Port Moresby, 16 April 1968
I have been giving thought to some of the political problems that now face us. The Secretary for Law is in touch on the texts of amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act.1 There remain the questions of the presentation of these amendments and of the determination of several policy issues to which the amendments give rise.
The following is a list of points on which policy has yet to be decided:
(a) Number of Official Members; whether departmental heads should be Official Members; role of Official Members in House of Assembly.
(b) Parliamentary and departmental duties of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members—in particular duties of those persons in answering for departments in the House of Assembly. Rights of access to the Administrator and the Minister, and of submission of matters to Administrator’s Executive Council
(c) Government’s attitude towards future constitutional development in light of the conclusion on this point in the report of the Select Committee.
(d) Revision of House of Assembly procedures and role of Official Members in such revision.
(e) Working of Administrator’s Executive Council—number of meetings—definition of role of Ministerial Members—the third Official Member of the Council.
(f) Extent to which Ministers and Assistant Ministers should participate in such bodies as I.D.C.C and Land Development Board—relation between such bodies and the Administrator’s Executive Council.
(g) Organization of Seminar for Members of the House prior to opening of 4th June.
(h) The Nominations Committee—membership of.
(i) Principles for selection of elected members of the Administrator’s Executive Council.
(j) Role of the House Budget Committee.
(k) Physical arrangements.
Many of these problems are discussed in the paper CWP/1. I enclose a redraft2 of this based on discussions with the I.D.C.C. here.
I also attach a draft statement which sets out my recommended views on points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) listed above, in a form which can be used publicly by the Minister, perhaps in the House of Representatives, or alternatively by myself in a public statement up here, or by both at appropriate times. I would be glad if this draft could be placed before the Minister and his reaction to it sought.
So far as the Official Members of the Administrator’s Executive Council are concerned, we did discuss this earlier and concluded that it would be better to have the Director of District Administration in it, on the grounds that the presence of the Treasurer could always be arranged whenever he was required and that the same applied to the Secretary for Law. I should be glad if the Minister’s firm view on this matter could be obtained.
It is important to clarify our minds as to the roles of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members on the l.D.C.C. and subordinate bodies, such as the Land Development Board. The latter are essentially bodies of officials which make recommendations to the Administrator. Participation of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members would not, therefore, be appropriate. But it would be essential for a departmental head to keep his Ministerial Member or Assistant Ministerial Member informed of matters going to such bodies from his department and to satisfy himself that what he submits is broadly acceptable to his Ministerial Member or Assistant Ministerial Member. Many matters which the I.D.C.C. has considered will then be submitted, on the decision of the Administrator (after consulting the Minister as necessary), to the A.E.C. for consideration. This would be done in the form of the I.D.C.C. paper with a covering note by the Ministerial Member or Assistant Ministerial Member concerned.
Matters could also come before the Administrator’s Council on the initiative of the Ministerial Member or Assistant Ministerial Member. Normally the Ministerial Member would have his departmental head prepare a case, and seek views of other departments through the I.D.C.C. The Ministerial Member would then consult the Administrator and, subject to his agreement, would put the matter to the A.E.C., again in the form of an I.D.C.C. paper with a covering note from himself.
Now that the elections are nearly over, we need to consider tactics in relation to the Nominations Committee and the elected members of the Administrator’s Council. In my view, the Administration is bound to be interested in the composition of the Nominations Committee because of the possible danger that in the confused state of affairs of the early days of the House a group of people might put in a slate which would gain acceptance, but would not be conducive to the objective approach we would need to the selection of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members. The Official Members might, therefore, be instructed to ensure that the Committee is broadly representative. I would think that at least two of the five should be from the Highlands, one from the New Guinea Mainland, one from the Islands and one from Papua. In my opinion Neville would be a good man to have as one of the Highlands’ representatives and possibly Ashton3 from New Britain as the Islands’ representative. I am not sure yet whether Official Members ought to exercise their right to vote on the membership of the Nominations Committee, but there is advantage in their doing so which we may not yet be in a position to forego.
