Canberra, 20 February 1968
Secret
Australian membership of the Committee of Twenty-four
Purpose of submission
The purpose of this submission is to seek your direction on the question of Australia’s continued membership of the Committee of Twenty–four.
Background
2. Relevant previous submissions to you on this subject, together with a copy of a letter from the Minister for Territories, and relevant telegrams, are attached.1
Latest developments
3. Recent developments are:
(i) The Americans and the British have both decided to continue their membership on the Committee, but subject to certain conditions (stated below);
(ii) The extremist Chairman of the Committee (Mr. Malecela of Tanzania) has been recalled from New York, and a relatively moderate Chairman has been appointed: Mr. Mestiri,2 Permanent Representative of Tunisia;
(iii) The British and the American representatives made strong criticisms at the beginning of the current meetings of the Committee’s work.
4. The British have told us that they will continue their membership, subject to the following:—
(i) The British representatives on the Committee will take a ‘tougher’ line than they have previously—even to the point of walking out of particular committee meetings when they think this is necessary or desirable;
(ii) Britain will not participate in any visiting missions of the Committee of Twenty-four;
(iii) The British representatives will attempt to work co-operatively and constructively under the new Chairman, Mr. Mestiri of Tunisia;
(iv) If the Committee of Twenty-four continues to act in the extreme and immoderate way it has in the past the question of continued British membership will again be reviewed.
5. The American representative stated in the Committee that it was questionable whether there was room for effective and worthwhile participation by the United States, but that after careful consideration the United States would not at present withdraw but reserved the right to review the situation at any time.
Possible Australian withdrawal
6. The subject for consideration now is whether, in view of these recent developments, Australia should withdraw in isolation. Arguments have been put to you previously concerning this matter, and you will recall that Mr. Shaw has recommended that, even if the United States and the United Kingdom do not withdraw, Australia should do so. The Minister for Territories supported that recommendation.
7. We suggest that there are counter-arguments which should be taken into consideration. These are, principally:—
(i) Withdrawal alone would undoubtedly attract to us considerable odium, not only in the Committee of Twenty-four itself, but in the Trusteeship Council, in the Fourth and possibly other Committees and in the Plenary.
(ii) We cannot expect our friends in the Committee of Twenty-four—the United States and the United Kingdom—to defend our position or state our case in regard to Papua, New Guinea and the Cocos Islands as fully and effectively as we ourselves are in a position to do. (Indeed on some issues our friends might be embarrassed if they spoke as strongly as we would wish them to speak.)
(iii) If there is now a prospect that the Committee will adopt more reasonable attitudes it is in the general Western interest that we should co-operate with the U.S.A. and Britain in influencing the Committee in more constructive, responsible directions.
(iv) The voting on the Papua – New Guinea resolution in the 1967 General Assembly,3 while not satisfactory from our viewpoint, was an improvement compared with 1966. By remaining on the Committee we might, given a more reasonable attitude on the part of the members, be able to gain better understanding of our policies and problems.
(v) If we alone left the Committee we might forfeit the sympathy, which at present seems to be growing, of our close Asian associates.
8. On balance we submit that at present our interests would be better served by remaining on the Committee for the time being. Like the Americans and the British we can of course keep the matter under continuous review, and if expectations of an improved attitude are disappointed, we could renew our efforts to persuade the United States and Britain to leave with us.
It is accordingly recommended that:—
1) we remain on the Committee of Twenty-four for the time being;
2) our representative express our concern about the past attitudes of the Committee to its responsibilities and functions;
3) our representative indicate that we (like the British) will not participate in visiting missions, and that we reserve our position about visiting missions of the Committee to territories;
4) we keep the subject of our membership under review;
5) our representative to be authorised to accept, at his discretion, membership of the Sub-Committee on Petitions (see paragraph 7 of telegram No.UN242 attached)4 if in his view we can exercise a moderating and constructive influence by so doing.5
[NAA:A1838, 935/2/4]
Territories: changes to the department and portfolio
Following the disappearance of Prime Minister Harold Holt, a new Liberal–Country Party Government was formed in January 1968 under the leadership of John Gorton. A number of changes were made to government at both the bureaucratic and executive levels. Among these were alterations to the administration of Australian territories—as explained by Governor–General Lord Casey during his speech at the opening of federal parliament:
My Government has decided to reconstitute the Department of Territories as the Department of External Territories so that it may have particular concentration on the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
The responsibility for the Northern Territory will, except in certain respects … be transferred to the Department of the Interior.1
Barnes became Minister for External Territories, responsible for a department of the same name and of which Warwick Smith remained Secretary.
