Canberra, 19 November 1968
Confidential
National unity
Some thought has been given in the Department to the situation arising from the secessionist moves in Bougainville and the New Guinea Islands area. Attached are some notes which have been prepared in the Department.
2. The Minister, at present, considers that the official position ought to be to encourage and speak in favour of unity but not to present any overt official opposition to separatist movements. Quite apart from whether the Commonwealth Government would be prepared at the wish of the majority to enforce unity on a minority who wish to break away, for the Government to take too firm a position in support of national unity could be counter productive and even strengthen the hands of those who wish to break away. We have all noted recent history (e.g. Nigeria, West Indies, Malaysia, Central African Federation) of attempts to create a large unit which have failed in an attempt to maintain unity.
3. Peculiar limitations apply in the case of Papua and New Guinea. The Trust Territory could not be divided while it remains a Territory without amendment to the Trust Agreement and this, it is considered, would be impossible to achieve. No new Trust Agreement, it is considered, would receive votes of a U.N. majority. It would be legally practicable to separate Papua from New Guinea but this would have implications in the Highlands which did not exist before the war. In this connexion you will have seen the Attorney-General’s reply to a question in Parliament on 23rd October. 1
4. The Minister’s thinking, therefore, is for the Government not to say that it is opposed to secession, but to present the arguments on economic and political grounds for the larger unit. The view would be put that the Government thinks that it is in the people’s own interests to have one Territory and if any section wants to change this the advantages of unity should be stressed. At present the attitude should be that the Government believes that the majority of the people will see the advantages of unity.
5. On this approach it is necessary to work out a total programme of encouragement of national unity. The attached notes indicate some of the points that may be considered.
Attachment
National Unity In Papua And New Guinea
A. Viability Of Present Administrative Union
[ matter omitted ]2
(ii) Case for splitting Territory up into federated or independent units
• Territory is completely artificial entity in sense that it is made up of people with many different cultures and attitudes.
• Smaller groups made up of natural geographic, economic or social groupings may be better able to achieve common purpose and thus may be more likely to endure—Territory may fragment into such smaller groupings whatever we do.
• Legitimate aspirations of natural groupings could be given expression.
• Loose federal system with customs union could give many of benefits of unity without possible tensions of unitary agreements.
• If Australia willing to follow wishes of people wishing to break away this could find favour in United Nations.
(iii) Case for preserving present Administrative Union
• Administrative Union has generally proved administratively viable, logical and successful—combined services promote efficiency and economy.
•U.N. would have to agree-there would probably be charges of ulterior motives even if people of breakaway areas solidly for fragmentation—U.N. has resisted dismemberment of dependent territories in past. On other hand they have supported Banabans in their moves to break away from Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
•There would be serious risk of fragmentation into smaller units than we contemplated and creation of unstable problem area just to north of Australia— possibility of outside political interference would be increased.
•Could effect 3 U.S. commitment under ANZUS.
• Federal system not really an adequate answer—weak system of government requiring considerable political expertise to be workable—all Federal systems have serious problems through conflicts between tiers of government.
• Australian economic aid to fragmented units would probably be far less effective than to Administrative Union—investment could be discouraged
(iv) Conclusion
• Despite dangers and drawbacks, case for Administrative Union appears strongest.
[ matter omitted ] 4
[NAA: A452, 1971/2197]
Tensions in the House: the Chatterton and Lussick bills
In lieu of the failure in May 1967 to achieve rises in salaries through the Territory’s arbitrator,1 PNG’s public servants began to pursue their claims through political channels. 2 With the aid of the Public Service Association,3 the MHA for Moresby open electorate, Percy Chatterton, introduced a bill in September 1968 aimed at establishing a commission of enquiry into local officers’ salaries. The commission would submit a report to Barnes, who would then make a decision on its recommendations.