One of the first things to be agreed with the Nominations Committee would be the principles for the selection of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members. In the first place we would want it quite clear that the job is to select a group of fifteen members and that the selection of Ministerial, as distinct from Assistant Ministerial, Members and the allocation of portfolios to them rested with the Minister in the nomination of the Administrator. In the second place I think we should ensure that the importance of geographic representation is accepted. This would mean that the Highlands and Sepik areas must be adequately represented. I do not think we are yet in a position where the population numbers can be fully reflected in representation, but at least they should not be neglected. As a broad guide, I am inclined to suggest three from the New Guinea Islands, four from the Mainland, five from the Highlands and three from Papua (bearing in mind the likelihood of more experienced Papuans being available for office). The next principle would be that the Council should be broadly representative of the various shades of opinion in the House. This would mean that some party candidates ought to be given the chance of office. The price for this would be some loosening of the party ties of the individual in order to enable him to fulfill his obligation to the Council of secrecy and also of support o 4 generally agreed policies. I suggest this principle because I think it would be a pity for party groupings in the new House to become too tight and binding.5 There may be some value in such groupings from the point of view of organization, but in my opinion, the House is not at the stage for the standard operation of a party system and we do not want one or more parties declaring themselves as an opposition and refusing to let its members take office. The final principle that I have in mind is the mixing of old and young, experienced and inexperienced. It would not be right for the members of the Council to consist solely of older and more experienced persons. There should be room for some of the younger members in order to help them gain experience of government.
I have not yet given much thought to actual names, but obviously those left of the Under Secretaries will have strong claims. We would be bound, for instance, to offer Paul Lapun a place in the Council, in order to demonstrate our intentions to make Bougainville continue on as part of the Territory as a whole. Matthias Toliman should continue for New Britain. The Sepik may present a problem. For the Highlands certainly Tei Abal, but there will be some problems in finding other suitable candidates from there. The rest of the New Guinea Mainland also seems to be somewhat open. In my view we ought to take on some of the younger ones for whom a period of responsibility would be salutory. In the case of some of the older hands who might be thinking of throwing in their lot with a party, I am inclined to let it be known that I hope they will serve in the Council. I think this might make them somewhat hesitant to commit themselves finally to a party. This will increase the likelihood of their being available to us.
This brings me finally to the question of the new Speaker. The field does not appear to be very promising. My hope had been that one of the Papuan or New Guinean members might have the experience and be able to inspire confidence. I still think that this should be our first preference. However, the field so far as European candidates is concerned is not much more promising.6
Attachment
CWP/l
CONSTITUTIONAL WORKING PARTY: PRINCIPLES TO BE ADHERED TO IN EVOLVING WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE ‘MINISTERIAL’ SYSTEM AND THE ADMINISTRATOR’S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
(1) Introduction
The scheme is coming into effect in the early stage of a gradual movement towards self-government. This stage is characterised by: (a) uneven development in various population groups which would give the more advanced groups a decided advantage if the movement is accelerated before, say, ? 1972?; (b) lack of effective indigenous middle and upper bracket public servants; (c) lack of effective indigenous middle and upper bracket for the professions; (d) lack of effective indigenous middle and upper bracket for economic life; (e) very narrow indigenous tax base; (f) lack of national feeling and unity.
At this stage the appropriate way to regulate the movement towards self-government is by giving Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members communal rather than individual responsibility, and by Australia sharing its ultimate legal authority across the board rather than ‘devolving’ it (or gradually parcelling it out). A certain threshold has to be reached before this is possible.
(2) The working arrangements now to be evolved must not be inconsistent with the following principles:—
(i) in the early stages movement towards a ministerial system should, in the main, take place through collective consultation in the Administrator’s Executive Council which should become the forum for collective policy making;
(ii) in addition, Ministerial Members should assume some responsibilities of a ministerial character in relation to departments;
(iii) Ministerial Members will not be appointed to ‘reserved’ departments;
(iv) the authority and responsibilities of Ministerial Members must be confined within arrangements which leave to the Administrator as the representative in the Territory of the Commonwealth Government ultimate authority within the Territory;
(v) the Commonwealth Government’s control over the conditions of service of the Australian members of the Territory Public Service must be preserved;
(vi) the final constitutional pattern for a self-governing territory should not be unduly determined by the interim arrangements.
