Canberra, 22 October 1968
Secret
West Irianese in TPNG
We have been discussing with the Department of External Territories measures to prevent the use of TPNG as a channel for the transmission of anti-Indonesian material into West Irian. Following a visit to TPNG early in August by Mr Starey and Mr Galvin (see attachments A, B, and C), 1 we proposed to the Department of External Territories that a zone should be created on our side of the border completely free of West Irianese (see attachment D).2 At a meeting held in the Department on 16th October,3 Mr Toogood, Assistant Secretary, Internal Affairs and International Relations, TPNG, indicated that measures were now being taken to clear the West Sepik and the Western District of West Irianese, whether approved permissive residents or persons awaiting the outcome of their applications (see attachment E).4 When Administration action is completed, there will be no West Irianese in the vicinity of the border on our side. We are hopeful that this measure will prove effective in preventing, or reducing to a minimum, any transmission of anti-Indonesian material across the border.
2. It is now clear that the two West Irianse most actively engaged in the handling of material have been Sarwom in Port Moresby and Hamadi in Madang. The former has ceased this activity, following a warning by the Administration earlier this year. The latter, who has been suspected of both producing and transmitting material, has recently been questioned on the matter by Administration officers, and warned that he was making himself liable to re-settlement in a remote part of the Territory. Despite an emotional reaction, and a denial that he was producing material, Hamadi is lying low at the present time, and not attempting to pass material to the border area. (There is no conclusive evidence that Hamadi has been running off ‘Suara Komando Pembebasan Papua Barat’5 in Madang, although he has been receiving cut stencils of this publication—see attachment F).6 He is currently under close surveillance.7
3. The situation on the extreme northern border area is complicated by the existence of a bush camp near the patrol post at Wutung, TPNG. This camp was set up by West Irianese who failed in their attempts to enter TPNG and has clearly been used for the transmission of material. It now contains about 80 people. Until recently, it has been a matter of doubt as to whether the camp is located in West Irian or TPNG. An Administration survey has now established that the camp is several hundred yards inside TPNG. Action is under consideration to effect its removal from our territory. We will advise you of the outcome. 8
4. A further complicating factor is the activity of a Dutch national named Visser, who runs a business in Vanimo, West Sepik. He is believed to have connections with Hamadi, and frequently visits the Wutung camp. His role, if any, in transmitting material into West Irian is at present being investigated. 9
5. You may find it useful to mention to Malik, Basuki Rachmat’10 and senior Indonesian officials the actions we are taking to prevent TPNG being used to transmit anti-Indonesian material into West Irian (i.e. the removal of West lrianese from the border area, and the administrative pressure now being brought to bear on the one or two leading elements). You should not however make reference at this stage to the problem of Wutung camp, or to the activities of Visser. You should also seek to avoid giving the impression that large-scale anti-Indonesian activity is involved, as the matter could easily be inflated in importance by the Indonesians as the advice you give them circulates among them. Further, we would not want you to go into great detail (e.g. the names of West Irianese activists in TPNG), but rather to cite the kind of action we are taking to prevent the passage of material throughout TPNG into West lrian. You could at the same time make the point that it is no easy matter to ensure that no material is being passed from TPNG into West Irian, and reiterate our hope that the Indonesian authorities will pass to us any evidence that may come to light indicating that a flow of material is continuing.
6. We would hope that, as a result of your past frank conversation with key Indonesians on refugee matters;11 the information you have passed them on Rumbino, Kaisiepo etc;12 and the assurances that you can now give them of our active efforts to prevent TPNG being used as a channel for dissident material, they will be convinced that we are seeking to effectively neutralise the West Irianese in TPNG. If they can be so convinced, we have in mind asking you to raise with them the related question of possible developments affecting the border area between now and the act of free choice. Here we are particularly worried about the prospect of armed dissidents bands fleeing into TPNG, possibly pursued by elements of TNI (see attachment G, paras 10, 11 and 13).13 The object of raising this question would be to secure Indonesian co-operation in ensuring that incidents involving Indonesian and TPNG forces do not occur in the period leading up to the ‘act of self determination’. This is clearly an extremely delicate matter and we will need to discuss it with the Indonesians at a carefully chosen time. In the meantime, we wish to build confidence in our motives in the handling of border and border-crossing questions and strengthen confidential exchanges. 14
[NAA: Al838, 3036114/1/6 part 11]
