Canberra, 29 May 1968
Papua and New Guinea–introduction of Ministerial Member system
There has been something of a storm in a teacup between the Department and the Administration while you have been away about the Ministerial Member system generally.
2. You will recall signing a submission containing three recommendations.1 The first sought approval of our Paper C.W.P.2 as arrangements under Section 25 of the Act; the second proposed that this should be published at the precommencement meeting; and the third proposed that the Administrative Arrangements Ordinance should be amended to remove departmental functions from Assistant Administrators.
3. I informed the Administration that we were proposing to put forward a recommendation on these lines and received a message while Hay was away opposing the recommendations and arguing for no arrangements at all to give local flexibility. The recommendations in respect of the functions of Assistant Administrators were also opposed.
4. I discussed very briefly with Besley and we felt that while the amendments to the legislation concerning Assistant Administrators did not necessarily need to be determined before the precommencement meeting (and your return) but that the functions of Ministerial Members did need to be so determined and I replied to Port Moresby to that effect.
5. I took the Minister through our C.W.P.2 and he approved it as the arrangements for the Ministerial Member system and that it should be tabled at the precommencement meeting. He also directed that recommendations should be put to him for any amendments to the Administrative Arrangements Ordinance concerning Assistant Administrators which may be needed.
6. On Sunday the Administrator telephoned the Minister in Warwick and objected to the proposition that C.W.P.2 should be the arrangements approved under the Act; he objected to the details being made public and to the proposal that C.W.P.2 should be tabled at the precommencement meeting. The following morning the Minister telephoned me about this and I told him that the Act required formal arrangements to be made under Section 25 and that these would have to be communicated at least to the Ministerial Members and the Assistant Ministerial Members.
7. Subsequently, a message arrived in the Department from the Administrator saying that the Minister agreed with the Administrator and that to keep faith with Voutas the Minister had agreed to the Administrator making a statement at the precommencement meeting in general terns about the functions of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members.2 This statement was sent down the same day for clearance and was cleared.3 After discussion with me, however, the Minister directed that if any questions arose as to how the system would work they should be answered in the terms of the previous approval. He also directed that a report be sent to him on the discussions on the Ministerial Member system.
8. It appears that Watkins hadn’t appreciated or hadn’t explained the effect of Section 25. The position now is that the Administrator has accepted the need for some formal approval under the Act and the Minister has agreed to discuss this when you are in Port Moresby next week.4 I have asked that any counter proposals the Administration may put forward to the revised C.W.P.2 should be sent to us immediately.
9. The basic element seems to be the unwillingness of the Assistant Administrators to accept that they are not to have departmental functions.
10. I understand that the Administrator has expressed concern that messages referred to the functions of Assistant Administrators at all. In explaining the need to amend the Administrative Arrangements Ordinance I referred to the summary of conclusions of your meeting with the Administrator in support of the proposition that they were to cease to have departmental functions5 and I asked when Somers was going to send his promised proposals for amendment. Somers’ reply was that he understood this was a matter to be dealt with as part6 departmental re-organization and required no immediate decision.
11. I don’t think we should accept this point of view. The moment at which the Assistant Administrators should cease to exercise administrative functions in respect of departments with Ministerial Members should be when the Ministerial Members take up office. We made this clear in earlier correspondence and there is no question of it having arisen out of the discussions on re–organization.7
12. The Administrative Arrangements· Ordinance itself provides for an order to be issued designating the Departments which are to be the responsibility of Assistant Administrators. While the legislation should be amended to remove this provision it is not the Ordinance itself but a proclamation under the Ordinance which actually designates functions and we now discover that by an error in Port Moresby the present order has been allowed lapse so that Assistant Administrators probably have no legal departmental functions.
13. The question of Assistant Administrators’ functions is likely to be discussed with you and the Minister in Port Moresby together with the detailed arrangements for the Ministerial Members. The Minister’s disposition is towards flexibility. I feel that the cloak of flexibility is a cover for preserving the authority of the Assistant Administrators (and the Departmental Head through the I.D.C.C.). The argument that we are trying to rush this at a pace members don’t want (as well as being tendentious) is not justified as our C.W.P.2 which8 would {le}ave a Departmental Head able to carry out his functions if a Ministerial Member did not feel able to perform all his duties.
