Port Moresby, 2 September 1968
Top Secret
I enclose an ‘Estimate of the Threat to Internal Security in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea and of the Territory’s capacity to meet it from its resources-to 1973’.
This document was prepared at my request as an aid to assessing the situation, particularly in the light of developments which may occur as a result of events on the other side of the border with West Irian in the next year.
Independently the Chairman of the J.I.C. 1 has asked the T.l.C. to prepare an assessment of the internal threat. No doubt this would have to be a more comprehensive document than the one now attached, but the latter will serve as a useful basis for further study.
Attachment
20 August 1968
Top Secret
Internal Security Committee T.P.N.G—estimate of the threat to internal security on Territory of Papua and New Guinea and of the Territory’s capacity to meet if from its resources—to 1973
Introduction
1. In the preparation of this assessment use has been made of relevant sections of the following J.I.C. (Aust) estimates:—
(a) J.I.C. (Aust) (65) 56—‘Threat From Indonesia to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea’. 2
(b) J.I.C. (Aust) (67) 50—‘The Threat to Australia and Her Territories’.3
(c) J.I.C. (Aust) (67) 54—‘The Effect on Australia’s Defence Requirements of Developments in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea’.4
2. For the purpose of this assessment it is assumed that:—
(a) Demands for the independence of T.P.N.G. will intensify over the next five years. (The date by which independence might be achieved cannot be predicted.)
(b) West Irian will remain under Indonesian control.
(c) There will be a re-emergence of organised Communist political and subversive activity in Indonesia within the next five years.
(d) The strengths of the Police, D.D.A., and the Army do not fall below estimated essential establishment levels and that their operational efficiency remains unimpaired.
External Influences
3. T.P.N.G., with its emerging political awareness and movement towards independence, provides a considerable potential for exploitation by external powers with expansionist aims. In this connection the U.S.S.R., Communist China and Indonesia are the powers most likely to constitute a threat.
4. U.S.S.R. An overt threat from the U.S.S.R. is unlikely. However, it can be expected to encourage and assist the C.P.A.5 to establish communist organisations in T.P.N.G. by the provision of funds, propaganda material and training facilities. Should there be any lifting of travel restrictions between Australia and the Territory an influx of Australian Communist functionaries can be expected. (It is noted that there is no recent evidence of any direct propaganda attack from the U.S.S.R. apart from its United Nations Trusteeship Council activities.)
5. Communist China. Again no overt threat to the Territory is likely. However, there is ample evidence of Chinese Communist propaganda activities in the main centres of the Territory. These activities are as yet on a low scale and directed primarily at the Chinese community. Communist China is likely to attempt to intensify a spread of propaganda and if a suitable opportunity occurs, foster subversive activities aimed at creating internal disorder and unrest.
6. Indonesia. Because of the common border and ethnic links between T.P.N.G. and West Irian, Indonesian interest in the Territory is inevitable. Whilst currently there is a continuing improvement in relations with Australia it is not possible at this stage to predict the attitude Indonesia is likely to adopt towards T.P.N.G., either as a ‘colonial’ possession of Australia or as an independent nation sharing a common border with her own Territory.
7. Future policies towards ‘East Irian’ are likely to be based on previous attitudes such as:—
(a) ‘East Irian’ represents a potential subversive threat to Indonesia through West Irian.
(b) Indonesian assistance to the people of ‘East Irian’ ifthey wish to be ‘free’.
(c) The Indonesian desire for regional hegemony.
(d) The support of any indigenous dissident movements against ‘colonial’ or ‘neo–colonial’ rule.
8. Frustrated political ambitions and/or dissatisfaction with economic or social conditions could lead to the emergence of subversive movements in T.P.N.G. which Indonesia might see advantages in exploiting. (It is unlikely that any internal situation would arise which would attract overt Indonesian military intervention.)
9. The internal security situation in West Irian continues to deteriorate. Also it now appears certain that Indonesia will ensure that the 1969 plebiscite is carried in her favour and she is prepared to use severe repressive measures if necessary. In the near future, but especially after the actual plebiscite, T.P.N.G. could become a refuge for dissident West Irianese. If the influx is large and/or includes a number of prominent West Irianese a tense situation could arise along the border. Should relations between Indonesia and Australia deteriorate at the same time, Indonesia could be expected to become active against T.P.N.G. possibly to the extent of raids by ‘volunteers’ on military, police or Administration posts or villages near the border. Any actions by Indonesia on these lines must have an upsetting effect on the internal security situation in T.P.N.G.
The Internal Threat
Present situation:
10. The attitude of the majority of the indigenous population towards the Australian Administration is at present favourable. However, public criticism of Administration and Australian policies is increasing. Anti-European statements by individuals continue to be reported; although difficult to assess, these so far do not appear to have had an adverse influence on public opinion in general. Steadily increasing pressures of population on land resources in rapidly developing congested rural areas, causing an uncontrolled drift to the major towns of unskilled villagers despite their traditional reluctance to migrate to new farming land in distant areas, are linked {with} evolutionary trends likely to promote increasing indigenous unrest and criticism of the Administration.
