Melbourne, 23 May 1968
Secret
I enclose the report prepared by my Deputy, Mr. P. Barbour, as the result of his recent visit to Port Moresby.
When the Administrator spoke with me earlier this year he seemed to be concerned with two principal considerations: that the security and intelligence functions be exercised efficiently but discreetly in the delicate period which lies ahead in the Territory; and that the Administration should aim to provide a security and intelligence organization which would not be capable of conversion into a type of ‘secret police’ when self–government is achieved in the Territory.1
After careful consideration of the factors and examination of Mr. Barbour’s report I am confirmed in my belief that the Special Branch should continue as the security intelligence authority. I endorse Mr. Barbour’s recommendations that the Administration should concentrate upon the careful selection of a small number of suitable experienced officers to staff the nucleus of the Special Branch and upon the training of selected indigenous police officers as a long–term programme.
I would urge most strongly that the Administration should regard the Special Branch as a regular member of its team, serving the requirements of the Administrator, and that a way be found to appoint selected civilian officers of the Administration to vacancies in the Special Branch as an interim measure pending the training of indigenous personnel.
I would regard the selection of a suitable head of the Special Branch as of primary importance. He must have the confidence of the Administrator and the co–operation of the Administration. I endorse Mr. Barbour’s view that he should preferably be selected from the staff of the Administration with his deputies providing the professional expertise. Although remaining under the general administrative control of the Commissioner of Police, I would see no difficulty in separating the Special Branch entirely from the C.I.D.2 and making its head directly responsible to ‘Government’ for all matters of security and intelligence. Apart from his having direct access to the Administrator, it is important that the Administrator should have the machinery for the collective assessment of the mass of intelligence reports which go into the headquarters of the Administration. Without it reports tend to ‘disappear’ into the central secretariat after being individually read by individual officers and much of their value is lost.
I trust you will find this report useful. I am sending a copy to the Administrator also.
Attachment
ORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH OF THE ROYAL PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY
1. A review of the organization of security and intelligence in the Territory was generated by a proposal for re-organization submitted by the Head of the Special Branch3 in January 1968. At the same time the Administrator felt the need for clarification of the Special Branch charter and for consideration of the form of organization best suited to bequeath to a self-governing Territory. Arising out of discussions between the Administrator and yourself it was agreed that l should visit Port Moresby and submit a report.
2. I visited the Territory from 21st to 28th April, 1968, and had discussions with the following persons:
His Honour the Administrator (Mr. D.O. Hay);
Mr. D.M. Fenbury, Secretary, D.A.;4
Mr. G. Toogood, Assistant Secretary, D.A.;
Mr. B. Hayes, Executive Officer, T.I.C.;
Mr. T.W. Ellis, Director, D.D.A.;
Mr. W.W. Watkins, Secretary, Law;
Mr. D. Parrish, Secretary, Labour;
Mr. R. R. Cole, Commissioner of Police;
Mr. A.C. Erskine, Deputy Commissioner of Police;
Mr. A. Brohocki, Special Branch, R.P.N.G.C.;
Mr. G. Grace, Special Branch,. R.P.N.G.C.;
5 Regional Director, A.S.I.O.;
Brig. I. Hunter, Army Commander.
I also met several District Commissioners, who were in Port Moresby for a conference, and certain other officials. All officials with whom I spoke were helpful and desired to achieve an effective organization in the interests of the Territory. None questioned the need for such an organization.
3. Broadly, the aspects under consideration were
(a) Functions of the security organization.
(b) Its form (Special Branch or a civilian body).
(c) Scope of its work.
(d) Staffing.
(e) Leadership.
(f) Handling of its product.
Functions
4. The functions of the organization were described by the Head of Special Branch in his paper of January 1968 as follows:
(a) The collection of security intelligence from both overt and covert sources, concerning persons, groups of people or organizations which are considered to be subversive or are potentially subversive.
(b) The collation of all such intelligence, its critical examination and its evaluation.
(c) To enquire into acts of subversion and sabotage against the security of the Territory, whether directed from or intended to be committed within Papua and New Guinea or not.
(d) To examine, in consultation with other authorities as necessary, all written material suspected of being subversive or seditious and to recommend appropriate counter measures.
(e) To keep the Administrator informed in relation to the state of public opinion on matters which are likely to cause rank discontent or dissatisfaction with the Administration and its policies.
(f) The organization of Travel Control.