14. In Fiji I was told that the principal factor in getting the membership system to work was to get the public servants to accept it. I do not see the system working on a basis which leaves it open to officials to treat Ministerial Members as Under-Secretaries.
[NAA: A452, 1970/4521]
Pacific Islands Regiment: ongoing debate over its size and role
The debate over the size and role of the PIR, principally between External Territories and the Army, resumed during 1968. Following agreement in October 1967 for the preparation of a joint Cabinet submission1 –an arrangement confirmed during the tense exchange of letters in December2–Territories became impatient over inaction in early 1968. Barnes signed a letter to the new Minister for the Army, P.R. Lynch, in which he noted that ‘little progress’ had been made and asked that senior officers of the two departments ‘meet straight away’.3 In the event, the letter was not sent because Warwick Smith met with his Army and Defence counterparts, whereupon ‘it was suggested that the question should be re-examined in the Defence machinery’.4
The process of formal consideration began in April with separate submissions by DOET and the Army to the Joint Planning Staff. Territories reiterated views expressed earlier by Warwick Smith,5 although it developed further the idea that current projections for the growth of the PIR would result in disproportionate expenditure on defence once the cost was to be raised locally.6 The Army paper argued that the Territory faced three main threats: the possibility of Indonesian insurgency similar to that experienced in Borneo during confrontation of Malaysia; racial tensions leading to a serious threat to internal security; and major unrest stemming from inter-tribal rivalries.7 It followed that the ‘role of the Army cannot be seen simply in relation to a future independent TPNG’—its role had to be applicable to the ‘approach to independence’, independence and post–independence. In practical terms, the PIR would be needed for ‘domination’ of the PNG–West Irian border and for assistance to the Territory government in the maintenance of civil order, while maintaining self-sufficiency to the greatest possible degree. This, in turn, required a third battalion and the maintenance of force support units at the present level, totalling 3,650 indigenous and 650 Australian Regular Army personnel. In the interim, however, the Army proposed to meet a target of 2, 800 indigenous officers by 1968–9, and move from two to three batialions only after 1970. On the question of relations with civil authorities, the submission contended that there was a need to educate current and future local government as there was a ‘lack of understanding’ of the PIR’s roles and responsibilities. Relations with the community would be best protected by avoiding further deterioration in conditions of service, by comprehensive training (including character training and civil action) and by avoiding premature use of the army for internal security purposes.
The subsequent Joint Planning Committee (JPC) report was described by Ashwin of DEA as ‘lengthy and in many ways a typical Committee production’.3 Ashwin noted that the ‘two chief points of controversy’ during the Committees deliberations were the validity of the three unit concept and the role of the PJR in internal security. On the first, Territories representatives, ‘while disposed in general to oppose the formation of a third battalion, were constrained to agree that the concept had a certain logic’. On the second:
All members of the Joint Planning Committee agreed that the Pacific Islands Regiment should continue to be seen as a ‘last resort’ force and that primary emphasis should be placed upon the Constabulary. The Committee agreed that PIR elements should not be raised specifically for internal security purposes. However, all present agreed that an Army force could be most important to a future independent New Guinea Government in the maintenance of law and order. On the question of a military coup d’etat Territories was initially disposed to argue that a three battalion force constituted inherently a greater risk than a force of two battalions. It could not of course sustain this. In the same context, Territories tried to argue against having any or more than token Army forces stationed in the Port Moresby area. Territories takes the view that because of what it calls the ‘atmosphere’ of Port Moresby and because it is the seat of Government, location of sizeable Army forces in the vicinity constitutes a possible irritant and a possible threat. The Committee would not accept this view … It considered it unrealistic to suggest that an independent New Guinea would not locate Army Headquarters and certain units at Port Moresby. It also considered that the investment already made in facilities there, the logistic backing available from Port Moresby and potential internal security needs made it utterly unpracticable to suggest any reduction of the size of the PIR establishment at Port Moresby. The Committee took the view that the proper response to Territories ‘fears about an Army coup d’etat lay in a whole range of measures involving officer development, standards of training and the promotion of rapport between the Army and the Community as a whole.
