Canberra, 22 July 1968
Top Secret
PNG/West Irian Border—contingency planning
Background
The United Nations Mission led by Mr F. Ortiz-Sanz which has been appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to assist in the arrangements for the exercise of self-determination by the people of West Irian is due to arrive in Sukanapura in mid August.
2. On the basis of information received from a usually reliable source within the Territory the Administrator recently advised that the Papuan National Front2 was believed to be planning demonstrations for August 17th to coincide with the arrival of the Mission. He went on to say that—
• The Papuan National Front adherents are known to have some arms.
• The Indonesian authorities have recently reinforced their military units in West Irian (7 battalions believed to be in the northern sector) and apparently are determined to repress any National Front demonstrations.
• If demonstrations do occur violence could break out and the TPNG border could be affected by—
• i. large influxes of refugees;
• ii. armed parties of Indonesian troops pursuing armed West lrian ‘rebels’ across the border.
3. The Administrator stated that contingency plans for handling influxes of unarmed refugees already existed and that the Administration should be able to handle such an influx fairly smoothly, although if large numbers of villagers badly in need of food, shelter and medical attention were involved, a major diversion of resources could be needed. He was concerned, however, at the possibility of incursions by armed bands who might not be disposed to report to Administration posts (presumably because they might wish to use PNG territory as a temporary refuge to rest and re-group their forces) and the further possibility that such groups might be pursued across the border by detachments of Indonesian armed forces.
4. The handling of such a situation could prove to be beyond the capacity of the Administration’s own resources and it might become necessary to seek the assistance of the PIR. This would raise policy issues for consideration by the Departments of External Affairs and Defence.
5. Although the latest advice from the Administration is that as the Liberation3 Front fears reprisals it has issued instructions that large-scale disturbances previously planned are not to take place, it is considered that it would be unwise to ignore the possibility of the situation developing on the lines feared earlier, and that thought should be given at this stage to possible courses of action in that event.
Assessment of likely developments
6. The TIC’s assessments which are in line with the above are given in Item 408 of MIS No. 5/684 and Item 418 of MIS No. 6/68.5 It would be helpful to have these assessments checked by External Affairs and the JIC in the light of the latest information available. The Administration has been asked to provide any further relevant information from sources within the Territory immediately it comes to hand.
Courses of action
7. On the assumption that any incursions by Indonesian forces would be motivated solely by a desire to apprehend West Irianese ‘rebels’ (i.e. that there would be no covert aggression as in a Pygmalion-type situation)6possible courses of action would seem to be:—
a. Diplomatic action with a view to—
i. persuading the Indonesian authorities that, subject to the need to maintain law and order, it would be desirable to avoid repressive measures in the event of demonstrations;
ii. enlisting their co-operation in ensuring that violations of the border by their armed forces do not take place, with the assurance that any armed West Irianese entering our Territory would be apprehended and disarmed;
b. Action by the Administration to try to handle any influx of West Irianese solely by means of its own resources;
c. In the event of the situation developing beyond the Administration’s capacity to handle it, the assistance of the locally based Services (in particular the PIR) to be sought.
Contingency planning by the Administration
8. As regards (b) above the Administration has been informed that as there can be no certainty of Government approval of Services’ assistance, plans must be made which include the possibility that the situation would have to be handled within its own resources.
9. At the same time it is considered that for planning purposes it would be useful to separate into the following stages the kind of situation that might develop:—
i. an influx of unarmed refugees which could be handled within the Administration’s own administrative and logistic resources;
ii. a situation as in (i) which developed to the point where, because of the numbers involved, some logistic and administrative assistance from PNG Comd would have to be sought;
iii. an influx of armed bands of Papuan Nationalists who might wish to use PNG as a temporary refuge to rest and re-group their forces and might therefore be unwilling to report to Administration posts;
iv. incursions by Indonesian troops in pursuit of armed bands.
10. To assist consideration of the matter in Canberra the Administration has been asked to provide (in time for circulation before the inter-departmental meeting) the following information in relation to stages (i) to (iv) above:7—
i. maximum DDA and police strength which the Administration could dispose in border areas and maximum number of unarmed refugees that could be handled and cared for;
ii. if the influx of unarmed refugees developed beyond (i), the kind of logistic and administrative assistance needed from the PIR;
iii. the kind of action contemplated, using the Administration’s own resources (DDA staff and police) in such situations and the kind of assistance that might be required bearing in mind the need to minimise the likelihood of confrontation between Indonesian troops and the PIR on the border as stressed in paragraph 7 of your memorandum of 28th June.8
Other aspects
11. The Administration has also been asked to provide a copy of any instruction similar to the attached extract from PNG Comd Operational Instruction 1/679—Patrols and Operational Exercises relating to the handling of border incidents which may have been issued to PNG police.
12. In relation to paragraph 7 above (diplomatic action) it would be desirable for Administration officers to be fully briefed regarding the means of identifying any Indonesian Army detachments who may cross into our Territory. Presumably such briefing could be given by PNG Comd.10
[NAA: Al838, 3034/1011/4/1]
1 The paper was provided to DEA under cover of a memorandum by Besley, dated 22 July. Besley confirmed previous correspondence to the effect that an interdepartmental meeting, involving Territories, DEA, Defence and the Army, would take place on 26 July. The meeting appears not to have taken place until 23 August (see Document 219).
2 See footnote 2, Document 54.
3 This word should probably read ‘National’.
4 Not printed. See NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 part I 0.
5 Not printed. See NAA: A1838, 936/3/15 part 4.
6 See Document 43.
7 The Administration’s reply has not been found.
8 Not printed.
9 In a section on ‘border incidents’, the instruction outlined that ‘Every effort is to be directed to the avoidance of incidents on the border’. Specifically, commanders were ordered, inter alia, that they were not to enter West Irian under any circumstances; that indigenes seeking political asylum should be reported to headquarters or, in the absence of guidance, should be encouraged to return unless in ‘obvious danger from the IRIAN … authorities’; and that contact with foreign patrols was to be avoided. In the case of unavoidable contact with foreign patrols, there was to be ‘no use, or undue display, of force’; the foreign patrol was to be informed that it was in Australian territory, after which the Australian patrol would withdraw, while maintaining surveillance and reporting to headquarters. If the foreign patrol acted aggressively, commanders were to retaliate ‘with only such force as is necessary to enable him to ensure the safety of the personnel and equipment under his command’ (NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4/1).
10 Commenting on the paper in a minute to Jockel and Osborn, Starey wrote: ‘It seems to me that the essence of the exercise must be one of presentation rather than reaction. Whether or not there are disturbances August 17th, (and it now seems unlikely that there will be serious outbreaks at that time), we are certain to be faced with the kind of problem discussed in this paper at some point. There might therefore be advantage in raising the question with the Indonesians while things are still fairly quiet. The objective would be to make it clear to the Indonesians that we will permit no armed groups to move around on the TPNG side of the border, whether refugees or Indonesian army. We could express our strong wish to avoid armed clashes of any kind occurring, and appeal for their co-operation in the prevention of incidents. I think this kind of approach could bring results. The suggested admonition in para 7(a) (i) of the paper would however be most unwise’ (23 July 1968, ibid.).