The potential threat:
11. Inter-Racial Unrest. Multi-racial situations have proved highly explosive in many African countries and, more recently, in the United States. Tensions and actual disturbances based on racial differences are likely to develop quickly in T.P.N.G. Locally generated and maintained unrest would be difficult to cope with; unrest aggravated by external influences could present a serious threat to internal security. The U.S.S.R., Communist China and Indonesia have in the past been very quick to exploit any situation based on racial differences which serves their interests. Their experience in such situations is enormous.
12. Inter–racial unrest could arise from one of the following factors, or combinations of them:—
(a) Racial discrimination: Whilst much has been achieved in the elimination of racial discrimination from legislation and administrative practices, it is difficult to eliminate deeply entrenched social attitudes. Economic and social distinctions, particularly if manifested in patronizing or hostile treatment of the indigenous people by individual Europeans, will inevitably cause serious friction and lead to widespread resentment. Continuing restriction against the entry of indigenous inhabitants of the Territory into Australia is likely to cause a sense of rejection, particularly amongst the more educated.
(b) Chinese community: The comparatively affluent Chinese community is the subject of indigenous jealousy and, in the future, is likely to be the target of real hostility and probably violence.
(c) Disparities in social and economic standards: Wage differentials and conditions of service inhibit the maintenance of amicable industrial relations; strikes, political agitation and demonstrations are likely to be instituted by Public Servants and industrial workers, and students are quite likely to agitate and demonstrate in support. Much is dependent on the patience of the indigenous community to accept the differential in wages, job opportunities and housing situations until the economy can support increases, or by indoctrination and propaganda the community accepts that as in other Territories, there must be differentiations to attract overseas expertise.
(d) Land ownership: This question is potentially a cause of considerable racial friction. There has been a steady increase in claims to and some encroachment on land occupied by the Administration, expatriate commercial and private owners. Land disputes are likely to increase further as independence approaches, and people manoeuvre to ‘state6 claims’ to valuable expatriate property.7
(e) Population pressure and urbanisation: Two linked evolutionary trends likely to promote increasing indigenous unrest and criticism of the Administration are:—
(i) The steadily increasing pressure of population on land resources in some tribal areas (e.g. Tolai, Chimbu, Wabag, Maprik etc) coupled with the general reluctance of villagers to migrate to new farming land in distant areas. (While the current success attending the movement of settlers in the carefully organised oil palm scheme may help to break down these attitudes, it could also foster expectations that all future resettlement entitles participants to equal levels of Government assistance.)
(ii) Uncontrolled drift to the major towns of unskilled villagers results in a proliferation of shanty settlements and the emergence of an urban vagrant element. The reasons for this drift are partly economic, but the urban migrants include a high proportion of young men primarily interested in seeking excitement and desirous of evading responsibilities.
(f) Distribution of resources: Administration and private enterprise distribution of financial, manpower and other resources, no matter how well intended or well planned, is never amicably accepted by all sections of the community, particularly by those who are in areas which are less well favoured. More favoured areas almost always get more attention than those less favoured ones; inevitably therefore, some of the people will be dissatisfied leaving the way open for the stirring up of political unrest.
(g) Cargo and other cultist manifestations: Cultist manifestations have been known to develop anti-Administration and anti-European characteristics, although their primary purpose is an attempt by magical means to bridge the gap between themselves and the demonstrably better favoured Europeans. ‘Cargo’ thinking is probably at the bottom of much of the resentment and envy of European and Chinese affluence. There is a marked tendency of participants in ‘Cargo’ cults to embark on unsophisticated independence movements.
(h) Growing political consciousness: So far political developments in T.P.N.G. have kept ahead of the expectations of the people. However, the continuance of what appears to an administering authority to be constructive and reasonable policies may not satisfy the rapidly accelerating political aspirations of a colonial people, who have the stimulus of example and increasingly frequent contact with other newly independent countries.
13. Inter-racial friction. The multiplicity of small tribal groups, which are extremely egocentric, makes it difficult for anyone from a particular group to gain the respect and allegiance of members of other groups, regardless of leadership qualities. Thus, while development is dependent on the emergence of national, or even regional, leaders, the tribal structure of the Territory works against such development. Whilst there is some evidence that this barrier is gradually being broken down, progress in this direction is extremely slow. In the transition from colonial dependence to independence against a background of traditional tribal isolation and distrust, the absence of national and regional leaders with popular support beyond the confines of their particular tribes inhibits the development of national unity and acceptance of the rule of law. The diminution of European influence with the Territory’s law enforcement agencies is likely to exacerbate this problem.
