Letter, Warwick Smith To Hay

Canberra, 18 December 1967

Secret

In connection with my letter of the 10th November, 1967, about the P.I.R.1 you mentioned, when I was last in Port Moresby, the absence of any ready criteria for determining the appropriate size of a future Territory Army.

I am inclined to think that the best way to approach the question in our discussions with Army would be to avoid the issue of optimum size, and to concentrate on practical arguments for keeping the P.I.R. at its present level.2

The attached copy of a letter to the Secretary, Department of the Army, was drafted on this basis and if you have any comments on it I should be glad to use them in further discussion with the Army.

Attachment

LETTER, WARWICK SMITH TO WHITE

Canberra, 15 December I967

Secret

Following the meeting in October between the Ministers for Defence, Army and Territories,3 I have been giving further thought to the question of the size of the P.I.R. from the point of view of the civil authority.

Since the lessening of the potential threat from Indonesia, as we see it the target strength of the P.I.R. for the immediate future will fall to be decided on factors internal to the Territory.

At the Ministerial discussion in October the Minister for Territories referred to past instances of disaffection among the P.I.R. and expressed his concern about the threat to internal security that an undisciplined force, insufficiently imbued with a sense of loyalty to the civil power, would represent.

In this connection the Defence Committee warned in a report in February, 1963, that ‘too rapid a dilution of trained personnel with new recruits could create indiscipline which might have disastrous effects in an emerging independent country at a time when political, factional and tribal feelings would be running high’. In approving the proposed expansion of the P.I.R., Cabinet decided that the objective should be to expand ‘at the maximum effective rate which could be achieved, “effective” being taken to mean that numbers should not be built up for their own sake at the sacrifice of training, discipline and equipment’.

On the score of loyalty to the government of the Territory, and to the community generally, I was impressed with Brigadier Hunter’s account (in the paper prepared for the C.G.S.4 briefing in July) of the objectives of the training programme of the P.I.R., and the way in which these objectives are being achieved.5 It seems clear however that with such a greatly intensified programme, a much higher concentration of training staff will be needed.

As I understand it the requirement for additional training staff is coming at a time when, because of the additional demands arising from National Service and the Vietnam war, the Army is finding it difficult to provide sufficient staff of the desired calibre for the P.I.R.

The Minister for the Army pointed out at the October meeting of Ministers that this shortage of suitable staff had led him to seek the approval of the Minister for Defence to a slowing down in the rate of expansion of the P.I.R. He suggested that if we could look to reaching a strength of 3,000, not necessarily within the next year or two, there would not be much difference between the views of the two Departments.

I understand that the total strength of the P.I.R. in October stood at about 2, 750, made up of 2,200 Papuans and New Guineans and 550 expatriates, and in view of the shortage of suitable training staff I have been wondering whether it might not be wise to hold the force at this figure, at least for the time being.

Another aspect which I think should be kept in mind in relation to the size of the P.I.R. up to the time of self-determination is whether when that time arrives the force should not be largely officered by indigenous officers, and whether this is a determining consideration in relation to present ideas of the size of the P.I.R. I cannot of course forecast when the stage of self-determination will be reached; neither can I say that we can rely on having until 1984—the date mentioned in your memorandum of 15th May, 19676—to achieve a largely indigenous officer strength.

Aside from issues relating to the quality and character of the force itself, there are important economic aspects to consider. We have had strong misgivings about the Territory’s capacity to support a force of three battalions after self-government is achieved. (I understand that with headquarters staff and supporting units such a force would number nearly 4,300.) The point has been put that if a future Territory government considered this too great an economic burden it could disband part of the force. This may however be politically difficult at the time—such a step could, for example, create discontent among those who were retrenched.

Army may have some formulae relating to the size of the force an under-developed country ought to maintain; we have no ready-made criteria, but it is worth noting that the ratio of l/510 of population which a force of 4,300 by 1970 would represent is exceeded in the case of only eight out of 35 countries which have achieved independence during the past 11 years. The remaining 27 countries may be grouped as follows:—

With these considerations in mind, I think it would be in keeping with the tenor of the Ministerial discussion if, apart from officer trainees, recruitment were to be restricted to replacements until a definite decision as to strength has been made by Cabinet. I think it would desirable to obtain a decision on this matter as soon as possible and I would therefore be grateful for your early consideration of the points I have raised and, as agreed at the Ministerial meeting, for an opportunity to consult with you further about the recommendations that should be made to Cabinet.

[NAA: A452, 1966/4989]

1 Warwick Smith had asked for ‘any points that occur to you which it might be useful to make in a discussion on P.I.R. numbers; and any views you may have on the size of the standing army that a self-governing Territory could or should maintain’ (NAA: A452, 1966/4989). For further description of this letter, see footnote 8, Document 145.

2 In discussing a draft of the letter to the Department of the Army, Legge minuted Warwick Smith in similar terms to paragraph two, adding: ‘By avoiding any final decision as regards numbers, we might also avoid the need to reimburse Army for any buildings taken over for civil purposes. Once a decision to hold the P.I.R. at its present strength had been taken the initiative for any further expansion would have to come from Army, and in the absence of a renewal of any external threat, and bearing in mind the increasing influence of the Administrator’s Executive Council in policy decisions, I think they would have great difficulty in obtaining Cabinet’s approval for further expansion. Meanwhile we would have permissive occupancy of the buildings and at most would probably have only the expense of maintaining them’ (22 November 1967, NAA: A452, 1966/4989). With reference to the attachment, Legge wrote to Swift on 18 December that the ‘Secretary decided it wd. be best to omit any reference to buildings at this stage’ (handwritten note, ibid.)

3 See Document 145.

4 Chief of the General Staff.

5 The paper had argued that there was a need in PNG for a loyal, western-style army which would be compatible with Australia’s attempt to build democratic institutions. It would provide a ‘sanction of power’ by the preservation of internal and external security. Hunter believed that this might be achieved by various forms of education for the soldiery including, inter alia, participation in a citizenship program, religious education and administrative experience (DOT summary of Hunter’s paper, NAA: A452, 1966/4989).

6 Not found.