Canberra, 30 May 1968
Top Secret
Future size and role of the Pacific Islands Regiment
The Defence Committee considered Joint Planning Committee Report No. 32/1968 on the future size, role, rate of development and disposition of the Pacific Islands Regiment including implications for programme objectives and works, taking into account local internal security problems, economic considerations and availability of officer trainees.1
2. The Defence Committee directed itself to a broad consideration of the policy issues involved and having regard to the conclusions to which it came which are noted later, refrained from a detailed examination of the content of the Report. In passing, the Committee—
(a) observed that the Report had only briefly canvassed the strategic factors2 and noted that these would call for consideration when the review of the strategic basis of Australian defence policy had been completed;
(b) recognised that Australia had an obligation to develop for Papua New Guinea as with other institutions, a defence force appropriate to its needs and circumstances and that the structure of that force need not necessarily conform with the Australian pattern;
(c) observed that the Report was directed to the P.I.R. and had scant reference to other elements of a defence force;
(d) noted that the then Minister for Defence in early 1965 had directed in relation to a Navy project, that ‘the desirable arrangement in due course might well be one Defence Force in Papua New Guinea covering all the Services.’
(e) accepted that the development of an adequately trained, well disciplined and effective force would take time and that this was especially true of the officer and N.C.O. element;
(f) accepted that economic and social factors had to be taken into account in deciding what the appropriate force should be and that economic considerations dictate that at the present stage of the country’s development, the Army in Papua and New Guinea should be developed primarily as an infantry force supported as far as practicable by indigenous supporting units;
(g) acknowledged the desirability of a progressive replacement of A.R.A. personnel now with the P.I.R. by indigenous personnel and of the Australian aim being a minimum defence presence in Papua New Guinea after independence;
(h) felt that the independence of Papua New Guinea might occur sooner than was sometimes asserted and that while it was impossible to predict what P.N.G.–Australia relationships in relation to defence would be, it was important that such a climate should be created as would cause P.N.G. to look to Australia rather than elsewhere for assistance in defence;
(i) considered that for this and other reasons Australia should in its association with the development of indigenous forces, do all within its power to create among the personnel of P.N.G. forces a spirit of goodwill towards Australia;
(j) considered that there was a need for greater efforts on the part of the Administration to involve the P.N.G. forces in the life of the community—to remove any suggestion that they were the instrument of the Australian Government and to present the P.N.G. forces as no less a vital element in the country’s institutions than the Police and Government Services. In this connection, the Committee noted the advantages of maintaining an appropriate relationship between the conditions of indigenous public servants, police and PIR and noted with approval the comments in paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Report.3 It thought there might be room for special action directed to the re-establishment of ex-members of the P.N.G. forces in their own communities and considered that the Administration in conjunction with the Army and Navy, should direct its attention to these problems as a matter of urgency;
(k) accepted that—
(1) the purpose of the P.I.R. was to provide an efficient national Army to P.N.G. capable of playing a vital part in the defence of the Territory against overt or covert aggression and to provide for the future, from within that capability, an efficient, well disciplined, stable and reliable Army, completely loyal to the Administration or established Government of the country;
(2) the roles of the P.I.R. were—
(i) to keep under surveillance and defend the border and coastal areas of P.N.G. particularly adjacent to West Irian;
(ii) to contribute to the internal defence of P.N.G. particularly in countering a threat from subversion, insurgency or guerrilla warfare, where such a threat is externally controlled, directed or supported.
(3) while the role and function of the Police is to maintain law and order, P.N.G. forces could, as was the case in Australia, under the Defence Act, have a role in the event of civil disorder to support the Police and clearly, in case of last resort, have the role of sustaining and supporting the Administration.
(I) accepted that since Australia would almost certainly become involved if P.N.G. were under attack, the defence ofP.N.G. should be taken into account as part of the total Australian Defence effort.