1 Final is Document 185.
2 Barnes had made an ‘undertaking … to Voutas that the details of the Ministerial Members system would be made known to all the members at the preliminary session [of the House] so that they could decide whether to stand for nomination’ (telex B270/4516, DOET to Administration, 27 May 1968, NAA: A452, 1970/4521 ).
3 Hay had noted that the speech was in ‘general terms, follow[ing] the line of the Minister’s own second reading speech … adding such matter from the working papers as is appropriate … the purpose of the speech is to explain the system to Members who have to elect a nominations committee and come to conclusions on who should hold ministerial offices’ (telex 5219, Hay to Ballard, 27 May 1968, ibid.). Text of the speech is contained in telex 5220, Administration to Ballard, 27 May 1968, ibid. For Barnes’ second reading speech, see Commonwealth parliamentary debates (Reps), vol. 58, pp. 1055–1060.
4 Barnes and Warwick Smith departed on 31 May for a visit to PNG.
5 See attachment to Document 179.
6 The word ‘of’ appears to be missing here.
7 On 23 May, Ballard had telexed Somers: ‘It must be accepted that it would not be in accordance with the decisions that have been taken by the Government or with the tenor of the Papua and New Guinea Act for departments which have become the responsibility of Ministerial Members to remain or to be stated in Territory legislation to be assigned to Assistant Administrators’ (telex B270/4460, Ballard to Somers, 23 May 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4245). Four days later, Ballard commented to Besley: ‘It is a thoroughly good thing that this has come to a head now. It would be much worse if it had not come to a head and it had in fact caused frustration to the Ministerial Members after they had taken up office … I feel it is essential to maintain the position that this has to be decided now’ (minute, Ballard to Besley, 27 May 1968, ibid.).
8 This word appears to be superfluous.
1 See Document 145.
2 See attachment, Document 151, and Document 152.
3 See letter, Barnes to Lynch, undated, NAA: A452, 1966/4989.
4 Memorandum, Army (White) to Defence, 8 April 1968, NAA: A6846 part 19. There was also some discussion of the Administration’s accommodation shortages, but Warwick Smith indicated to Hay that he ‘doubt[ed] whether we will get any finality for some weeks yet’ (letter, 3 April 1968, NAA: A452, 1966/4989). Indeed, at the meeting White had ‘pointed out that the first and essential step before any use of Army accommodation by other agencies should be to seek a Cabinet decision on the size and role of the force in P/NG with a related time programme’ (brief by J.R. Lynch (Director of Quartering, Department of the Army) for Major-General M.F. Brogan (Quartermaster-General, Department of the Army), 2 May 1968, NAA: A6846 part 19).
5 See attachment, Document 151.
6 Supplement no. I to Joint Service Reference no. 55/1968, 23 April 1968, NAA: A1838, 689/2 part 2. The paper contended that a force of 3,500, as proposed by the Army, would, with Air and Navy, correspond to 6.1% of Administration expenditure (as calculated in relation to current defence expenditure in the Territory and total Administration expenditure for 1967/68).
7 Supplement no. 2 to Joint Service Reference no. 55/1968, 24 April 1968, ibid. In mid-May, Warwick Smith had told Hay that ‘in my view it was not for the Army to make any assessment about what was required for internal security. Their internal security function was limited to giving aid when called upon by the civil power. Any conceivable practical size of the P.I.R. would be I thought much in excess of any strength that could be required for internal security purposes i.e. a strength of 1,200 was the lowest strength anybody had suggested for the P.I.R.—from a military point of view this was more than enough for internal security purposes having in mind the availability at reasonably short call of Australian forces’ (minute, Warwick Smith to Besley, 14 May 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/2441 part 2).
8 Minute, Ashwin to Jockel, 27 May 1968, NAA: A1838, 689/2 part 3.