Canberra, 2 October 1968
Top Secret
Threat to internal security in TPNG
In relation to the attached paper1 you asked for comments on
(a) the argument;
(b) arrangements re defence forces
The Argument
Reference documents
• JIC (Aust) (65) 56—‘Threat from Indonesia to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea’—is pre October 1965 and therefore is somewhat out of date as regards Indonesian attitudes.
•JIC (Aust (67) 50—‘The Threat to Australia and Her Territories’—has been superseded by JIC (Aust) (68) 50 which takes a slightly more favourable view of current Indonesian attitudes to Australia.
• JIC (Aust) (67) 54—‘The Effect on Australia’s Defence Requirements of Developments in TPNG’ can be regarded as reasonably up-to-date.
• All the above papers were prepared in consultation with this Department.
Assumptions
• Assumptions (a) and (b) seem reasonable.
• I can find no basis for assumption (c) in any recent JIC document and in view of recent Indonesian action against the Communists I would not consider it justified.
• It is not clear what is mean by ‘estimated essential establishment level’ in the case of the Army, but the level required in assisting in the maintenance of internal security seems to be implied.
External influences
• Paras 3–6 appear reasonable although the CPA reaction to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia makes future relations between the CPA and the CPSU2 and continued financial support of the former by the latter uncertain. JIC supports the view that the lifting of travel restrictions between Australia and the Territory would result in an influx of Australian Communist functionaries but extent of this would depend on adequacy of CPA funds.
• Para 7—The statement that future policies towards ‘East Irian’ are likely to be based on the previous attitudes listed, which are those of the Sukarno period, is unsupported. The present JIC view as expressed in paras 7 and 8 of JIC (Aust) (68) 50 is that—
-Indonesia is primarily interested in improving relations with Australia as a neighbour with a view to obtaining assistance, especially economic.
-Indonesia may seek bilateral links with Australia and South-East Asian countries to oppose Communist expansion and subversion.
-At the same time possibility remains that future Djakarta government might revert to less responsible and possibly aggressive policies.
-Possible source of friction would be use of TPNG as a refuge and source of support by dissident West Irianese.
• Paras 8 and 9 considered reasonable.
Internal threat
• The argument of this section is considered reasonable.
• All the factors mentioned have figured in various Defence Department papers prepared in consultation with this Department, in particular JIC (Aust) (65) 56 and JIC (Aust) (67) 54, although in one or two places increased emphasis is given, or an idea that has not figured in earlier papers is introduced. For example para 12(d) gives increased emphasis to the possibility of racial friction over land ownership. Lands Section confinns there has been an increase in claims to and encroachments on alienated land. Paras 12(g) introduces the undocumented statement that ‘there is a marked tendency of participants in ‘cargo’ cults to embark on unsophisticated independence movements’.
• Antagonism between Papuans and New Guineans is another factor that has not received much emphasis in earlier papers but which should not be overlooked. I myself heard New Guineans complaining to the 1965 UN Visiting Mission about excessive expenditure in Port Moresby. The recent football riot in Port Moresby is further proof that such feelings exist.3
Summary
• Paras 15 and 16 are a fair summary of the earlier considerations.
•Para 17 would in my view be improved by mention of the need to keep all the factors referred to in mind when policies are being formulated .
Arrangements Re Defence Forces
• Para 18(c) should include reference to the need for Commonwealth Government approval for use of the forces in aid of the civil power and perhaps should be reworded to read:—
(c) the approval of the Commonwealth Government to the use of the Defence Forces in aid of the civil power can be speedily obtained where this is necessary to maintain internal security.
[ matter omitted ]4
[NAA: A452, 1968/4161]
1 Attachment to Document 220 ..
2 Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
3 See Document 207.
4 Matter omitted refers to procedures for call-out of military forces in aid of the civil power. See editorial note ‘Internal security planning’.