The Administration opposed the bill. Speaking in the House, Henderson said the
bill is a direct attack on the arbitration system. A small sector of the Territory’s workforce which in the past has used arbitration extensively has now mounted a highly-organized political attack on the whole arbitration system. Why? Because in one case the Arbitrator has not given them all they have asked for … Mr. Chatterton claims the Public Service Association is now frustrated. This amazes me because there is nothing whatsoever to stop the Public Service Association from taking this case back to arbitration … members must remember that the arbitration system isn’t designed for public servants. It is designed to cover the whole workforce of this Territory … It doesn’t matter how much it is sugarcoated, [the bill] is still an attack on our system of arbitration …4
There followed what Hay described as a ‘tense and sometimes emotional debate’5 in which supporters of the bill and especially the Pangu Pati used ‘strong and coercive tactics in an attempt to weaken [the} stand taken by Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members’.6 In the event, the bill was rejected by 53 votes to 24, partly (Hay thought) because the ‘Pangu Pati and PSA overplayed their hand by threatening members who voted against the bill with active opposition by public servants at the next election’.7
But the Chatterton episode was not without consequences. In the first place, five holders of ministerial office—Oala-Rarua, Singiliong, Langro, Kapena and Watson—were absent during the vote, in spite of an earlier decision by the Administrator’s Executive Council that it should support the Government position and ‘oppose [the bill]] on the grounds that it placed [the] arbitration system in jeopardy’.8 The _ South Pacific Post _characterised the incident as serious; leading with the headline, ‘Ministers didn’t vote: govt. to consult Canberra’, it asserted that events in the House had ‘created a constitutional problem’.9
Behind closed doors, Hay played down the significance of the walk–out. He telexed Warwick Smith:
Reviewing this situation in the light of the obligations set out in the ‘arrangements’ for holders of Ministerial Office,10 my opinion is that there has been no direct breach of the convention that office holders will not publicly oppose policies or decisions in accordance with advice of AEC. So far as co-operating with the senior Official Member is concerned, it is true that there has been a falling short of what had been expected. The situation was a particularly difficult one for Kapena and Oala Rarun because of their previous stand. Langro, a former public servant, was also in a difficult personal position. Bearing in mind the very real pressures to which they have been subjected in the last few days, I think that we should not reproach these persons for the position they took and should not regard it as a cause for me formally to seek an explanation for their course of action. I would however propose to speak to each one and remind him of obligations accepted by him. 11
Warwick Smith and Barnes were less sympathetic. The Secretary wrote that he and Barnes had discussed the matter and ‘the Minister asked me to pass on to you the thought that those Ministerial office holders who abstained on the Bill exposed their colleagues who voted against it to more odium than they would have incurred had the Ministerial office holders presented a united front’.12 Barnes also considered that the loyal office holders ‘could very well wish to raise the issue in the [AEC]’, pointing out that those who did not vote had let down their colleagues. Beyond this, the Minister had ‘no other comment to make on this particular case at present but foresees that if a particular Ministerial Member or Assistant Ministerial Member were to make a practice of being neutral or not supporting the Administration’s position on important questions, or not opposing proposals the Administration was opposing, the matter might have to be reviewed’.
Apparently as this letter was in transit, Hay communicated his intention to publicly defend his MMs and AMMs. He submitted to Canberra a draft statement that would ‘sustain [those who voted with the Administration]against criticism from PS.A. representatives when they return to their electorates’.13 The statement was also intended to ‘set the record straight’ on a ‘tendentious A.B.C. commentary’ by denying that the abstainers were viewed by the Administration as ‘disloyal’ and would be ‘ticked off’ by Hay. The reply was brusque. Hay was told that Warwick Smith had spoken to Barnes, from which it ‘emerge[d]’ that the ‘Administrator has hitherto avoided involvement in political controversy in large part because he has never commented directly on political issues [and] with constitutional evolution it seems more important still to maintain this non–involvement’ 14 Moreover the Minister did not wish ‘at this stage and in this context’ to publish the arrangements governing the behaviour of ministerial office holders. On the specific issue, the Minister saw ‘no particular reason to defend the Ministerial Member who abstained-and even less so the Assistant Ministerial Members who abstained’. The idea of a rebuke in the AEC was again proffered. On the other hand, Hay was advised that ‘whatever action is practicable to support the Ministerial Members who voted with the Government (and private Members) should be taken’—the ‘most appropriate ‘form being perhaps a press statement by the senior Official Member reiterating the points made on the official side during debate on the bill.