CWP/2
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPERATION OF MINISTERIAL MEMBERS
I. General
The Ministerial Members are to participate collectively in the formulation of policy and undertake certain departmental duties and functions of a ministerial character in the Administration.
[ matter omitted ]7
II. Operational Aspects
(A) Role of Ministerial Member
(I) IN RELATION TO THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
[ matter omitted ]8
• With the agreement of the Administration, initiate legislative proposals for submission to the Administrator’s Council;
(II) IN RELATION TO THE ADMINISTRATOR’S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
• Take part in the discussion of policy questions in which the Council is consulted by the Administrator;
[ matter omitted ]9
(III) IN RELATION TO DEPARTMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS
• To assist his Departmental Head on the basis of mutual co-operation, on all matters affecting the business and functions of the Department, other than those management functions which are the sole responsibility of the Departmental Head;
• To exercise such delegations as may be authorised by the Administrator;
[ matter omitted ]10
(B) Role of Departmental Head of a Department with a Ministerial Member
(I) In Relation To The House Of Assembly
• To advise the Ministerial Member on matters within the competence of his Department.
(II) In Relation To The Administrator’s Executive Council
• To advise the Ministerial Member on matters affecting his Department coming before the Council;
• To attend meetings of the Council at the request of the Administrator or Ministerial Member;
[ matter omitted ]11
(C) Relationship between Departmental Head and Ministerial Member
[ matter omitted ]
(II) In Evolving And Applying Policy And In Making Day-To-Day Decisions
• A Departmental Head desiring to originate a policy proposal will clear same in the first instance with the Ministerial Member. He would then process the proposal through the Inter-Departmental Co-ordinating Committee and in reference to the Department. Subsequently, on the decision of the Administrator (after consulting the Minister as necessary) the proposal would go to the Administrator’s Executive Council for consideration. This would be done in the form of the Inter-Departmental Co-ordinating Committee paper with a covering note in the name of the Ministerial Member.
• If a Ministerial Member desires to initiate a policy proposal he will request the Department to prepare the proposal in appropriate form.
• If the Departmental Head is unable to agree with the Ministerial Member that the proposal should be processed, he will refer it to the Administrator. Otherwise, the Departmental Head will process the proposal through the Inter-Departmental Co-ordinating Comittee to the Administrator in the normal way. The procedure for submission to the Administrator’s Executive Council would be as described above.
• In the case of all major Inter-Departmental Co-ordinating Council proposals views would be exchanged with the Department of External Territories in the early stages.
The Role of the Administrator’s Executive Council
[ matter omitted ]12
• Other distinctions between consultation and advice (in the sense used in the Papua and New Guinea Act) will be preserved. In the foreseeable future, there are not likely to be many issues in which formal advice is sought.
• It is on this basis that, subject to the Administrator’s responsibility to administer the government of the Territory, the Administrator’s Executive Council will be the principal instrument of policy of the Executive Government of the Territory.
[ matter omitted ]13
The role of Assistant Ministerial Members
• Assistant Ministerial Members will be required to be on duty in their Departments (or engaged on departmental duties, such as inspections, elsewhere) for the first two weeks in each month. During that time they will be consulted by the Departmental Head and senior officers in major matters affecting the Department.
• In addition, they could participate in the activities of the Department to which they are attached …
[ matter omitted ]14
• Each month the Assistant Ministerial members will meet jointly with the Administrator and/or senior officers to discuss and study future legislation and other matters of Territory interest.
[ matter omitted ]
NOTES FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MATTERS ARISING FROM REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
The changes to which the amending legislation gives effect arise from recommendations by a Select Committee appointed by the House. The Select Committee took great trouble to consult the people of the Territory in public and open hearings and it may be confidently said that its report reflects the overwhelming majority of Territory opinion.
The effectiveness of constitutional changes depends not only on their wording but on the spirit in which they are conceived and carried out. The Select Committee report recognizes that the Commonwealth remains constitutionally responsible for the good government of the Territory. The Commonwealth must be in a position to exercise that responsibility. It must also be able to account to the Australian taxpayers, who after all pay for more than half the annual budget and also spend substantial additional sums on activities of Commonwealth Departments and instrumentalities (for example Civil Aviation, Works, Army and the A.B.C. and O.T.C.),15 on the expenditure of their money. The Commonwealth intends therefore to retain the ultimate decision in such vital matters as budget strategy until the stage of self-government is closer than it now is.
