Canberra, 7 March 1966
Secret
Papua New Guinea: constitutional developments
I have read the notes prepared in Mr. Booker’s Division1 on the draft Cabinet Submission prepared by the Department of Territories.2 I have not seen the draft Submission itself, which I understand you are holding.
2. The following notes are intended to amplify the paper prepared in Mr. Booker’s Division entitled ‘United Nations Aspects of Draft Cabinet Submission Prepared by the Department of Territories’.3 These notes rightly stress the need for us to secure the agreement of the United Nations to the status which the Territory is to achieve. The notes say that if we are to carry out the obligations which are imposed by the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, and if we are not to provide critics in the United Nations with a focal point of attack, it will be necessary for us to secure the agreement of the United Nations to the status which the Territory is to achieve. At another point in the notes it is also said that it is desirable to seek the agreement of the United Nations if only to avoid continuing interference in the affairs of the Territory by the Committee of 24.
3. I think the argument could be strengthened by making a good deal more of the international politics of the situation. Basing myself to some extent on the experience which Malaysia has had with lndonesia,4 it seems to me important that we should make use of the United Nations in a positive way as an instrumentality in our policy. I have in mind that the United Nations role in the de-colonisation of the Borneo Territories, even although neither of them was covered by the Trusteeship Agreement of the United Nations, was of great value to Malaysia. By bringing the Borneo Territories into Malaysia with the assistance of the United Nations, through the report of the Secretary-General on the exercise of self-determination, Malaysia’s case with the Afro-Asian world was greatly strengthened and this stood Malaysia in good stead when the issue was taken in the Security Council.5
4. It is for positive reasons, rather than merely avoiding criticism at the United Nations, that it seems to me essential to have United Nations endorsement and goodwill for whatever solution is reached for TPNG. We want so to arrange matters that TPNG comes into the international community with the blessing and support of the United Nations so that (i) potential troublemakers will in some degree be deterred (without over-emphasising the point I believe there would be some deterrents) and (ii) so that we would be strongly placed to invoke the moral and political support of the United Nations if we need it. Of great importance, too, in this picture is the position of our allies. The United States, in particular, is much more likely to give us whole-hearted support if our policies have won the acceptance of the Afro-Asian countries and it will be in the United Nations, for a large part, that the attitudes of the Afro-Asians will be formed.
[NAA: A I 838, 93611/3]
1 Presumably, attachments to Document 14.
2 Apparently, draft of 9 February 1966 in NAA: A 1838, 936/5. Final is Document 25.
3 Attachment ‘A’ to Document 14.
4 See footnote 2, Document 12.
5 See Dee, Australia and the formation of Malaysia.