Canberra, 4 December 1968
Confidential
Visit by Brigadier-General Sarwo Edhie to T.P.N.G.
You may not be familiar with the background of the subject which is briefly summarized below.
2. On 27th September, the Indonesian Minister for Internal Affairs, Basuki Rachmat, also at the time acting Foreign Minister, told Loveday that he was anxious to discuss with President Soeharto as soon as possible a proposal that the Military Commander of West Irian, General Sarwo Edhie, visit T.P.N.G. He said that he would like advance knowledge that this visit would in fact be acceptable to the Australian Government, and asked if we could reach an early favourable decision and let him know. This approach followed earlier indications, including a public statement by General Edhie himself, that the Indonesians would like such a visit to take place.1
3. In a submission of 2nd October to the Acting Minister,2 the Department recommended that Loveday be instructed to reply along the lines that the Australian Government would be happy to arrange a visit by General Edhie in December if President Soeharto desired it to take place. The main paragraphs of that submission follow:—
As Military Commander of West Irian, General Edhie is the most important Indonesian Government figure in that Territory. This is because of both the predominant position of the Army in Indonesian affairs and also the leading role which the military has played in West Irian since Indonesia assumed control in 1963. The civilian Governor of West Irian,3 an indigenous West Irianese, is of little consequence. It is expected that General Edhie will remain in his present position for some time, and certainly over the period leading up to the ‘act of self-determination’ which Indonesia is obliged to carry out in West Irian before the end of 1969.
General Edhie is known to be well-disposed towards Australia and has spent a year at Queenscliff Staff College in 1964. (The Commandant of the College at the time, Brigadier Hunter, is now Commanding Officer of the Pacific Islands Regiment in T.P.N.G.) In subsequent years he has acquired a reputation for honesty and strong leadership and was the leading military commander in the Djakarta area in anti-communist operations after the September 1965 coup. He will be playing a key role in the events surrounding next year’s ‘act of self-determination’.
When General Edhie stated in public on 21st August that he wished to visit T.P.N.G., he commented that he hoped to discuss ways and means of stopping rebels from fleeing from West Irian into the eastern part of the island. If the visit is to proceed, we would have to ensure that General Edhie was under no misapprehension that he could have such discussions in T.P.N.G., where the Administration is concerned only with the implementation of policies determined by the Government in Canberra. Our contacts with the Indonesian Government on refugee problems are carried out almost exclusively with the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Malik. It would also cause a bad impression in Australia if it became widely believed that General Edhie was visiting T.P.N.G. to get us to put a stop to receiving refugees. The domestic (and international) delicacy of this matter is well understood by General Soeharto and Foreign Minister Malik and it would be essential for General Edhie to understand and accept the position if this visit is to take place.
Our Ambassador in Djakarta has commented that there would be advantages in a visit by General Edhie to T.P.N.G., provided it is carried out fairly soon. If it is not undertaken soon it will become harder to arrange it later as the problems associated with carrying out the ‘act of self-determination’ will tend to make West Irian questions as a whole more sensitive politically as time goes on.
Departmentally we favour an early visit by General Edhie. While General Edhie would not be going to look into the question of West Irian refugees and similar matters of border control, the contacts he would have with Administration officials would assist in his gaining an appreciation of our point of view, of our good faith in the matter, and of our efforts to prevent difficulties and frictions arising between Australia and Indonesia on account of New Guinea matters. Furthermore, a tour of familiarization of T.P.N.G. (as well as being something which can be presented publicly as quite normal) could help him in his responsibilities in West Irian. It is important that the Indonesians appreciate the rate of development and the effort being put into T.P.N.G. An exposure to the realities of Australia’s development effort in T.P.N.G. could influence General Edhie to urge his own Government to do more for the development of West Irian. None of these reasons is compelling in itself, but they add up to a sufficient case for agreeing to the visit. Not the least important consideration is that the Indonesians at a high level are interested in the visit and we would not wish to put them off without good reason.4
4. On 21st October, Loveday discussed the proposed visit with Malik, making the point that the visit would not be for the purpose of discussion of basic policy on the handling of the West Irianese refugee problem. Malik readily accepted this point and said that it was important to handle the visit correctly. He did not think that it should include the border areas. He thought it would be a very good idea for General Edhie to make the trip (the more facts people knew the better) and that he would strongly recommend the visit to President Soeharto.5
5. On 7th November, Malik told Loveday that it appeared unlikely that the visit could be made this year as General Edhie would be very busy following up indications that the two main rebels in West Irian were prepared to give themselves up. Malik said that he would let Loveday know if and when the visit to T.P.N.G. was convenient.