Within this framework it intends to share its responsibilities to an increasing extent and to rest heavily on the advice and opinions of Territory leaders and the House of Assembly.
We do see the relationship between the House of Assembly and the Administration as being one of co-operation in achieving broadly agreed purposes. The Administration will be expected to initiate, in accordance with the government’s broad policy, plans for the economic social and educational advancement of the people of the Territory. Where the Administration has an important piece of legislation to present, then it is essential that this should be able to command a priority, and one of the amending provisions now before the House provides for this. But it will in all matters, including policy matters, consult with the elected political leaders of the Territory and it will be responsive to Territory views put forward in such consultation. The concept is one of shared responsibility as between the Administration and the House.
The way will still be open for the private members to put forward legislation. In the new House it is to be hoped that initiatives for legislation will also come from Ministerial Members in consultation with their departments. The way is open for them to bring forward legislation through the channel of the Administrator’s Executive Council.
The Administration with at the most 10 members out of 94 could not, even if it wished, ensure the passage of its legislation by its command of sufficient votes. It must first convince the Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members that the legislation is worth while. It must then convince the House. Its success in doing this will in all probability depend on the degree of consultation which has earlier taken place, and the degree to which the legislation represents Territory and Australian opinion jointly.
Clearly the success of this approach depends upon the elected Members as well as on the Administration. I ask of the elected members that they accept the constitutional assumption on which the activity of the House of Assembly must be based, namely, that it is not for a self-governing body.
For this system, and it is an agreed system, to work, members need to accept a restraint on their activities which is not acceptable in a self-governing parliament. In the latter their aim naturally would be to form a government of like minded persons in order to put through a programme on which they gained election. By contrast, the Territory House of Assembly shares in the responsibilities of government, not by trying to take over the functions of government, but by having persons acceptable to it and, in a practical sense, responsible to it, who take part in the decision making processes of the Executive. The deliberative and legislative roles of the Assembly will also increase in importance.
It follows from what I have said that the government has confidence in the new system of Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members. The Administrator’s Executive Council will function much more as a Cabinet than its predecessor. It will, as the Select Committee report says, become the principal instrument of policy of the executive government of the Territory. It will need, in all probability, to meet each week in order to transact business. Members will need to contribute to the full range of the private Council discussions and will thus have to study in detail the variety of business papers. When matters affecting their departments are under discussion, it will be for them to argue the case, just as they will have to do in the House of Assembly. Their range of interests and responsibilities will go much beyond the affairs of single departments. Indeed, at the present stage, the movement towards self-government will be taking place as much through the communal as through the individual responsibilities of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members. Their departmental responsibilities will also be considerable. The running of departments, including promotions, transfers, allocation of duties will, as in Australia, remain the sole responsibility of departmental heads. The Ministerial Members will be consulted on policy questions and on important executive decisions based on agreed policy. They will be able to initiate, in concert with departmental heads, the study of policy matters. They will also be able to make recommendations to the Administrator, including recommendations in16 topics for discussion in the Administrator’s Council. The Select Committee report recommended a procedure to be followed in the event of disagreement between Ministerial Members and departmental heads. This is a sensible precaution, but I do not expect that it will often have to be brought into force.
Inevitably much more of the time of Ministerial Members will have to be spent on government than on purely electoral business.
It would be wrong to describe the positions of Ministerial Members as in any sense ‘learner’ positions. On the contrary, they are truly executive positions with real, though limited, responsibility lfMinisterial Members do not measure up to these responsibilities, we may expect them to be criticized in the House and this could lead to demands for their resignation.