(g) The discharging of all security checking commitments required by Government. The advising of Government Departments, essential services and vital industries on all protective security measures.
(h) The provision of relevant intelligence to the authorities responsible for the protection of Very Important Persons, resident in or passing through the Territory.
(i) The maintenance of liaison and collaboration with such friendly intelligence agencies as the Government may authorize or direct.
(k) The maintenance of records in such depth as to enable the organization to fulfil the above functions.
(j) The dissemination of all evaluated intelligence to interested parties and agencies.
Such functions correspond reasonably with those of A.S.I.O. Item (e) might be queried, but should be accepted if interpreted as applying only to such intelligence on the subject which may come to the organization in the course of its duties.
5. The suggestion has been made that a distinction should be drawn arbitrarily between ‘political’ intelligence and ‘security’ intelligence and that the former is not a concern of the security intelligence authority. It is difficult to conceive of a definition of ‘political’ or of ‘security’ which would allow of such a distinction being drawn. It may be said that political intelligence is security intelligence and security intelligence is political intelligence. Nor is it appropriate to distinguish between intelligence from ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ sources and to limit the security intelligence authority to the latter field of activity. An experienced and well-trained security intelligence officer should be capable of determining what intelligence matters are relevant to the security considerations and of ensuring that no embarrassment accrues to government by his actions. If the organization is regarded, properly, as a part of the appapatus of Government, it should be able on the one hand to receive from other departments all intelligence which is relevant and on the other hand to contribute its part to the whole picture being presented to Government. Difficulties are created if the executive attempts to prescribe the actions of the Head of the organization in the performance of his responsibilities. Suffice to define ‘intelligence’ as that which is reported through all arms of the administration and ‘security intelligence’ as that part of it which relates to security considerations.
Form of organization
6. Careful consideration has been given to the question of whether the security intelligence authority should be a police or civilian body. There are precedents for each in democratic countries. While Australia, Britain and New Zealand, for example, have civilian bodies, Canada and the United States have the security authority vested in the police. All British colonial territories have bequeathed Special Branches to those which have gained independence. Each country adopts the form best suited to its peculiar circumstances.
7. It has been suggested that a Special Branch may be more prone to conversion in a self-governing Territory to a form of ‘secret police’ or ‘political police’ and that the tendency towards authoritarianism displayed by newly independent governments causes them to use the police and military forces as their principal source of power. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the best legacy for the preservation of law and order is a trained, disciplined, regular police force which by its very training is less easily perverted. I was told that the experience of at least one newly self-governing country in Africa was that the Prime Minister, thwarted in his efforts to pervert the trained regular Special Branch, created his own covert civilian intelligence body for political and racial affairs which functioned in a totally unscrupulous and illegal manner.
8. If Australia is able to achieve the legacy of a strong and democratic central government in the Territory there is reason for optimism as to the use of the police. No doubt every effort is being made to develop an indigenous police force of integrity and public respect of which a Special Branch could form an integral part.
9. Difficulties of staffing the Special Branch tended initially to encourage consideration of a civilian agency as the only solution, but further difficulty was found in the administrative location of such a body. After careful examination of these aspects it was felt that the administrative problems were not insurmountable, in which case it was suggested that such a body could be located administratively under the Secretary of the Department of the Administrator, which I feel would be most appropriate.
10. However, in the circumstances existing in the Territory all senior officials whom I consulted agreed that the Special Branch should be retained in preference to a new civilian agency. Furthermore, the Special Branch is a viable entity with a sound basis of records, organization and established relations with other agencies including A.S.I.O. To establish a new organization would take time which can ill be afforded at a critical stage in the development of the Territory towards independence. I would recommend that preference be given to facilitating the development of the existing Special Branch as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Scope of Special Branch role
11. Some difference of opinion was expressed on the scope of the responsibility of Special Branch as a collector and repository of intelligence and this is a factor which has caused the Administrator some concern. After some examination of this aspect I have concluded that the extent of the concern depends mainly on the definition of ‘intelligence’. If viewed as in paragraph 5 above, there appears to be no problem. However, it has also been said that the resources of the Administration cannot permit ‘more than one’ intelligence collecting agency or ‘more than one’ repository and ‘therefore’ it should be the responsibility of the Special Branch. This is neither logical nor correct.
