Port Moresby, 8 March 1968
Secret
Assessment of reactions of T.P.N.G. communities to influxes of West Irianese natives
The purpose of this paper is to assess:
(i) Extent of sympathy among the indigenous people from all parts of the Territory for West Irianese dissidents;
(ii) Whether anti-Administration feelings would be aroused if West Irianese crossing the border were forcibly returned to West Irian in the face of sternly oppressive measures by the Indonesian authorities; and
(iii) The probable effects on T.P.N.G. communities in the border areas of experiencing relatively large influxes of West Irianese crossing the border for political reasons and then seeing them being returned.
Extent of sympathy among the indigenous people from all parts of the Territory for West Irianese dissidents
2. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the indigenous population of the Territory have more than a vague awareness of the situation in West Irian though, doubtless, the better-educated minority have a limited knowledge of the current unrest existing there. There appears to be a lack of interest in West Irian even on the part of the Territory’s politically informed indigenes. A few exceptions would be relatives and friends of well-established West Irianese residents in the Territory.
3. It is likely, however, that there is a dormant sympathy, dating back to the time of the Indonesian take-over of West Irian. This was manifest at the time in public statements by a small number of indigenous personalities of the Territory, in referring to West Irianese, ‘our brothers’, as having been abandoned.
Whether anti-Administration feelings would be aroused if West Irianese crossing the border were forcibly returned to West Irian in the face of sternly oppressive measures by the Indonesian authorities
4. Except for the VANIMO and the AlTAPE coastal areas, the border Districts are relatively isolated and first-hand news of events there would probably be slow in leaking out. Experience indicates that, in all probability, it would be inaccurate and exaggerated and would take some considerable time before even the politically conscious section of the population of the Territory became aware of the true facts. Because personal communication is slow, the publicity given to events on the border through radio broadcasts and newspapers would have a considerable bearing on the eventual Territory-wide reaction.
5. It is unlikely that there would be any significant and spontaneous indigenous reaction against the Administration were it to forcibly return West Irianese.
6. It is, however, highly probable that the issue would be seized upon by certain European elements (academics, missionaries, etc.) and some indigenous political personalities, on humanitarian, racial, religious or political grounds. A few political personalities may follow suit, seeing in the issue a political opportunity. Although it is considered that the mass of the Territory’s indigenous population would remain apathetic, the Administration may suffer some embarrassment through adverse publicity through news media, within and outside the Territory.
7. A factor which should not be disregarded is the presence of supporters of West Papuan Nationalist organisations in the Territory. Whilst members of these organisations undertake not to engage in political activities concerning West Irian, they could well influence local indigenous political personalities to oppose the policy of the Administration. Furthermore, members of these organisations would certainly inform their headquarters in Europe, Japan and the U.S.A. of the situation and of the Administration’s policy towards border crossings. Thus, the issue would soon become internationally known and may well be seized upon by countries already critical of certain aspects of Australia’s policy.
The probable effects on T.P.N.G. communities in the border areas of experiencing relatively large influxes of West Irianese crossing the border for political reasons and then seeing these people being returned
8. The reactions of border communities would be affected by the following consideration:-
(i) clan relationships and affinities;
(ii) traditional attitude towards their counterparts across the border (i.e. traditional friends, enemies or neutrals);
(iii) visual evidence or even rumours of ill-treatment by Indonesian troops/police; and
(iv) economic factors.
9. In the border areas, with the exception of some isolated pockets, generally no close ties exist between the population on either side of the border. However, in the VANIMO area of the West Sepik District, particularly WUTUNG Village, where tribal affinities do exist, the border population is already resentful of the current policy of the Administration towards West Irianese crossing the border. It is highly probable that in the abovementioned circumstances, such feelings would be greatly exacerbated and would be vented upon the local district administration.
10. Visual or rumoured evidence of ill-treatment by Indonesian authorities could arouse sympathy and consequent hostility towards the Administration on seeing the West Irianese being forcibly returned. This sympathy, however, would perhaps be neutralized by the immediate economic problems attached to the housing and feeding of large numbers of refugees from local resources.
11. Although isolated from the rest of the Territory, the reactions of the sparse border communities should not be regarded as of no consequence. Their feelings on the issue are quite likely to be voiced through their representatives in Local Government Councils and the House of Assembly.
[NAA: A 1838, 936/3115 part 4]