There is more of an educational character in the position of Assistant Ministerial Members. But the positions will be important ones. Like Ministerial Members, their communal responsibilities will rank in importance with their departmental duties; they will have to spend more time in departmental duties than has up to now been the case. At least two weeks in each month will need to be spent in such duties. The Assistant Ministerial Members will hold regular joint meetings with the Administrator. At these meetings the opinions of Assistant Ministerial Members will be sought on broad questions of policy. They will be asked to study forthcoming legislation in detail and to let the Administration have their views. They will have the advantage of prior knowledge of the Administration’s intentions and the Administration, by organized discussion with them, will enlarge the range of its consultations. Assistant Ministerial Members will have to answer in the House of Assembly for the activities of their departments. Because of the unique opportunity they will have to study legislation well in advance, they will be able to explain it to their colleagues in the House. They will thus be able to help other Members in their understanding of the business of the House. These are considerable responsibilities.
The amendments now before the House include on which17 states that the Governor-General may appoint ‘not more than’ ten Official Members of the Territory House of Assembly. The present Act makes it mandatory to have the number ten. This amendment reflects the government’s view, already stated, that the Administration must rely on the persuasiveness of its programme, and the degree to which it represents Territory views for votes in order to get its legislation through. It is the government’s view that the Official Members should comprise the two Assistant Administrators, the Director of District Administration, the Treasurer and the Secretary for Law and up to five other officials not necessarily departmental heads. The purposes of these changes are, first, to place on Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members the responsibility of answering for departmental affairs; second, to relieve departmental heads of an onerous function, and enable them to devote themselves full-time to their important departmental duties. Whether or not the full five remaining vacancies will be filled depends on the extent to which the burden of presenting the Administration programme, conducting government business and taking part in House Committees can be effectively carried by the five persons mentioned above, together with Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members. It is likely that in the first instance three or four District Commissioners with wide experience of various rural areas will be appointed and that this number will suffice.
The report of the Select Committee refers to future constitutional development. The government sees this as a continuing process and has no doubt that the House will wish in due course to review the success of the measures now being enacted and perhaps to embark on further studies. This is a matter within its competence. I would however make the point that experimentation may be a good thing with constitutional as with other arrangements. While Australia retains ultimate responsibility the Territory has an opportunity to experiment. It may be wise to take this opportunity rather than to aim in the short-term to draw up a final constitution, probably on the advice of outside experts, which may prove no better suited to the Territory’s needs than the present one.
One area of fruitful experiment immediately available is the procedures of the House of Assembly. In many respects the present Standing Orders, which largely follow Australian practice, have not led us to as full an understanding of and participation in the legislative processes, as had been hoped. The remedy for this state of affairs lies with the new House of Assembly. If the Members wish to try new procedures, which rest more on oral than written presentation and which, for example, by the Committee system make possible the more detailed and intimate study of legislation than is possible in a Committee of the whole, then they will find the Official Members ready to co-operate to the full.
It may well be that improved procedures will satisfy some criticisms of members which have been directed against the type of constitution. One of the features of the Westminster type constitution is in fact its adaptability. This has yet to be tested in the Territory circumstances.
[NAA: A452, 1970/4520]
1 For background, see footnote 1, Document 168.
2 For original, see Document 168.
3 0.I. Ashton, MHA, East and West New Britain regional electorate.
4 This word should perhaps read ‘for’.
5 In a marginal note, Hay added: ‘Mr Guise has made it quite clear that he would not let party affiliations prevent him from taking a position of responsibility in the Admin. Ex. Council’.
6 In a handwritten addition, Hay commented that he would ‘be discussing these points, in general terms, with the Minister when he is here’.
7 The remainder of this sub-section corresponds to that in the attachment to Document 168 except that the words ‘but not all’ were omitted in connection with the exercise of ministerial responsibilities by elected members. Also, the words ‘policy making’, in the context the AEC’s capacity, were placed in quotation marks.
8 Matter omitted includes five points that in substance match the first five points of II(A)(i) in the attachment to Document 168.
9 Matter omitted is in substance the same as points three and four of II(A)(ii) of loc. cit.
10 Section II(A)(iv) matches that of loc. cit.
11 Matter omitted, and that following, is substantially identical to the corresponding section of loc. cit.
12 Matter omitted matches the first dot point of the corresponding section in loc. cit.
13 Matter omitted is the same as the last dot point in this section of loc. cit.
14 Matter omitted, and that following, is identical to the corresponding section of loc. cit.
15 Overseas Telecommunications Commission.
16 This should probably read ‘on’.
17 The words ‘on which’ appear to be superfluous.