of a drop in revenue and in employment as the Army contracts come to an end. Against this must be placed the considerable increase in the skilled indigenous work force which has resulted from the Army capital works programme.
Standards
This is the subject of separate consideration.
Social Effects
It is early to offer a firm judgement. Within the Army itself there is evidence that the policy of breaking down tribal barriers, of building a national spirit based on education, discipline and an unusual emphasis in religion is proving successful. There is little doubt that this policy will produce an elite, but this is very much what the Territory needs.
[NAA: A452, 1966/4989]
1 The letter was received in Canberra on 24 June.
2 Warwick Smith had informed Hay that Barnes had written to the Minister for Defence regarding the PIR (Document 119). Hay was provided a series of headings (see below) that would need to be covered in a review, and he was given a DOT paper which raised related ‘questions and factors’. Warwick Smith commented that after such consideration ‘we should… be ready to indicate what we would consider to be the desirable size of a local defence force from a civil standpoint and whether any changes are needed as regards the present role and disposition of the forces’. Finally, Hay was asked to ‘arrange for an assessment to be made of the use to which Army installations already in existence or under construction could be put in the event of the Government reaching a decision that the further expansion of the P.I.R. should be halted’ (NAA: A452, 1966/4989).
3 Attachment B, Document 111.
4 A word or phrase appears to be missing in this sentence.