Whatever the party-political reasons for the reorganisation, it was justified by the Governor-General in terms that constituted one of the strongest official statements yet on the possibility of union between Australia and PNG:
This [modification] is an indication of the recognition by the Government that the present problems and future destiny of the Northern Territory differ from those of Papua and New Guinea.
The destiny of Papua and New Guinea is to become a self-governing country developed for independence if and when it is clearly demonstrated by the majority of the indigenous population that this is what they wish. My Government’s basic policy for Papua and New Guinea is therefore to develop it for self-determination.
Whether some subsequent special relationship with Australia is worked out, and what such a special relationship might be, can only be worked out in the future between the then Government of a self-governing Papua and New Guinea and the then Government of Australia.
But my Government believes that the development of Papua and New Guinea as a seventh State of Australia is fraught with difficulties, and that statehood, as against self-government, is not likely to be the outcome of development.2
In private, Barnes was unhappy that Territories’ administrative capacity had been reduced, complaining to the Prime Minister that a decision to deprive Warwick Smith of a Deputy Secretary was taken ‘very quickly’ and would prejudice the ‘effective handling’ of ‘the Government’s policy of progressive advancement of the native people’ during which ‘many intricate and potentially critical situations will be encountered’3 A draft letter by Warwick Smith to the Chairman of the Public Service Board:—written later in the year—showed that the Secretary was similarly disenchanted with the new department’s lack of resources. He wrote of the ‘more or less arbitrary assessment [that] was made of the organisational requirements’ and of ‘serious and urgent … deficiencies’.4 The letter also gave insight into Warwick Smith’s broad view of Australia’s task in the Territory:
Papua and New Guinea is in very great degree a ‘least-developed’ country. With the adoption and vigorous prosecution of the Five Year Development Programme, backed officially by the Commonwealth, the country is undergoing nothing short of a social, economic and political revolution. The winds of change are under forced draught. High pressure change [is] the order of the day—change from a colonial traditional/subsistence society and economy towards a modern self-governing, educated, sophisticated society and economy. The pace of change is dramatic, but continuing careful appraisal is required to ensure that the associated social strains and stresses do not outrun what is tolerable. Cargo cults, secession movements, excessive urban unemployment, bad race relations, strikes, riots, all have to be avoided or mitigated … From another point of view, the Australian Government’s policy of aid, with its near-commitment of around $500 million in grants over the next five years could easily go seriously awry, its objectives could easily be defeated if one or more elements in the situation were badly handled. There is no necessary or natural connection between policy objectives and results … in the Territory we are obviously concerned with the whole field of government … the list of [functions] is almost inexhaustible … Over and above all that, however; is the consideration that the position is never static. Over the whole field there is the fact that policies have continually to be reviewed and developed and adjusted to meet the imperatives of change … It would be tempting to contemplate responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government in [PNG] being coped with by a small Department in Canberra, concerning itself only with ‘broad policy’ and with the duties of a secretariat. The Australian tradition towards the Territory, however, and indeed the whole requirement imposed by Government and public is one of very considerable involvement and the practical expression of this involvement is seen in the size of the Commonwealth grant to the Territory and the degree—almost unique in ‘colonial’ affairs—of Australian activity and interest in the Territory. If we took a hypothetical analogy with Britain, for example, and adjusting for population, we would find ourselves thinking of a British ‘colony’ of say 11 million people across the Channel … with an annual British subvention of say $450 million (France and Algeria would have some resemblances).5 Further, the process of education, sophistication and development began in important areas of [PNG] much later than in many ex-dependent territories—indeed, on the Highlands since World War II—and in the climate of today has to be carried forward at a much greater pace than even a decade ago.