A second outcome of the Chatterton bill was that it led immediately to further action in the House on local salaries—and this in turn created another political predicament for the Government. In reporting the defeat of the Chatterton bill, Hay noted that even those who ‘were prepared to go along with the Administration … thought that something should be done about the present arbitration ordinance which, rightly or wrongly, does not have the confidence of members’.15 Indeed, during the debate MHA Walter Lussick had foreshadowed another private bill, ‘the object of which would be to introduce an appeals system’. This initiative had been seen by Lussick and other expatriates who were well-disposed to the Administration as a necessary sop for those who might otherwise have voted for the Chatterton proposal. As MHA John Middleton explained to Barnes:
He and his friends were much opposed to the Chatterton Bill but the only way to defeat this was to undertake to put their own proposal forward. If the Lussick Bill did not come into force there would be quite serious trouble in the Territory and the image of the Administration would drop heavily … he and his friends did not want the Lussick Bill but they could see no alternative.16
Canberra’s response was uncompromising. In provisional guidance, the Administration was told that ‘Opposition [to the bill] should be strong and should be expressed on the floor and in the lobbies as appropriate17 —and in his conversation with Middleton, Barnes added that the bill ‘would be vetoed if passed’.18 Barnes’ rationale focussed not on politics but on macro-economics: ‘if we could not hold the present wage structure this would mean that the whole economic development programme would fail.19 It followed that there could be no substantive concessions. Barnes believed that ‘if the Government could find some way of saving the face of the proposers of the Lussick Bill this might be the best course … He was inclined to think that the best course would be to appoint some outside expert to report on the matter’. 20
When Hay reported the Government’s attitude to the AEC, its elected members reacted with ‘dismay’.21 They said that ‘Lussick and his colleagues were committed to the introduction of the bill and that if the Administration tried to oppose it, or even postpone it, the Administration would not only be defeated but would lose the confidence of the independent minded members of the House’. The AEC thought that the only alternative was to ‘secure an amendment’, which could be done‘in virtually any direction thought necessary by the Government’. Hay consequently warned that ‘an inflexible attitude to the Lussick Bill may tend to harden the opinion of the local officers against the Government and the Administration .. . To carry out the main policy measures of the Government, both economic and constitutional, the Administration needs the willing co-operation, and involvement, of the House and the local officers … you should be aware of the political situation in the House of Assembly and outside … I am bound to advise you against taking, at this stage, a position of inflexible opposition to any amendment to the Arbitration Ordinance’. Hay wrote that he was opposed to a system of appeals, but was attracted to the idea of a commission or bench that would examine important cases—while the less important would be heard by a single arbitrator.
Hay reinforced his viewpoint in talks with Warwick Smith in mid-October. Predicting that the bill would pass by a vote of 70 to 20, the Administrator said a veto by the Governor-General would ‘give rise to a crisis with the legislature at a time when the Government has said that it will act in accordance with the wishes of the House’.22 Warwick Smith remained unmoved. He commented that the PSA could not be permitted to get what it wanted ‘through pressure tactics’ and that amendment of the ordinance without concrete concessions to local officers would not help—it would make them ‘only still sourer’ With Barnes’ endorsement, Hay was asked to return to the AEC with the suggestion that the Lussick bill be converted to a motion which would establish a commission of enquiry into the arbitration system.23
The AEC’s opinion was that such a move would depend on Lussick, who in turn said he might consider an adjournment so that an enquiry could go ahead.24 He later reported that this would be impossible, though he felt sure his amendments could be tailored to meet Government concerns.25 At the same time, he cautioned that ‘Administration opposition to any amendment at the November meeting [of the House], even on the basis that it is prepared to set up an enquiry and bring in amending legislation later on, would be very serious both for the future of his own pro-Administration group and also for the ministerial system and the House’s confidence in it’. Given this mood—and brushing aside the discussions in Canberra–Hay again appealed to Territories for flexibility, repeating his call for an amendment that would provide a bench for major arbitration cases.
