Port Moresby, 20 December 1968
RESTRICTED
Report on the Third Meeting of the House of Assembly—18th November to
29th November
I attach copies of a report which has been prepared by Mr. T.W. White, Senior Liaison Officer, with some editing by myself. I should be glad if it could be brought to the Minister’s attention.
Attachment
This report of the Third Meeting of the House of Assembly draws attention to the main issues and the significant trends and attitudes evident during the meeting.
[ matter omitted ]1
Debate On Bills
5. There was little debate on any of the Bills, and many went through all stages without any debate at all. Mr. Lapun’s National Name Bill and Mr. Lussick’s Arbitration Bill2 attracted the most interest.
6. (a) National Name Bill
Pangu challenged the Government’s Constitutional stand on this Bill.3 There appeared to be a widely held view that constitutional changes should be made to enable a National Name to be chosen at a later date. Mr. P.G.C. Johnson’s4 later motion on this matter gave expression to this feeling.5 Pangu itself suffered a telling defeat when the Bill was lost 70–10.
(b) Lussick’s arbitration Bill
Feelings against the Government on its attitude towards the Bill centred on the late request for a postponement. This was regarded as a ‘Canberra affront’. The fact that the Government did not seek to oppose the substance of the Bill was largely overlooked. Lussick sought to expedite the Bill through all stages. The only speakers in the debate were Mr. Neville who made a bitter attack against Canberra and Mr. Henderson who put the Government’s point of view. Had the debate been prolonged this attack would probably have continued. An unexpected closure motion by Mr. Mackinnon prevented this from happening. Consequently the expected protracted and emotional debate did not occur.
[ matter omitted ]6
Debate On Motions
10. Debate on the Five Year Plan7 and on the National Unity motion8 overshadowed all other business before the House.
Five Year Development Plan
11. The main criticism of the plan came from members of PANGU, and from Mr. Percy Chatterton. Their theme was that there was not enough in the plan for the Papuans and New Guineans, and that indigenous interests had been overlooked in favour of the expatriate sector. PANGU was ably supported in its attack by Mr. Chatterton and his ‘black New Guinea’ statement was damaging,9 and could result in repercussions yet to come. Mr. Chatterton specifically called for preferential treatment for New Guineans (trade stores), and tax incentives for expatriate companies employing a high percentage of indigenous people. He and PANGU received support during the debate from some non-aligned Members, and from some Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members (Giregire, Watson) who pressed for more assistance from the Administration to help indigenous businessmen, and greater participation by indigenous people in the development of the economy10.
12. Speeches by Ministerial Members, who spoke for their Departments on the Plan, tended not to hold the interest of the House. Most of these speeches were read. Sometimes Ministerial Members did not fully grasp the meaning of what they were saying.
13. Some of the European elected members (McKinnon, Middleton, Watts, Pyne,11 Evennett)12 were strongly critical of remarks by PANGU members and Chatterton, which they said would scare off investment when it was most needed.
14. Lussick’s motion calling for an endorsement of the Plan was carried on voices.13 The wording of this motion had been cleared with the Administration beforehand. There was some disposition on the part of the members to seek some changes, but they were dissuaded from pressing them on the grounds that they might have affected the Australian government undertakings which in turn depended on the form of words chosen on the motion. Others (Garrett,14 Neville and Chatterton—who proposed an amendment), expressed reservations on the motion concerning possible future tax increases.
National unity motion15
15. A number of the speakers who supported the motion sought to lay the blame for secessionist movements squarely at the feet of a few Europeans. Expatriate elected Members initiated this line of attack and the theme was adopted by many indigenous elected Members.
16. Indigenous Members from Bougainville (Lapun and Mola)16 and from the Gazelle (Toliman, Epineri, Tammur) strongly denied this, and on the whole, presented an effective case. Their main points were—rejection of Moresby centralisation; too little help too late; dangerous to impose artificial boundaries which were not acceptable to the people; preferential treatment for Europeans; the referendum was a safety valve and would enable people a genuine choice; self determination was a right not a privilege; and Bougainville was a pawn in the colonial power-game. Lapun made the significant point that a system of federation of States might be acceptable, and Mola said many people now rejected union with the British Solomons.
