Canberra, 16 February 1966
Secret
Papua and New Guinea: constitutional developments
The attached notes on the question of future constitutional arrangements in respect of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea are intended to bring out some of the issues which are either not mentioned or not faced in the draft Cabinet submission prepared by the Department of Territories.1 They are not, of course, intended to set out a definitive External Affairs position.
2. Defence matters are only touched upon in the notes but it is intended that these aspects will be dealt with more fully in the comments which will be prepared on the paper which is to be presented to the Defence Committee tomorrow.2
3. The Department ofTerritories has indicated that it intends to call an interdepartmental meeting to discuss the draft submission.3 It is recommended that the attached notes be taken as a guide to the questions which might be raised by this Department at the meeting (or, as opportunity offers, in direct discussion with the Department ofTerritories).
Attachment
PAPER BY BOOKER
Canberra, 15 February 1966
Secret
THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE TERRITORY OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
COMMENTS ON DRAFT CABINET SUBMISSION
It is assumed in these comments that it is in Australia’s general interest that the people of Papua and New Guinea should remain friendly to Australia; and that we should be able to maintain such defence installations in the Territory as are necessary for the security of the Territory and of the mainland of Australia.
2. These requirements are the more likely to be met the closer the relationship with Australia, and it follows therefore that we should seek the closest relationship that is politically feasible and acceptable.
3. In essence the choice ultimately is between full integration in the Commonwealth, or independence with, if possible, long–term treaty relationships. There will no doubt be an intermediate stage in which there will be a growing degree of self-government with sovereignty residing in Australia, but it is assumed that this cannot be regarded as a permanent solution. Internal and external pressures will necessitate a choice being made between independence or integration in Australia.
4. Full integration in the Commonwealth could consist of integration as a territory with less than full state rights; or of full statehood. It is assumed that full integration of Papua and New Guinea as a dependent territory is not now a practicable proposition—if only because in exercising their right to self-determination, which the Australian Government has already conceded, the people of the Territory would be unlikely to choose this. It is conceivable, however, that the people might choose statehood if it gave then full equality with the people of Australia. It is also conceivable that such a choice, demonstrably exercised in full freedom, would be acceptable to international opinion.
5. What would {full statehood} involve? In brief:
i. Full rights as Australian citizens, including free movement throughout Australia, full social service benefits, and equal wage standards.
ii. Representation in Parliament and Cabinet proportionate to population (at the present time Papua and New Guinea would be the third largest state);
iii. Equal access to the Commonwealth Public Service and to the armed forces.
iv. Full interstate free trade.
6. Papua and New Guinea could only be made a state of the Commonwealth if this were agreed at a referendum. It seems unlikely, in view of the abovementioned requirements, that this would be acceptable in present circumstances to the majority of the Australian people. In other words the Australian people would be unlikely to accord to the people of Papua and New Guinea full equality in all respects with themselves.
7. Any form of integration with Australia in which the people of Papua and New Guinea had less than full rights would mean that they would be neither independent nor equal. It would be unrealistic to assume that such a situation could for long be acceptable to the people of the Territory or to international opinion, or indeed to Australian domestic opinion.
8. The only practical course, therefore, seems to be to encourage the people of the Territory to look forward to sovereign independence, but at the same time to accept a close association with Australia established by treaty and other contractual means. In such a relationship a special status could be accorded to Papuans and New Guineans vis-a-vis Australia but this would be given as a privilege and not as a right and its extent would thus be subject to Australia’s own control.
9. A further theoretical alternative exists, namely that a decision be deferred until the people of the Territory have progressed to the stage at which their standards are within reach of Australian standards. Integration as a state might then be both feasible and acceptable. In view of the pace, however, at which constitutional advance is already moving, it is not realistic to assume that such a long deferment would be practicable.
10. Having accepted that the ultimate status for Papua and New Guinea should be sovereign independence with a contractual (and not a constitutional) relationship with Australia, it is clear that a wide range of possibilities remain open to us. The contractual relationship could embrace defence matters, financial aid, trade relationships, discharge by Australia on behalf of Papua and New Guinea of responsibilities in international relations, and so on. Provision could even be made for special immigration status or for participation in Australian social services. The precise scope of this relationship would, however, be the result of practical evolution and it would be unwise and indeed impossible to attempt to define it in detail at the present time. On the assumption, however, that the relationship covered such general questions as defence, aid and trade, international acceptance of such an arrangement would not be hard to obtain (see attached paper for general consideration of United Nations aspects).
11. The question arises as to whether some target date might be set for the achievement of the relationship described above.
12. The acceptance of a target date would be well received internationally and if it is true, as suggested above, that integration with Australia would be unacceptable from our own point of view it might be to our advantage to accept in the near future that a date be set for an act of self-determination by the people of the Territory, and that it be our expectation that they {would} choose independence. This might help to prevent the building up in the Territory of pressure in favour of statehood. Moreover, it would enable us to forecast more clearly what our own requirements would be in terms of a contractual relationship at the prospective date of independence. (For example, if a target date of ten years from now is chosen it might be possible to estimate what installations etc. we would be likely to need in the Territory at that time.)
13. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that international acceptance of the independence of Papua and New Guinea will not solve all our problems or relieve us of all international pressure. There will undoubtedly continue to be demands that we give free immigration access to the people of the Territory. We will no doubt be under pressure to accord at least the same treatment as the New Zealanders have accorded to the people of Western Samoa. Internationally it must be regarded as likely that restrictions we impose on the movement of Papuans and New Guineans to Australia will be merged in, and reinforce, the general criticism of our4 immigration policy.
14. It must also be expected that pressure will be maintained on us to continue and even to expand our economic aid to the Territory—this will no doubt be merged in the broad international campaign for the transfer of resources from the ‘have’ to the ‘have not’ countries.
15. In regard to defence arrangements we must also expect the same kind of criticism that other former colonial powers now receive in regard to the maintenance of military bases in the territories previously under their control; and we must expect that, as elsewhere, this will have repercussions among the people of the Territory that might in the long run undermine any arrangements we have in this respect.
16. On the whole it seems reasonable to assume that the pressures upon us to make concessions in all fields to the people of Papua and New Guinea will be more easily resisted if they have been granted sovereign independence than if they retain the status of a dependent territory or are integrated into the Commonwealth. On the other hand the contractual relationship with Australia will be revocable by the people of Papua and New Guinea, and it is conceivable that ultimately it might be replaced by relationships with other countries. (Indonesia is, of course, the obvious possibility.) In defence, therefore, it might be wise to assume that in the long run the security of the mainland of Australia might have to be maintained without access to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. (Defence aspects are dealt with more fully in the attached paper)5
Attachment ‘A’
PAPER BY SMITH
Canberra, undated
Secret
UNITED NATIONS ASPECTS OF DRAFT CABINET SUBMISSION PREPARED BY DEPARTMENT OF TERRITORIES
The following are comments on the United Nations aspects of the draft Cabinet Submission prepared by the Department of Territories on ‘Papua and New Guinea—Ultimate Status’. The comments take account of our obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea, and of the views expressed by the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. They are also made in the light of the declared principle of Australian policy that the political future of TPNG will be chosen freely by the people and will not be pre-determined by Australia.
2. In our view the treatment in the submission of international aspects (paragraphs 37–40 entitled ‘United Nations’) needs amplification. Paragraph 40 of the submission appears to take the view that ‘close association’ would not satisfy the United Nations, but it is not possible to forecast this until the nature of this association has been defined. In general it might be said that opinion in· the United Nations will be affected by whether In our view the treatment in the submission of international aspects (paragraphs 37-40 entitled ‘United Nations’) needs amplification. Paragraph 40 of the submission appears to take the view that ‘close association’ would not satisfy the United Nations, but it is not possible to forecast this until the nature of this association has been defined. In general it might be said that opinion in· the United Nations will be affected by whether
3. If we are to carry out the obligations which are imposed by the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, and if we are not to provide critics in the United Nations with a focal point of attack, it will be necessary for us to secure the agreement of the United Nations to the status which the Territory is to achieve. It would in any case not be in Australia’s interests to adopt a policy which would indefinitely permit the United Nations to debate the affairs of the Territory and by inevitable extension the internal affairs and policies of Australia itself.
4.
In respect of the Territory of Papua, the obligation derives from Article 73 of the Charter, the material parts of which read:
‘Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end: … 6
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances, of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancements…’
5.
In respect of the Trust Territory of New Guinea, the obligation appears from the terms of Article 76, the material parts of which read:
‘The basic objectives of the trusteeship system in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: …
(b) To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;’
and from the Trusteeship Agreement which defines Australian undertaking more closely. Article 3 of the Agreement reads as follows:
‘The Administering Authority undertakes to administer the Territory in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and in such a manner as to achieve in the Territory the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, which are set forth in Article 76 of the Charter.’
6. Relevant also in this connexion is Article 85 of the Charter, which states:
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.’
7. Relevant also are the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 15147 and 15418 (referred to in the draft submission). The draft states that the difference in status of the two territories ‘no longer has such practical importance in U.N. eyes’. While this is true, there is still a distinction of some importance between the two territories in relation, on the one hand, to the Committee of Twenty-four set up under Resolution 1514, and, on the other, to the Trusteeship Council.
[matter omitted]
11. The status of ‘close association’ proposed in the draft submission would only accord with this if it provided for the status of the Territory to be altered by the people of the Territory.
12. The two resolutions are not inconsistent as stated in the submission—1514 provides that if dependent peoples expressly desire independence, it should be given to them forthwith, and that this should not be delayed or qualified; but if dependent peoples want one of the courses provided in 1541, that resolution sets out how these may be put into effect.