6. On 28th November, Loveday reported that despite Malik’s advice on 7th November, there were now indications at the Army level that Edhie was hoping to commence a visit to T.P.N.G. on 9th December. This was still tentative, as President Soeharto had not yet approved the visit, nor had formal advice through the Foreign Ministry been received. On 29th November, however, General Soepardjo of the Foreign Ministry6 told Loveday that the President had approved General Edhie’s visit to T.P.N.G. subject to final approval by the Army Commander. This was given on 2nd December.
7. The Administration has advised that it can handle a visit of about five days, commencing on 9th December, and including Port Moresby, Lae, Goroka and Wewak. The Embassy in Djakarta is discussing details of the visit with the Indonesians on this basis.7
[NAA: Al838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3]
1 Hasluck had also received a letter from journalist Peter Hastings, who wrote that during an evening with Edhie, the General had requested help in obtaining an invitation to PNG. Hastings asserted that Edhie was ‘apprehensive, like many Indonesian politicians these days, [about] the enormous economic disparity between TPNG and West Irian, of the political and economic discontent this causes West Papuans … and of the possible effects of future TPNG independence on coastal West Irianese’. ‘However’, Hastings continued, ‘he is also aware that if future Australian–Indonesian tensions are to be avoided over New Guinea then Indonesia must make a greater and more sustained economic effort in West Irian’. Hastings believed there were ‘certain advantages’ to inviting Edhie to PNG, including that he ‘would probably use his impressions of TPNG’s economic and social development as a lever to obtain more money from Djakarta and a greater Central Government commitment to development generally’. On a personal level, Hastings labelled Edhie as less impressive than his reputation suggested: ‘Edhie is highly regarded and I’m not quite sure why. He commanded the RPKAD (paratroopers) in the counter-coup and was responsible for killing a large number of Communists … He is supposed to be clear thinking, progressive and clean handed. I, in fact, found him rather vain, a trifle arrogant and somewhat repressive. However, he is nobody’s fool’ (13 August, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 2).
2 Gordon Freeth—who replaced Hasluck as Minister on 11 February 1969.
3 Frans Kaisiepo.
4 In Territories, Besley commented to Barnes that the Administration preferred that the visit not go ahead because of possible reaction in PNG, but would concur if the ‘advantages were overriding’. Besley argued that the visit would provide an opportunity to ‘inform the Indonesians adequately in both Djakarta and Sukarnapura of our position with respect to the border’. It would also help the people of the Territory ‘to recognise that 1969 will not bring a change in the status of West Irian and to be developing a framework for future amicable relations with an Indonesian West Irian’. Barnes approved the visit, with a series of provisos designed to meet concerns over public reaction in the Territory: ‘(a) it is presented as a familiarisation visit preferably of an inter-military courtesy nature; (b) the Indonesians and Brigadier-General Edhie are agreeable to there being no public statements regarding border problems or the “act of free choice”; (c) the Indonesians and Brigadier-General Edhie are informed of some possible local reaction during the visit and (d) the visit takes place prior to 18th November or, if later, at a time when the House of Assembly is not meeting’ (submission, 8 October 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4602). External Affairs was informed of these wishes on 15 October (memorandum, DOET (Galvin) to DEA, NAA: Al838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3). The Administrator later objected to definition of the visit as a military one, yet it was also felt undesirable to ‘treat him publicly’ as equal to the Administrator, even though he was the ‘key man’ in West Irian (minute, Galvin to Besley, 11 October 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/4602). Consequently, Barnes agreed that the visit ‘should be handled as one by a distinguished representative’ (minute, Besley to Rose, 16 October 1968, ibid., and memorandum, DOET (Besley) to DEA, 17 October 1968, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3).
5 In his report of the conversation, Loveday commented that the ‘discussion of the origins of the visit provided a good opportunity to get it across to Malik, in another form, that we were anxious to be frank and open with the Indonesians about our attitude to West Irian and what was going on in East New Guinea’ (cablegram 2480, Loveday to DEA, 21 October 1968, ibid.).
6 Soepardjo was located in the Ministry’s Asia–Pacific Directorate.
7 In a cablegram of 4 December, Loveday wrote that he had provided briefing notes for Edhie and other Indonesian army representatives via Soepardjo. These notes stated that the visit was likely to be the object of ‘considerable’ press interest and that it ‘might be desirable for a common Australian/Indonesian public approach’. The suggested outlines of this public relations strategy were, inter alia, that the visit was a ‘familiarisation tour’, during which the Indonesians would ‘observe economic and social conditions in the Territory’. The visit was ‘not for the purpose of discussion of basic policy on the handling of people who cross the border from West Irian’, as such policy questions were ‘discussed between Canberra and Djakarta at the political level’. Loveday’s paper added that ‘Privately … while border crossing is a matter which must be handled at the political level, the Australian Government expects that if General Sarwo Edhie so desired, there would be opportunities during the visit for discussion of value to both sides, in which senior officials of the Papua and New Guinea Administration would be prepared to discuss practical aspects of the implementation of policy’ (cablegram 2811 to DEA, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 3.).