Canberra, 25 February 1966
Papua and New Guinea ultimate status submission
Mr Payne1 and I have read the Defence summary2 and the note on your discussion with the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. 3 We feel that the Defence Committee have largely adopted the External Affairs3 view. The last page of the Defence assessment states in effect that irrespective of the constitutional or treaty arrangements the security of Australian defence interests in the Territory depends upon the goodwill of the Local Government. This is far cry from the original proposition in paragraph 14 of our draft submission that the only satisfactory form of solution would be a form of association which was both close and permanent and which guaranteed Australian retention of Australia’s responsibility for the defence of the Territory and undisputed authority to discharge that responsibility. Also in paragraph 13 of our draft submission we have said that the effect of the Defence assessment is that the defence aspects are ‘vital’ to Australia’s security; the present Defence assessment says that ‘it is important that access to the Territory and its base facilities be maintained’.
2. The conclusion that both Mr Payne and I come to from this is that the Defence assessment in its present form does not support our proposition for closer association.
3. We are bound to query whether External Affairs and the Defence Departments have really given thought to the types of closer association which have been tried overseas, particularly the Porto Rico, Netherlands West Indies and British West Indies precedents.
4. I would like to suggest that before we do any more rewriting you should show the schedule that we had prepared containing details of forms of closer association to Sir James Plimsoll to find out whether he really does exclude an association on these general lines, but adapted to suit the requirements of the Australian constitution.
5. There is one thing that the Defence paper may bring out which would improve our own thinking; this its that a constitutional arrangement which does not give the option of withdrawal might cause resentment and not serve a useful purpose. The British West Indies arrangement had envisaged it being possible for any of the parties, including Great Britain, to pull out. In the case of the Cook Islands the United Nations insisted on such a provision as the price of ‘getting off the hook’.
6. It seems to me that the alteration which we might need to offer to External Affairs to secure their support, and from this possibly the support of the Defence Committee, would be to include—
(a) the schedule setting out the forms of some of the types of constitutional association which have been achieved elsewhere; and
(b) the proposition that there should be an open ended option for the Territory’s withdrawal from an association arrangement of this kind if they wish.
[NAA: A452, 1965/3353]
1 E. E. Payne, position unidentified, DOT.
2 Document 12.
3 Plimsoll had commented to Warwick Smith that ‘His basic position was that … independence is the desirable outcome but his interpretation of independence is independence plus treaties plus common administrative services etc.’ (note by Warwick Smith, 24 February 1966, NAA: A452, 1965/3353).