13. There is also no area of disagreement about whether 1541 applies to Trust Territories; since the resolution is concerned with the transmission of information under Article 73e, and Article 73e specifically excludes Trust Territories, it clearly does not apply to Trust Territories. But it is true that 1541 may be used, and has been used, as a guide to determine how the ends of integration or free association might be achieved in the case of Trust Territories.
14. Thus it is not sufficient to suggest, as the draft submission does, that a status of ‘close association’ could be established without the agreement of the United Nations. Our obligation in the Trusteeship Agreement can be varied only with the consent of the General Assembly (Article 85 of the Charter), and until it is varied we are under a specific treaty obligation to report on the Territory and to assist in its examination by the United Nations.
15. There is no specific obligation in the case of the non-self-governing territory of Papua. But for reasons mentioned above it is in practical terms desirable to seek the agreement of the United Nations to the ultimate status proposed if only to avoid continuing interference in the affairs of the Territory by the Committee of Twenty–four.
16. An indication of the present thinking of that Committee of Twenty–four and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly is seen in the recent consideration of the Cook Islands. Here the General Assembly finally agreed that the transmission of information should cease, in a situation where the Cook Islands were granted internal self-government, with reservation of external affairs and defence to New Zealand but the resolution adopted by the General Assembly noted that ‘the people of the Cook Islands have reserved their right to move to a status of complete independence’ and went on to ‘reaffirm’ the ‘responsibility of the United Nations under General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) to assist the people of the Cook Islands in the eventual achievemenf of full independence, if they so wish, at a future date’.
17. Provision for such a choice is therefore likely to be essential if any arrangement for ‘close association’ is to be acceptable in the United Nations.
[NAA: A1838, 936/5]
1 Draft under reference is presumably that of 9 February 1966 in NAA: A1838, 936/5. Final is Document 25. For background to the submission, see editorial note ‘PNG’s constitution and ultimate status: debate in Port Moresby and Canberra’.
2 Consolidated departmental comments on the Defence Committee paper (of which the final version is attachment to Document 25) have not been found. However, Jockel provided Plimsoll his own assessment of the earlier Defence paper (attachment to Document 12). Inter alia, he remarked: ‘[the paragraphs on] the importance of Papua/New Guinea to Australia’s defence interests … lead me to think that we should be more relaxed in our thinking on this subject … I do not believe we should allow defence questions to dominate our thinking about the political and constitutional future of the Territory. I also think we should be clearing our minds about the type of defence arrangements we want in the future … For political, historical and sentimental reasons Australia will no doubt accept continuing obligations for the defence of Papua/New Guinea as long as the New Guineans want us to do so. For defence reasons we will wish to have a defence connection with Papua/New Guinea for the dual purpose of containing Indonesia and ensuring our lines of communication with South East Asia and with United States bases in the Pacific … Do we need a permanent, resident Australian defence presence in Papua/New Guinea in order to deter Indonesia? … What military presence and what facilities do we need in Papua/New Guinea in order to ensure our lines of communication? … should Papua/New Guinea become independent … we should aim at the minimum defence presence … Similarly, with respect to a treaty arrangement, I think in terms of something simple and flexible and not in terms of an elaborate and detailed defence agreement which would (i) impose heavy and automatic bilateral commitments upon us and (ii) highlight the question of the retention of Australian bases for Australian purposes’ (attachment to minute, 16 February 1966, NAA: A 1838, 696/3/3 part 4).
3 A meeting appears not to have occurred prior to circulation of the final submission. A draft paper written by Richard Smith (Dependent Territories Section, DEA), under cover of a minute of 11 March from Booker to Jockel (11 March 1966, NAA: A1838, 936/5) reads: ‘We have not been able to discuss substantively with the Department of Territories the present draft, or the one earlier draft which we were able to sight’.
4 The word ‘discriminatory’ was here struck through.
5 Presumably the paper mentioned in paragraph 3 of Booker’s minute to Plimsoll.
6 Ellipsis and those following are in the original.
7 The operative paragraphs of resolution 1514, adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960, read as follows: ‘The General Assembly … Declares that: 1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. 2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. 6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity’ ( Year book of the United Nations 1960, New York, 1961, pp. 49-50). In 1961, the General Assembly established a Special Committee ‘to examine the application of the Declaration [of resolution 1514), to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the General Assembly’ (see resolution 1654 of 27 November 1961, Yearbook of the United Nations 1961, New York, 1963, p. 56). Initially consisting of 17 members, the Committee was later expanded and became known informally as the Committee of Twenty-four.
8 Resolution 1541 of 15 December 1960 established principles intended to guide administering powers in deciding whether an obligation existed to transmit information on their non-self-governing territories. The resolution included principles that defined self-government and the means by which this should be achieved (see Yearbook of the United Nations 1960, pp. 509-10).