Warwick Smith questioned the gravity of the situation,26 confiding to the Minister shortly afterward that the adjournment of the Lussick bill pending an enquiry ‘does not seem likely to provoke a crisis’. 27 Rather, it was any amendment via Lussick that would have serious ramifications, both specific and general: ‘Not only could the local officers’ case be reopened, contrary to the Government’s position, but the Public Service Association—and indeed other organisations—would plainly infer that a sufficiently bitter and prolonged campaign will achieve any results they sought’.28 Warwick Smith was even content to change the ordinance along lines suggested by Hay after an enquiry because this would be a Government initiative and would not engender an undesirable political situation parallelled by unwanted policy adjustments.29 Certainly, inasmuch as Hay and the Administration believed the Lussick initiative to be a vital question of face for the AEC and its supporters, the Secretary and his Minister were adamant that the same principle applied to Territories. There was, in the first place, a need for the Government to prove its toughness, not its sensitivity.
Another attempt appears to have been made to have Lussick and his group agree to an adjournment30 —sweetened by a public announcement by Barnes that an enquiry would take place. 31 But an acrimonious debate and vote was not avoided. Introducing his bill, Lussick remarked that
This present bill was merely designed to help the Government; however, after coming to the aid of the Administration when it was under pressure with Mr. Chatterton’s bill, we now find ourselves opposed by the very people on whose behalf we landed in this position. We have, thus, been placed in a very embarrassing position in our home electorates. If we withdraw this bill now the people in our electorates will say that we are quite insincere … We are the people who represent our areas … we cannot just be rubber stamps for the Government. Sometimes the Government must listen to what we say … The Government has asked me to wait … Is the Government going to amend our present bill, or … introduce its own bill in the House? I do not like this situation, and I think that we are quite entitled to go ahead … I want all elected members to support me … If we do not have success with it our right to legislate in this House will be questionable.32
Neville was less polite:
I feel—as do many other of our colleagues—that we are again witnessing the heavy handedness of Mr. Warwick–Smith and his Department. This heavy-handedness is to be deplored and we should strive … to overcome it … there are certain areas in which we, the House, should not delve … Nevertheless, there are certain areas and most subjects—this is one—where this House should not be treated with ignorance, disdain, neglect, call it what you will, by some first to tenth rate clerk in the Department of Territories33
Henderson rose to refute ‘the wild statements’ made by Neville, and he protested that the Administration was not against reform of the arbitration ordinance— ‘All the Government is asking the House is to wait until expert advice is available’.34 His protest was to no avail. Lussick’s bill was passed without a formal vote. 35
Hay was disturbed by this conflict and expressed his dissatisfaction in a lengthy letter to Barnes:
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there was a good deal of resentment, both amongst Australian Members and also amongst indigenous Members, at the attitude taken by the Government. These Members believed that they had in effect protected the Government’s position by voting against the Chatterton bill … They had done so on the understanding that Mr. Lussick would move a bill. They could not see why the Government was not, after a period of some two months, prepared to accept some amendment to the legislation. The appointment of experts was regarded as a device to enable the Government to avoid coming to an early decision. On the part of certain more sophisticated European Members, the feeling existed that the issue was not sufficiently important for the Government to disregard the expressed opinions of the House altogether. The likelihood was, in our opinion, that this resentment would be expressed in some very critical remarks about ‘Canberra’ in the course oft he debate. It is the considered opinion of senior officers present, not just official Members, that had the debate gone on, then a strong and bitter attack against Canberra would have developed. Mr. Ellis, for instance, has described the attitude of the House as ‘heavily anti-Canberra’. A telegram from the Department indicates to me that there is some disposition to doubt the validity of this opinion. I have checked it from many sources and am convinced that our assessment is well-founded.
