Canberra, 21 August 1968
Secret
Situation in border areas of TPNG
Attached is a report drawn up by Mr. Galvin of External Territories and myself covering the situation in the border areas of TPNG as observed on our recent visit.1
Contingency planning
2. As a result of this trip, and in the light of further information which has been forwarded to us by External Territories, I am satisfied that adequate contingency plans exist for handling an increase in the number of persons crossing the border into TPNG. The plans are not, and cannot be, rigid as it is not possible to predict the likely size of an increased flow. But provision has been made for the strengthening of the four key border posts (Wutung, Pagei and Imonda in the North; Wean in the South) as required by events. This reinforcement is to consist of extra Administration officers and extra police. The assistance of the PIR in handling the logistic and administrative burden would be sought only if the flow assumed proportions beyond the capacity of Administration and Police to handle. In the light of the extremely rugged nature of the terrain in the north, a mass entry by Sukarnapura-based West lrianese seems unlikely. While access to TPNG is much easier in the south, the relatively small population of Merauke and surrounding districts similarly makes attempted mass entry doubtful. Entry at points other than the four mentioned above is unlikely to be more than sporadic.
Role of the PIR
3. In the light of conversations with Administration officials in Port Moresby and in the field, I am now absolutely convinced that use of the PIR as an armed force should be made only in the most unlikely event that Indonesian Army units attempt a deep penetration of TPNG. The possibility of entry by such Indonesian units certainly cannot be ruled out. They would presumably be engaged in ‘hot pursuit’ of dissidents and it must be remembered that the border is not in fact marked (there are 14 small stone markers spread over 300 miles of jungle country). I imagine that the best way to defuse this problem would be to discuss it frankly with the Indonesian government. The burden of our approval should be that we will not permit or tolerate any use of TPNG by armed intruders, whether West Irianese or units of the Indonesian Army. Any armed dissidents who enter our Territory will be rapidly neutralized. As for the Indonesian Army, we are seeking the co-operation of the Indonesian government in ensuring that intrusions do not occur. If they do, whether by accident or in the heat of pursuit, unarmed Administration officers will quickly bring the intrusion to the attention of the unit or units concerned, and request withdrawal. We would be most reluctant, for obvious reasons, to confront intruding TNI2 units with elements of the PIR, and would do so only if these units refused, when made aware of their intrusion, to withdraw.
A buffer zone
4. In our visits to the sensitive areas, we found that not only are applicants for permissive residence held for the whole of their waiting period at the border posts themselves, but both in the north and the south the practice has not been effectively implemented of moving approved permissive residents away from the border area. The drawbacks of this situation are clear. Not only do new crossers have available to them the advice of their predecessors as how best to answer questions, but even more importantly the West Irianese living close to the border form a potential, and I believe in one or two cases, actual link in the chain of communications from Port Moresby and Madang across the border into West Irian. This chain enables the transmission of printed material and badges produced overseas and presumably, the output of Hamadi in Madang (see below). In the north, there are several recently approved permissive residents living in Vanimo, which is almost adjacent to the border. One of them, Dominggus Itaar, is almost certainly a transmitter of nationalist material. He works for a Dutchman called Visser,3 who has business interests in Vanimo, and regularly visits a small camp of West lrianese just across the border from Wutung, ostensibly for romantic reasons. The point is that if we could lay down a policy whereby no West Irianese would be allowed to remain in the sensitive areas, either in the north or the south, we would go a long way towards disrupting the flow of material from TPNG to West Irian, and at the same time create an ‘antiseptic’ environment for the reception of new crossers. This might also be a useful card to play at some point in our future dealings with the Indonesians. In the case of the waiting applicants there would be no problem in moving them further away from the border, apart from that of selecting suitable locations in the north and the south. Mr. Toogood does not think this would be difficult. In the case of those, such as Dominggus ltaar, who have been living near the border subsequent to being granted permissive residence, new jobs would clearly have to be provided in such new locations as may be selected. But the policy, and the effort, is clearly worthwhile.
The special case of Hamadi
5. Hamadi, a West Irianese permissive resident in Madang, is apparently engaged, inter alia, in producing anti-Indonesian material. This probably gets across the border via ltaar/Visser in Vanimo. The legal aspects of confiscating Hamadi’s products are being investigated by External Territories in consultation with Attorney-General’s and the Crown Law Department in Port Moresby. Another approach to the problem would be to confront Hamadi with the knowledge we have of his activities, and let him know that unless they cease, he will be moved to a part of TPNG in which he would be unable effectively to engage in producing anti-Indonesian material for West Irian. As Hamadi is well established in Madang, and is in fact Council Clerk of the Madang local government Council, this sort of approach could well have considerable shock effect. A further precaution would be the implementation of the suggestion canvassed above for the removal of West Irianese from the border zone (in so far as this would disrupt the courier chain).
Interpretation capacity
6. Of the four significant border posts, only Wutung is in a satisfactory state as far as interpretation is concerned. There the officer-in-charge is himself a fluent Indonesian speaker and can exercise a check on such local assistance as he may employ (police, villagers). In Weam and Imonda, the Administration officers have to rely on local people or West Irianese permissive residents for interpretation, and in Pagei on an Army Civil Affairs Officer. I think it essential that each of the four posts should have an Indonesian-speaking Administration officer, as reliable interpretation is essential during the initial interrogation of border crossers.
Conclusion
7. As a unified approach to the above matters between ourselves and External Territories is essential, an early high level inter-departmental meeting is desirable. I understand that Mr. Galvin is recommending that External Territories convene such a meeting. The one question which involved another department is Contingency Planning, particularly with relation to the role of the PIR. This will be dealt with at the meeting between ourselves, External Territories and Defence scheduled for 2.30 p.m. on Friday, 23rd August.
[NAA: A1838, 936/6/9]
1 Not printed.
2 Tentara Nasional Indonesia—Indonesian National Army.
3 Adrian Visser, store owner and builder, Vanimo.