17. Pangu, together with the above speakers, adopted the line that the areas had been neglected (Islands), and that the Government must identify the causes of discontent and frustration, and act. Platitudes about unity were unconvincing. Some Pangu Members (Lapun, Lus) rationalised their opposition to the motion by saying that there could be no unity until there was a common name for the Territory, and that their Bill (Lapun’s) had been rejected. Mr. Meanggarum said he would support the motion and secede from the Party.17
18. The motion was adopted on voices after receiving strong support from the majority of Members.
Other motions
(A) Education Subsidies (Garrett)18
19. Elected European Members strongly supported the motion. The insertion of the phrase calling for the extension of the subsidy to ‘all people’, resulted in support from some indigenous elected Members and Pangu. The motion was adopted 49 for 36 against.
(B) WEST IRIAN REFUGEES (SOMARE)19
20. Chatterton and Middleton both spoke in support of the motion. Criticisms against the Government were directed towards its general handling of the recent situation, and conflicting statements made to defend its actions. The motion was defeated 24 to 56.
Paliau Maloat voted against the motion and not with the remainder of Pangu.
(C) Extension Of Terms Of Reference—Public Accounts Committee (Johnson)20
21. The Government’s defence that the U.P.N.G. and the Institute of Higher Technical Education were outside the jurisdiction of the Public Accounts Committee did not receive much sympathy. The general feeling was that the jurisdiction should be broadened.
Chatterton supported the Government on the grounds that political pressures could be brought to bear. Oala Rarua said the House was represented on the University Council. The motion was adopted 55 for and 37 against.
22 (D) Local Government Service (Lussick)21
Pangu (and Epineri) attacked the motion on the grounds that D.D.A. control of Council Advisors was undesirable, and that the motion did not take this aspect into account. There was little debate and the motion was agreed to on voices.
The Pangu Party
23. Pangu trod more warily at this Meeting. It continued to harass the Government side, but on some occasions sought to co-operate with individual elected Members (Chatterton on the Development Plan), or with the independent group as a whole (Education subsidy, Lussick Bill). Probably the party is trying to shake off the image that it is an all-time loser, and enable some later ‘horse-trading’ to be done.
24. Mr. Somare is an articulate and impressive leader in the House, and is probably embarrassed by the seemingly uncontrollable outbursts by Mr. Lus.
25. The loss of Mr. Meanggarum probably came as a surprise to few people. Mr. Paliau Maloat, who supported the Development Plan and opposed Mr. Somare’s West Irian Refugee motion, is reported to be wavering, but his occasional independent stand need not indicate that he is seriously at variance with Pangu aims and policies.
The Independent Group
26. The Independent Group held frequent meetings during the House’s sittings. The Government’s attitude towards the Lussick Bill, and the firm stand taken by the group on this issue, has perhaps contributed towards their strength, and has directed some of their opposition away from Pangu and toward the Government. Speculation continued that the group might soon form a Party, with Lussick, Watts and Neville providing the leadership, and with financial support from certain business groups in Port Moresby. But no definite moves took place and there was evidence of some difficulty in establishing clear leadership and of some reluctance to move formally to a party status.
The Speaker
27. Mr. Guise occupied the Chair to open each session during the Meeting and then vacated it to the Deputy Speaker. A recent eye operation did not permit Mr. Guise to attend full sessions.
Ministerial And Assistant Ministerial Members
28. The confidence and standing of holders of Ministerial Office continued to increase. Tei Abel and M. Toliman continued to make the best impression in the House, especially when speaking ‘off the cuff’. But Oala Rarua, Ashton, Giregire, Kapena, Leahy and Diria, were also effective debaters and speakers. Replies to questions which were read verbatim were generally acceptable, but as previously stated prepared speeches were not well received.
29. The briefing sessions and meetings held for Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members before the House discussed specific issues, have no doubt helped members considerably, and has enabled, on most occasions, the Government to present a common front.22
[NAA: A452, 1968/3178]
1 Matter omitted is a list of bills considered by the House, including those that passed all stages, those deferred and that defeated (Lapun’s private National Name bill—see footnote 1, Document 223).
2 See editorial note ‘Tensions in the House: the Chatterton and Lussick bills’.
3 In response to Document 239, Warwick Smith stressed that Lapun’s bill was ‘ultra vires the Papua and New Guinea Act’ and he instructed that ‘an official member should object to the bill on these grounds and the Speaker should rule it out of order’ (telex 8226, Warwick Smith to Hay, 14 November 1968, NAA:A452, 1968/5013).
