Canberra, 11 January 1966
Secret
Elements of unrest in Papua/New Guinea
On 7th January I attended the meeting of the Local Intelligence Committee3 in Port Moresby as the E.A. representative and also in my capacity as Chairman, JIC. The JIC had previously expressed the view that I should attend one of the meetings of the LIC, partly to show an interest in their work and also to give some guidance on the practical operations of the LIC. I spent two days before the meeting calling on the Acting Administrator4 and a number of other officials, including the members of the LIC, with a view to making myself as familiar as possible with the current situation in the Territory.
2. A point of special interest, to which the Minister’s attention might be drawn, is that the LIC and most of the officials with whom I had talks voiced concern regarding the growth of unrest and resentment among the indigenous inhabitants, but especially in the security forces (the police and the army), in the Public Service and among the younger, educated natives who were likely leaders of the future.
3. The basic causes of the unrest related to conditions of living and not in any sense to the political future of the Territory. They related especially to the levels of pay and to the serious lack of accommodation.
4. Thus the TPNG5 Public Service Ordinance (1963), which brought down salary levels to what it was estimated the economy of the Territory could afford,6 was continuing to cause resentment both among native members of the Public Service and potential members who were at present students, this despite recent arbitration hearings which were not yet complete. Resentments over the serious deficiency of accommodation in urban areas, which affected in particular police and urban employees in business and industry, had been exacerbated by the recent announcement of plans to spend £3m for housing for migrant European labour.
5. It was the view of a number of senior officials well placed to judge the situation that a police strike was not unlikely in two or three months time if it appeared that they were not going to get satisfaction from the report of the Police Advisory Committee at present studying their conditions or if action were unduly delayed. Should this occur the situation in such centres as Port Moresby, Rabaul and Lae could become difficult and internationally embarrassing, especially if advantage were taken of the police strike by indigenous students or unemployed to cause trouble by looting or otherwise. The LIC view in its December report is that ‘should improvements in police conditions of service, which might result from the Committee’s report, be less than expected by members of the force, or be unduly delayed, it is considered very likely that strike action will be taken’.
6. On 10th December, 25 native soldiers went on strike at Murray Barracks over pay. Although this outbreak was dealt with promptly and severely, senior army officers are of the view that such an outbreak could well occur again in a few months time. One senior army officer expressed reservations regarding the ability of Australian officers to keep the loyalty of native troops, if discontent over pay levels continued. Senior army officers were concerned regarding the deterioration of the general internal security situation as it had developed over the last 12 months and which they considered was likely to grow worse in the ensuing 12 months.
7. Among the native Public Servants and students there seemed to be developing a bitterness towards the Administration and Europeans in general, which was taking on racial overtones. In its December report the LIC commented that ‘the situation now poses a potentially serious threat to good race relations, the morale of the Public Service and even to the maintenance of public order, due to the fact that elements of both the police and army have been involved’. It further commented ‘that it is evident, from considerations of reports received over the past six months that the Administrator, and by inference the Australian Government, has to some extent lost the trust and respect of the younger educated section of the urban native community due to what they considered to be a mishandling of these issues (Public Service salaries etc.). Because of their education the influence of members of this section on other members of the native community is out of proportion to their numbers’.
8. In general official views were that:
(a) unrest was localised and confined to urban areas;
(b) it had no relation to wider political demands and in fact political consciousness remained on a low level with little progress in the organization of either unions or political parties;
(c) press and radio had been unhelpful in playing up previous incidents;
(d) there was little external subversive activity;
(e) it was possible that trouble, although localised, could spread, and become a focal point for the development of a more distinct anti-Administration or anti-European political approach.
9. It was a very commonly held view among officials that the present unrest was partly the result of mishandling of the situation by Canberra, but was basically the result of a wrong determination of priorities. It was considered that, if Australia wishes to maintain good relations with the indigenous inhabitants or intends to continue the administration for a number of years, it was essential to retain the good will of the educated group who would be the future leaders and of the police and army, without whose assistance the Europeans could not maintain law and order. It was considered better to divert say £1m a year {from} economic development projects to improving the pay levels or the accommodation of this significant element of the native community.
10. In addition it was considered that there was an urgent need for clarification of ideas in Canberra on the future importance of the Territory to Australia, especially from the Defence and economic points of view. Those responsible for administration in the Territory needed to know whether Canberra had a clear idea of where it was going or whether the development of policy was being ‘played by ear’; whether Canberra was prepared to accept the international embarrassment of the Administration having to suppress ‘undesirable’ political movements or unrest in a country which was supposed to be in the process of being brought along at a rapid pace towards self-government and independence. Was Canberra consciously placing economic development before retention of good will among the future indigenous leaders?
[NAA: A 1838, 936/3/15 part 2]
1 O.L. Davis, Assistant Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
2 Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, DEA.
3 The establishment of the Local Intelligence Committee (LIC)—also known as the Territory Intelligence Committee (TIC)—was approved in 1964 for the purpose of ‘meeting the needs of the Administrator …and of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), for intelligence on the whole island of New Guinea and adjacent areas’ (‘Terms of Reference of Local Intelligence Committee’, approved by Barnes on 17 September 1964, NAA: A452, 1963/3387). Among its specific functions were ‘advising and reporting on internal intelligence matters … assessing and evaluating all available intelligence material on its area of responsibility … issuing periodical intelligence reviews at least once a month, and more often if the situation requires it … issuing Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Reports as the need for these may arise [and] undertaking intelligence studies at the request of the Administrator or the [JIC]’ (Joe. cit.). The background to the formation of the TIC was a direction from Cabinet of May 1963 that’ an adequate intelligence organization to provide warning of infiltration or subversion in eastern New Guinea should be established as soon as possible’ (see letter, Shane Paltridge (Minister for Defence) to Barnes, 19 June 1964, ibid.). Thus, in August 1963, Minister for Defence Athol Townley put to Cabinet a submission on intelligence needs for the Territory in which he argued for a committee whose members would be drawn from existing agencies and against the DOT view that a specialised agency should be created (submission no. 878, Townley to Cabinet, August 1963 (no exact date), ibid.). The submission was not considered because of general elections, and afterward Barnes agreed with the Defence plan, precluding the need for resubmission to Cabinet (letter, Barnes to Paltridge, I July 1964, ibid.). In 1968, a Territories official reflected that the TIC’s ‘Main purpose at [the] outset was to meet the possibility of Indonesia adopting tactics of infiltration and subversion. There is still [the] need on [the) part of Defence, External Affairs, Service Departments, A.S.I.O. and the Minister for External Territories for information on such matters as— [a] border security [b] information on West Irian [c] impact on P. & N.G. of propaganda from Indonesia and other (especially communist) countries [d] development of anti-Australian forces in P. & N.G.’ (minute, M.A. Besley (First Assistant Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of External Territories (DOET)) to Warwick Smith, 18 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1970/4671 ).
4 J.T. Gunther.
5 Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
6 The Public Service Bill 1963 came into effect in September 1964, at which time the Administrator announced that different rates of pay for overseas and local officers were to be a practical outcome of the Ordinance. These changes were opposed in the House of Assembly when it resumed in January 1965. On 28 February, the elected members of the House endorsed an alternative bill, which sought to localise a number of the powers associated with PNG public service. The Governor-General later vetoed the bill on the advice of the Australian Government. See I.F.G. Downs, The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945–75, Canberra, 1980, pp. 315–6.