3. The Committee noted that—
(a) In November, 1964 the then Prime Minister had announced that the P.I.R. would be increased to three battalions and supporting units with a total strength approaching 3,500 by June, 1968;
(b) The approximate strength of PI’s is at present 2,500 and of the A.R.A. 632;
(c) The Army is at present working to a programme to increase the strength of PI’s to 2,800 by June 1969; even so this will involve deferring the raising of a third battalion;
(d) The increase in the force from the present level to 2,800 is necessary to fill the logistic and service units required to make a two battalion PIR a viable and self-supporting force for the present and that without this increase the ARA would need to provide these functions;
(e) It is anticipated that the required numbers of PI’s can be recruited and trained by June 1969 without loss of standards;
(f) In relation to the raising of the third battalion, difficulties are foreseen in officer manning which will prevent a three battalion PIR being achieved in 1970 as previously expected;
(g) Although additional ARA officers cannot be made available to the PIR, the currently planned indigenous officer production will permit a start to be made on raising the third battalion in 1972 and its manning should be completed by 1974.
4. The Committee felt that while it did not dissent from conclusions in the Report, that from a military point of view, to carry out the roles mentioned in para 2 (j) (k) a three battalion organization deployed as mentioned in para 50 of the Report,4 would be required, no final decision should be taken at this stage on the three battalion concept advanced in the Report. It was reinforced in this feeling by the considerations noted in para 3 and because it desired that a review be undertaken not later than 1970 to decide the overall position of the defence forces of P.N.G. including the P.N.G. Naval Division, air transport and other support requirements.
5. The Committee desired that the review should take account of the defence needs of P.N.G. in the setting of that country’s economic and social considerations, strategic considerations affecting Australia, and the relationships that might exist between the P.N.G. forces and the Australian Defence structure. It should direct particular attention to the type of forces that the circumstances of P.N.G. demanded which might not necessarily conform to the Australian pattern and might point to the desirability of a unified defence force.
6. The Committee considered that–
(a) Meantime the Army should work to a P.I.R. strength of 3,500 odd (including 650 odd A.R.A.) by June 1969 and adopt a flexible approach to its composition so that if needs be, there could be a rapid expansion following the review mentioned in paras 4 and 5 or in the event of other circumstances arising that required it;
(b) While the strength proposed fails to satisfy the Prime Minister’s announcement of November 1964 as to number of battalions and target date, a force of the strength mentioned is about the minimum that would present any sort of credible appearance in relation to the tasks facing the P.I.R;
(c) Having regard to plans already announced for the P.I.R. and other considerations, any decision not to proceed in accordance with our stated policy would not be in the best interests of Australia in its relations with the U.S.A. and countries in South East Asia.
[NAA: A1209, 1968/8538 part 2]
1 See footnote 2, Document 189.
2 See footnote 18, Document 189.
3 Paragraph 66 noted that in recognition of possible problems between the PIR and a PNG government after independence, the army had instituted ‘a comprehensive scheme which incorporates balanced training in the military, education, character development and civil action fields … It seeks to show the PI soldier his duties and responsibilities as a member of a National Army both to the Army and to the Government of the country’. Continuing, paragraph 67 emphasised the importance of ‘positive measures’ for cooperation and understanding between the Administration, or a future government, and PNG forces: ‘Although there is co-operation between them on patrol programmes, including civic action patrols, the [Joint Planning] committee discussion has suggested that there could be more co-operation in other matters. For example, the Administration appears to play no part in the Army education programme discussed in paragraph 66 and no mention is made of the PIR in the Annual Reports of the Territory. The Committee felt that as progressive steps are made towards increased political and administrative responsibility by indigenes, on the one hand, and towards a national army on the other, it is important that every possible step be taken to develop on both the civil and military sides an awareness and understanding of each other and a sense of common identity. A separate study of this should be made’ (NAA: A1209, 1968/8538 part 2).
4 That is, one battalion based at Wewak/Vanimo to cover the northern border area, another based at Port Moresby to defend the southern border area, and a third stationed in the Lae area (ibid.).