1 Shaw had been informed in December 1967 that the United States had decided to withdraw from the Committee. He recommended that Australia do likewise, essentially because of the Committee’s ‘extreme and tendentious’ activities. External Affairs strongly supported Shaw’s advice, adding that Australia could withdraw after the end of the 1967 session if the Americans implemented their decision. Australia would continue to submit reports to the Committee but would not necessarily attend meetings at which these would be examined. Hasluck approved the recommendations (submission, Booker to Hasluck, 14 December 1967, NAA: A1838, 935/2 part 19). However, at the end of January, Hasluck was informed that the US had had ‘second thoughts’ and that the British had ‘not been able to make up their minds’. At the same time, Barnes wrote to Hasluck underlining his strong agreement with a further recommendation by Shaw that Australia leave the Committee regardless of US or UK conclusions. The Department drafted a letter to Barnes which stated a preference for ‘rest[ing] for the present on the instructions already given … namely that we should withdraw if the Americans do so’. In a marginal note of 31 January, Hasluck rejected the suggestion, and proposed instead that Australia might try to persuade its allies ‘to our own way of thinking … My own disposition is still to withdraw even in isolation, unless you can produce better reasons for staying in’ (submission, Booker to Hasluck, 31 January 1968, ibid.; for earlier consultations with the US, UK and New Zealand on the Committee of Twenty-four, see Document 103).
2 Mahmoud Mestiri.
3 See Document 153.
4 Not printed.
5 Hasluck approved the recommendations on 21 February. On the same day, the Australian Mission in New York was instructed accordingly (cablegram 192, Canberra to UNNY, NAA: A1838, 935/2/4). Regarding paragraph 8(3), Hasluck responded to a later request by Mestiri for access to Australian territories by instructing UNNY to make clear that Australia ‘does not consider it desirable for Missions from the Committee to visit territories under its administration … and … reserves its position about Visiting Missions of the Special Committee in general’ (submission, Booker to Hasluck, I July 1968, NAA: A1838, 935/2/4). On the broad question of international influences on Australia’s PNG policy, Warwick Smith wrote to Justice J.R. Kerr Judge, Commonwealth Industrial Court and Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court): ‘you say [in your Roy Milne lecture that] Australia is under strong international pressure to disengage politically in New Guinea … I do not think that this international pressure has recently been as strong as it was a couple of years ago and I doubt if it will be an important factor in the next few years’ (letter, 1968 (exact date illegible), NAA: NA 1983/239, 9/25).
1 Commonwealth parliamentary debates (Reps), vol. 58, 12 March 1968, p. 9.
2 The statement echoed Cabinet’s decision on ultimate status of March 1966 (Document 34) and public comments made by Barnes in July 1967 (see footnote 2, Document 122).
3 Letter, Barnes to Gorton, 12 March 1969, NAA: NA 1983/239, 70. There was a view in Territories that even the old department had inadequate resources. A DOT paper of 1966 commented: ‘[The] Number and variety of policy issues outstrips [the] organisational equipment provided. The Department is limping in some areas. [The] Problem of “brush fires”—a complete breakdown in some sections can be avoided by the use of emergency squads but this leads to consequential problems. There is no “fat” in the establishment whatever’ ( 19 February, ibid.).
4 Draft letter, Warwick Smith to Chairman, Public Service Board, undated (c. mid–December 1968), NAA: NAI983/239, 48/5.
5 In a later letter to Professor L.F. Crisp of ANU’s political science department, Warwick Smith wrote: ‘I do not attach all that much weight to the British experience in de-colonisation. Emphatically, yes, we should learn everything we can from their experience, particularly the snags and pitfalls. But things have moved on since then; moreover the Australia/New Guinea relationship is one which never existed between Britain and any of her colonies etc … [the British] never gave a subsidy of $50.00 a head nor experienced a dependent Territory with a population (on proportionate figures) of 10 million roughly in the position of the Isle of Wight or the Isle of Man—in which wars have been fought etc’ (23 December 1969, NAA: NA 1983/239, 49/8).