1 Not printed. For comments by Starey on this trip, see Document 218.
2 Jockel had asserted that the presence of West lrianese in the border area ‘renders more difficult the proper handling of new border crossers, who would naturally seek the guidance of their compatriots in responding to the questions of Administration officers’ and, ‘more importantly’, there were ‘strong indications that the West lrianese in the Vanimo/Wutung area form an important link in the courier chain which enables the transmission of anti-Indonesian material from TPNG to West Irian’. He proposed that Wutung, Vanimo, Pagei, Imonda and Weam be ‘cleared’ of lrianese as soon as possible. Those awaiting the results of residency applications could be moved to holding points far enough from the border to ‘neutralize’ people concerned, while permissive residents could be given alternative employment in other parts of PNG. Aside from practical results, Jockel believed these actions could be presented to the Indonesians ‘as evidence of our good faith’ (memorandum, DEA (Jockel) to DOET, 29 August 1968, NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 10. For context, see Document 219).
3 See NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3. See also submission, Besley to Barnes, 31 October 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5508.
4 Not printed. The Administration decided to use Manus Island, which had suitable accommodation and temporary employment opportunities, as a holding point for applicants for permissive residence and for those awaiting resettlement (see cablegram 11697, L.R. Mcintyre (Deputy Secretary, DEA) to Hasluck, 5 November 1968, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3). Manus was chosen on the initiative of the Administration, prompting Warwick Smith to stress that ‘Approval should have been sought and given for such a sensitive operation’. Besley agreed, commenting that the decision was taken as ‘Wutung squatters were building up; numbers of crossers were increasing; and more evidence of anti-Indonesian activity [was] becoming available’—in addition to pressure on the Administration ‘for early response and proposed action’. Barnes was informed of events connected with the removal of Irianese, but not consulted for advice (except in regard to bush camps; see footnote 7). Aside from the reasons listed above, Besley wrote that Manus was selected because it was ‘out of the way’ (submission, Besley to Warwick Smith, 2 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5508).
5 ‘The Voice of the Command for the Liberation of West Irian’.
6 Not printed.
7 In a letter to Hamadi (apparently of November 1968), Barnes responded to a suggestion that permissive residents should be concentrated ‘at one or two places’ by contending that West lrianese should assimilate and not live ‘as a separate group’. Barnes also dismissed a request that the lrianese be allowed to engage in ‘political purposes’ (NAA: A452, 1968/5721 ).
8 On 23 October, Barnes authorised the ‘return to West Irian as quickly as possible, without the use of force, West lrianese living in border camps which are clearly situated in T.P.N.G.’. He was informed on 4 December that the camps had been cleared (submission, Besley to Barnes, 4 December 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5508).
9 Ballard wrote to Galvin on 11 November that ‘in relation to the illegal activities of Visser and the others in TPNG—quite specifically it seems to me that we should not be attempting to stop activities related to an exercise of choice at the coming referendum [in Irian] on the assumption that the referendum will (be rigged to) go Indonesia’s way [but] anything beyond this should be stopped’ (minute, ibid.).
10 Indonesian Minister for Internal Affairs.
11 See, for example, Document 138.
12 Kaisiepo and Dirk Rumbino, an lrianese with connections to Jouwe’s Freedom Committee, had been refused requests to come to Australia (see Document 54 and memorandum, DEA (J.R. Burgess, Malaysia and Indonesia Section) to Djakarta, 18 June 1968, NAA: Al838, 3034/1011/4 part 2).
13 Not printed. See Document 219.
14 Concern existed in Territories that DEA’s focus on the relationship with Indonesia might generate political difficulties in PNG. On 11 November, Ballard minuted Galvin: ‘I am worried about … any general approach in EA that the PNG authorities should be taking sides in support of the Indonesian line at the coming referendum. This is a referendum to which the people of W. Irian have a right & the internal political consequences in PNG of the Administration appearing to assist Indonesia in denying that right will be very real and could well give Pangu (of which Somare is the leader) the cause it lacks to unite the House of Assembly against the Administration’ (NAA: A452, 1968/5508).