14. Relations between Papua and New Guinea. Finally the tribal rivalries referred to above are compounded by the smouldering ill-feeling that appears to exist between many Papuans and New Guineans in general, and between Highlanders and Papuan coastal dwellers in particular; this ill-feeling is exhibited in outbreaks of lawlessness in the urban centres and claims by outspoken Papuans that New Guinea receives preferential treatment at the expense of Papua as a result of the Australian Government’s desire to impress visiting United Nations missions to the Territory. With the union of Papua and New Guinea as one nation, and in the absence of effective controls, the current latent animosity which exists could cause a serious threat to internal security.
Summary
The potential threat
- 15. Multi-racial situations have proved highly explosive in many African countries and, more recently, in the United States. Racial tensions, exploitable by communist or other subversive elements, and arising from such issues as racial discrimination, disparities in social and economic standards, land ownership, population pressures, urbanisation, ‘Cargo Cultism’, and a growing political consciousness, could lead to a serious situation and endanger the internal security of the Territory.
16. The absence of effective indigenous national leadership capable of gaining popular support inhibits the development of national unity. This combined with the progressive diminution of European influence within the Territory’s law enforcement agencies in the move to independence can only serve to make the containment of public disorder and disunity more difficult. Any adverse situations arising would be further complicated by the latent animosity existing between Papuans and New Guineans which could be triggered off with little or no warning.
17. There is no indication at present of circumstances pointing to the materialization of the threat in the foreseeable future but owing to the explosive nature of its many constituent parts, plans to meet it should be kept continuously under review.
Capacity to meet the threat,
18. The Territory’s resources to anticipate and meet threats to internal security comprise various intelligence agencies, the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary (including Reserve Constabulary and Special Constables), Field Officers (predominantly those of the Department of District Administration), and where applicable in emergency situations, the Defence {Forces} (mainly the Army). Provided that:—
(a) the intelligence gathering and assessing machinery is strengthened and improved;
(b) the strengths of the Police Force and Field Staff of the Administration do not fall below estimated essential establishment levels;
(c) the Defence Forces are available to the Civil authority for internal security duties in support of the Administration resources; and
(d) rapidly increasing indigenisation of those resources is not followed by any lowering of their operational efficiency.
then the Committee is of the unanimous opinion that the Territory is capable of coping with the types of internal threat which could arise in the foreseeable future.
19. This assessment assumes that the local elements of the security forces will remain loyal; serious disaffection, against a background of widespread racial turbulence, could necessitate the intervention of armed forces from the mainland.
[NAA: A452, 1968/4161]
1 N. F. Parkinson.
2 See paragraph 7, Document 12.
3 September 1967 (no exact date). Excerpts from the assessment’s cover note read: ‘We believe that recent developments have reduced the likelihood of Indonesia pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in the years immediately ahead, and therefore the risk of limited war with Indonesia is slight … The use of TPNG as a refuge for dissident West lrianese could lead to tension and even armed clashes in the border area and, should relations between Indonesia and Australia seriously deteriorate, Indonesia could be expected to intensify her activities against TPNG, possibly including raids by “volunteers” on military, police or Administration posts, or villages near the border. Although we see no likelihood of the present Indonesian Government initiating these actions as a matter of deliberate policy, Indonesia could be expected, nevertheless, to exploit any situation which may arise in TPNG, to further the extension of her influence there’ (cover note by Parkinson, NAA: A452, 1967/3299).
4 With regard to PNG’s internal security, this paper concluded that ‘the pace of constitutional development appears to be satisfactory to most members of the House of Assembly and to the majority of the people at this time. There is, however, some discontent on this issue among the leadership of the more politically aware groups and in the urban areas … There is no indication that in the long term there will be a general and significant deterioration in race relations. However, multi-racial situations have proved highly explosive in other parts of the world, and racial tensions could quickly develop in TPNG … exploitation, by communist or other subversive elements, of racial tensions or other causes of popular discontent such as social and economic disparities could endanger internal security … This danger would be accentuated if the disaffection arising from such issues extended to the police and the PIR … internal pressures, particularly in the United Nations, for the acceleration of constitutional development, have so far had little impact on popular views in TPNG. However, the younger and more radical leaders in the future could be encouraged in their actions by expressions of support in the United Nations forums’ (cover note by Parkinson, dated ‘July, 1967’, NAA: A 1838, TS666/67/54).
5 Communist Party of Australia.
6 This should perhaps read ‘stake’.
7 Issues associated with land tenure were of ongoing concern of the Administration and Territories. For example, on 9 September the Territory’s Public Solicitor, W.A. (‘Peter’) Lalor, told Barnes ‘about the increasing number of claims which indigenous people were making that alienated land was native land. He told the Minister that it was clear from his records that the number of cases which were actually before the Courts or the Commission were just “the top of the iceberg”—a far larger number was likely to come forward. He said the most serious claim at the moment concerned one for the town of Lae … he had every confidence that the claim if pressed in the Court would succeed; and if it did succeed the Administration would be up for the full value of the land and the improvements’ (note by Ballard on discussion, 11 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4850). In response to such problems, a Land Policy Study Group, consisting of departmental and Administration officers, had been established in January 1968 (see submission, Ballard to Barnes, 19 January 1968, NAA: A1838, 1967/7843).