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As it turned out, the suspension of standing orders, the fortuitous gagging of the second reading debate (which we owe to Mr. McKinnon) and the fact that no divisions were called for; all combined to reduce the damaging consequences which it had been feared would attend the passage of the bill …
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Some queries received from the Department indicate that, in the opinion of some officers, there were opportunities which could have been taken by official Members to secure an adjournment, but all these opportunities were procedural. Considered in isolation from the character of the House, they may seem to have some point. Seen from here they are unrealistic. Rightly or wrongly, the House is accustomed to passing legislation quickly, and for the official Members to have attempted to resist by quoting rules which are not understood would have precipitated the kind of acrimonious debate which I and other senior officers have been anxious to avoid.
It is, in my view, a mistake to assume that the Administration can get its way in the House, or should try to, by resort to complicated procedures, which, however valid in a more sophisticated House, can on occasion imply trickery or deceit. Such distinctions as between a motion and a bill, or between voting against because of timing and voting against because of opposition to substance, are hard enough to draw with indigenous Members. It is for this reason, as well as because of the implication that official Members do not know their jobs, that I have expressed strong opposition to a suggestion that they should come to Canberra in early 1969 to be instructed by departmental officers on matters of procedure and constitutional development with which they are familiar. 36
In conclusion, I repeat the view I expressed in earlier messages about the Lussick bill, that it is essential for the carrying out of the Governments policies in the Territory that the spirit of confrontation between the Administration and the elected Members does not develop in the present House. This will involve the Government and the Administration in occasionally leaning towards the House rather than insisting in all cases on the letter of its view prevailing.37
1 Attorney-General Nigel Bowen was asked about the ‘legal position’ regarding the separatist objectives of the Melanesian Independence Party (see Document 234). He replied: ‘It would not, as a matter of international law, be possible for part only of the [trusteeship] area to detach itself unilaterally, as it were. If any proposal of the kind referred to were to ‘be’: put forward, authorities at three levels would need to be considered debate peoples of the total area, Australia as trustee, and the United Nations’ (Commonwealth parliamentary debates (Reps), vol. 61, 1968, pp. 2225–6).
2 Matter omitted covers historical background.
3 This word is partially illegible in the original and may possibly read ‘affect’.
4 Matter omitted traverses ‘ways of promoting national unity’, including adoption of a flag, anthem and common name; use of propaganda techniques; a national unity week; military and police demonstrations; support of national sporting teams; encouragement of voluntary and Government-sponsored groups to ‘organise on a Territory-wide basis and to hold annual meetings’; organisation of a national airline and aviation authority; a new national capital; promotion of pidgin as a national language; organisation of nationally-focussed works projects; unification of Papua and New Guinea laws; the posting of more public service officers outside their home districts; increasing labour mobility; co-opting the help of Christian missions; engaging in more research on attitudes so as to enable better propaganda; and the decentralisation of decision-making whereby ‘Senior officers with wide delegated powers [would) make decisions on [the] spot [and] could be stationed in key areas such as Rabaul and Bougainville’.
1 See Documents 108 and 112.
2 E.P. Wolfers, ‘September-December 1968’ in Moore with Kooyman, A Papua New Guinea political chronicle , p. 62.
3 loc. cit.