12. It is probably true to regard all the Departments and agencies of the Administration as collectors and reporters of ‘intelligence’ in the normal course of their duties. The need for some apparatus to collate it is mentioned below (paragraph 23). The existing machinery permits liaison (albeit inadequate as yet) between them and the Special Branch to ensure that all intelligence relating to security interests is available to the Special Branch. Indeed the majority of such intelligence comes from overt sources or, at any rate, is obtainable from such sources in the exercise of their normal responsibilities. The principal one of these is the Department of District Administration. By the nature of its functions and the breadth of its coverage, the D.D.A. is best placed to provide the ‘intelligence’ which the Administration requires to keep itself informed of events and attitudes. By this I mean the information which it has the resources to obtain officially and normally. Information which cannot be obtained by this means is relatively rare in rural areas and such cases call for Special Branch operations.
13. The senior and experienced officers of the Administration agreed that, at this stage, the main requirement for Special Branch representatives is in the urban areas. Special Branch officers in urban areas have either been found helpful where they exist or are considered necessary where they do not exist. This is consistent with the usual pattern of priorities for Special Branch-type work. I would assess the highest priority for Special Branch activities as being in Port Moresby, followed by other principal urban areas such as Rabaul and Lae. I see no advantage in attempting Special Branch representation in rural areas at this stage; any such requirements which arise can be handled by mobile representation from urban centres or Headquarters in Port Moresby.
14. The Director of D.D.A. is prepared to co-operate closely with Special Branch, not only as a major contributor overall, but also in the absence of resident Special Branch officers in certain Districts. Having discussed his plans in detail I am confident that they will meet the requirement admirably and will risk no embarrassment of the Administration. The Administrator is understandably concerned that the activities of D.D.A. officers should in no way prejudice their image as guardians of the welfare of the indigenous peoples.
15. In those Districts where Special Branch officers are located co-operation will be developed and in those where Special Branch is not represented a designated officer of D.D.A. (perhaps the Deputy D.C.) can discreetly be made responsible for ‘intelligence’ interests. I feel confident that by close liaison in Port Moresby between the Special Branch and D.D.A. a valuable coverage can be achieved and collation effected of the intelligence product.
Staffing
16. Lack of available staff of the right calibre is one of the main problems facing the Special Branch. All concerned assured me that there are no suitable appointees available in the Constabulary and recruitment prospects are poor. Experienced Administration officers all agreed that the main qualification required by Special Branch recruits was experience in the Territory, preferably of eight years District service. After general consultations I concluded that the immediate requirement could best be filled by the appointment of selected D.D.A. officers with the appropriate experience and suitability.
17. At the present stage of political development in the Territory the Administrator is naturally anxious that Special Branch activities should not inhibit legitimate political activity or embarrass the Administration. To ensure this requires personnel of integrity, discretion and professional competence who are familiar with local conditions. It is essential, therefore, to appoint only suitable officers to staff the Special Branch. Unsuitable officers or persons appointed only because they are available or because they must be drawn from the Constabulary are likely to do more harm than good. Since available resources of personnel are very limited, it is obvious that in the present circumstances Special Branch would be well advised to concentrate on a small nucleus of competent officers and an active programme of professional training. I would recommend that no attempt be made to expand Special Branch representation into rural Districts at this stage and that priority be given to staffing a nucleus in the Headquarters in Port Moresby and in selected urban districts. After consultation with senior Special Branch officers, it is considered that the appointment of six D.D.A. officers at various levels would meet the immediate requirement. They believe that six D.D.A. officers can be selected who would be willing to accept appointment to the Special Branch. I would envisage that they serve in a civilian capacity and that they have opportunities for promotion either in vacancies within the Special Branch or by leaving Special Branch to take positions elsewhere in the Administration service. This is to be regarded largely as an interim measure to relieve the present staffing crisis, but it may be expected that at least some of such officers will wish to continue a Special Branch career and that those who choose to leave will be replaced by others on the same basis until permanent indigenous candidates are available.
18. The objective of staffing the Special Branch will be to achieve an increasing component of indigenous officers. These persons should, I believe, preferably be graduates of the Police College with practical experience in the Districts who are selected for their suitability and given thorough training by professional security intelligence staff upon appointment.
Leadership
19. I believe the selection of a suitable head of the Special Branch is most important. He should be a man in whom the Administrator has confidence and who enjoys direct access to the Administrator when necessary, and to ‘Government’. He should also enjoy good relations with other Departments and agencies of Government.
20. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Police assured me that there is no-one suitable to head the Special Branch in the Police at present. Furthermore, I believe there is positive merit in a civilian appointment. There was general agreement that an officer of the D.D.A. would be a desirable appointee and I understand Mr. Erskine has one or two suitable candidates in mind to recommend. It was felt that the grading of the position should be equivalent to that of a District Commissioner. I would recommend for consideration that he hold the title of ‘Director of Security and Intelligence’, following the model of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The R.C.M.P, incidentally, have adopted the same practice of appointing civilians to positions in the ‘Special Branch’, who are gradually being replaced as career police officers become trained to Special Branch work.
21. Consistently with my recommendations for a civilian Director and his access to the Administrator, I consider it desirable for the Special Branch, while remaining a police formation under the general administrative and disciplinary control of the Commissioner of Police, to be directly responsible to ‘Government’, say, in the form of the Secretary of the Department of the Administrator. This has several merits, not the least being the integration of Special Branch activity with the Administration and the facility to ‘feed back’ its product to the Administration in the field.
Handling of the product
22. Experience of intelligence reporting generally has emphasized the need for an efficient machinery of collation and analysis to serve ‘Government’. Too often reports are tendered to individuals or Departments and ‘disappear’, so that they either fail to reach ‘Government’ or fail to be collated into a picture of the situation as a whole.
23. Such a matter is really outside the charter of my visit, so I have refrained from pursuing it. However, it would appear that the creation of some sort of secretariat machinery would enable intelligence from all quarters to be drawn together on behalf of the Administrator and would provide him with a service on which to base his monthly reports to Canberra. At present it appears that the only joint machinery is that of the T.l.C. which serves a different purpose but whose assessments assume another perspective in the absence of a concomitant ‘Administrator’s Report’.
24. Some confusion exists as to how such a machinery can be established and I have not attempted to intrude. The problem is quite complex as it would be undesirable to develop yet another intelligence-processing group or a separate repository for sensitive material. I have also not attempted to pursue the aspect raised by the Administrator concerning the incipient diversion of local and Australian intelligence responsibilities, beyond saying that A.S.I.O. will continue to exercise its Commonwealth functions while the Special Branch develops gradually towards independence.6
[NAA: A452, 1968/3943]
1 In a letter of 14 March to Warwick Smith, Hay explained the background to Barbour’s visit as follows: ‘Police Commissioner [Cole] has been concerned about staffing difficulties and has suggested that the Special Branch might be better placed elsewhere in the Administration. Second, I have independently formed the opinion that a civilian–type intelligence organization, under the control of the Administration, might better suit this Territory than a Special Branch’. Hay had urged that Barnes approve a visit by ASIO to ‘review the organization and functions of Special Branch since its establishment and recommend any changes that may be considered necessary’ (NAA: A452, 1968/3943). Concerns about the Territory’s intelligence structures and operations had been evident in Territories and the Administration since early 1967 (see NAA: A452, 1969/2032).
2 Criminal Investigation Department.
3 A.C’. Erskine.
4 Department of the Administrator.
5 Name expunged.
6 Responding to the report, Hay wrote that he had ‘some doubts’ on paragraphs 4, 5, and II, and on paragraphs 22 to 24. With regard to the form of the organisation (paragraphs 6–10), he agreed that it should ‘be developed from and within the existing Special Branch’, while on the Branch’s role (paragraphs 11–15), he concurred with the suggestion that it concentrate its work in urban areas. Hay also agreed that priority in staffing (paragraphs 16–18) should be given to a ‘small nucleus’ in Port Moresby and to a training program. He supported the use of personnel from DDA and the Police Training College. On the question of leadership (paragraphs 19–21), Hay approved of a civilian appointment (letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 16 July 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/3943—and on 13 August the Minister endorsed the selection of DDA’s D.P. Sheekey as ‘Director of Security and Intelligence’ (letter, Warwick Smith to Hay, 13 August 1968, ibid.). As an interim measure, Sheekey’s position was formally located within DDA, despite the concern of the Administrator that the image of DDA be protected. Another temporary step to alleviate the Special Branch staffing crisis was the creation of six positions in DDA headquarters, ‘it being understood they would carry out discreetly Special Branch duties in rural areas, in association with their normal duties’. Because this was not a long-term answer to the problems identified by Barbour, it was also decided that a review would later be conducted on the desirability of converting these positions to full-time status (submission, Besley to Barnes, 24 October 1968, ibid.).