4 House of Assembly debates , 2 September 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, pp. 286-8.
5 Unnumbered telex, Hay to DOET, 4 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4412.
6 Unnumbered telex, Hay to DOET, 2 September 1968, ibid.
7 Telex 7463, Hay to Warwick Smith, 6 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5095.
8 Telex 7433, Hay to Warwick Smith, 5 September 1968, ibid.
9 South Pacific Post , 6 September 1968, NLA: NX 342.
10 See Document 197.
11 Telex 7433, Hay to Warwick Smith, 5 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5095.
12 Letter, Warwick Smith to Hay, 7 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4412.
13 Telex 7596, Hay to Warwick Smith, 11 September 1968, ibid. Hay had been particularly agitated by PSA activities, writing to Ellis: ‘I would like to see that some of the more extreme efforts of the P.S.A. to influence Members of the House are exposed in an adjournment debate, preferably by Papuan and New Guinean Members. The point to be exposed is that a very small number of people (about 3%), who should be thinking of the country as a whole, are trying to manipulate the House in their own interests and to do so by threatening to intervene actively in politics at the next elections. If public servants do this they will forfeit the confidence of the public they should be serving … We have got to give the Members who supported us some ammunition to fire when they go home’ (memorandum, Hay to Ellis, 10September 1968, NAA: M1866, 2). In Canberra, a similar sentiment had been expressed by Kirkpatrick: ‘I was concerned to see the threats (stated and implied) to members by Voutas in warning them how they should vote … It occurs to me that it could be arranged for a Government back-bencher to ask the Minister a “Dorothy Dix” on these threats some political capital could be made out of it (incipient dictatorship type of thing)’ (minute, Kirkpatrick to Warwick Smith, 5 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4412).
14 Telex 6605, Warwick Smith to Hay, 12 September 1968, ibid.
15 Telex 7463, Hay to Warwick Smith, 6 September 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5095.
16 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 19 September 1968, ibid.
17 Telex 6480, Warwick Smith to Hay, 6 September 1968, ibid.
18 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 19 September 1968, ibid.
19 loc. cit.
20 loc. cit.
21 Letter, Hay to Barnes, 7 October 1968, ibid.
22 Notes of discussion by Ballard, 15 October 1968, ibid.
23 Telex 7383, Warwick Smith to Hay, 16 October 1968, ibid, and letter, Hay to Barnes, 20 October 1968, ibid.
24 loc. cit.
25 Telex 8644, Hay to Warwick Smith, 29 October 1968, ibid.
26 Telex 7777, Warwick Smith to Hay, 30 October 1968, ibid.
27 Submission, Warwick Smith to Barnes, 1 November 1968, ibid.
28 loc. cit.
29 loc. cit.
30 See telex 8894, Hay to Warwick Smith, 8 November 1968, ibid.
31 See telex 7941, Warwick Smith to Hay, 6 November 1968, ibid., and telex 9220, Hay to Warwick Smith, 20 November 1968, ibid.
32 House of Assembly debates, 22 November 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, pp. 638–9.
33 ibid., p. 639.
34 ibid., p. 640.
35 loc. cit.
36 Warwick Smith had conveyed the Minister’s desire for official members to visit Canberra during February 1969 ‘for discussions with himself and departments here on their role and function in the House of Assembly, the general constitutional position, parliamentary procedures etc’ (telex 8529, 26 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5901). Hay replied: ‘I am strongly opposed to the suggestion contained in your teleprinter. Official Members and myself are well aware of their role and function in the House of Assembly, of the general constitutional position and parliamentary procedures. It would be a waste of public money for them to go down to Canberra to be instructed on the basic elements of their duties. Such differences as have arisen in this and the last session on matters of procedure and handling of motions etc has largely been due to the lack of appreciation on the part of departmental staff of the requirements of the tactical situation in the House. You cannot separate the consideration of the issue from the situation in which it is raised and the general tactical situation arising from the fact that Official Members are in a minority. This requires a certain amount of give and take. Already we are in danger of an atmosphere of confrontation building up. If there are any particular points which the Minister believes are not being made in accordance with Government policy then I hope that he will let me know’ (telex 9492, 29 November 1968, ibid).
37 Letter, Hay to Barnes, 2 December 1968, NAA: M1867, 3.