4 MHA, Angoram open electorate.
5 P.G. Johnson moved that a select committee be appointed to seek the views of the people and report to the House ‘on a single name for the Territory … a national anthem, and national flag and a national symbol … particularly in view of the forthcoming South Pacific Games to be held in Port Moresby and of certain recent indications of trends towards disunity and regionalization’ ( House of Assembly debates , 26 November 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, p. 702).
6 Matter omitted lists motions adopted by the House and that lost (‘Sympathy with the plight of West Irianese refugees’ (Somare)—see footnote 17). Two motions were adjourned.
7 See Document 210. Cabinet consideration was followed in September by a statement in the House of Assembly by Henderson and the tabling of a detailed report entitled ‘Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea’ ( House of Assembly debates , 10 September 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, pp. 441–4). Newman added to Henderson’s comments when debate resumed on 20 November (ibid., p. 596). For a copy of the report—known in official circles as the ‘green book’-see NAA: AA 1979/97, box 11.
8 Brere Awol put forward a motion that ‘this House declares that national unity is essential to the progress of Papua and New Guinea as a modem state with enough resources and population to sustain a developing country. That this House resolves to support national unity and in particular calls upon the Administration and holders of Ministerial office, through the use of field staff, Administration radio, and lessons in schools. to tell the people what they will gain by keeping together as a single country’ ( This Week in the House , no. 6, 26 November 1968, NAA: A1838, 936/411 1/1). It appears likely that Awol was prompted by official MHA’s or indigenous members of the AEC. Apart from Hay’s tactical discussion with the AEC (see Document 239), Barnes had called for ‘Official Members’ opposition [to the Lapun bill] … be covert not overt’ (telex 8440, DOET to Port Moresby, 21 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5013; see also Document 242)—and it is clear that the Administration knew in advance that a private member’s motion was to be put (telex 9244, Hay to DOET, 21 November 1969, ibid.).
9 Speaking about the means of increasing indigenous participation in economic development, Chatterton argued: ‘we perhaps need something like a Black New Guinea policy. The White Australia Policy is, or is claimed to be, a means of protecting Australians from unfair competition. I suggest that native entrepreneurs in this country may need the same sort of protection, because, in open competition with Europeans, they are at a disadvantage. Not only has the European greater “know-how”, he has easier access to credit, and easier physical access to those with authority to make decisions who at present are nearly all white. Ban discrimination as much as you like: it would still remain true that a European business man would have a better chance of penetrating the barricades and getting face to face with the managing director than would his indigenous counterpart. The latter will all too often be intercepted in the outer office by a junior clerk who will tell him “Mr. So-and-so is too busy to see you now; try again next week” ’ ( House of Assembly debates , 20 November 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, p. 600).
10 In a lengthy submission to the Administrator of 11 November, John Guise criticised the development plan in severe terms. Referring, inter alia, to the emphasis in the plan on foreign investment, Guise commented that ‘an apparent paradox … is that during the period that Papua and New Guinea will probably cease to be a dependency of the Australian Government, it could well become a pawn of international business interests’.. He also argued that the plan gave ‘great verbal emphasis’ to indigenous participation in economic growth, but ‘fails miserably to provide the machinery to achieve it’—‘ tokenism’ was the plan’s ‘protective coating’. These issues, according to Guise, contained political and social dangers. The development of the national economy ‘without raising the economic level and participation of the masses’ would, he contended, create ‘uneasiness’ and ‘tensions’ as political development occurred. He concluded with the hope that the plan would be ‘radically revised’ to allow for ‘substantial’ indigenous participation (NAA: A1838, 936/14/1 part 3). Hay was disappointed at the reception given to the development plan. He had had ‘hopes … about capturing the imagination of the people’, but because the plan was ‘hurriedly presented’ and complex—’ a difficult thing to talk about‘—it ’didn’t get off to the start that … was needed’ (Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 4:1/9).
11 Eric Pyne, MHA, Chimbu regional electorate.
12 Norman Evennett, MHA, Esa’ala open electorate.
13 In an undated marginal note, Warwick Smith underlined the first six words of this sentence and asked: ‘why give an expatriate member this prominence?’.
14 J.J. Garrett, MHA, Madang regional electorate.
15 See footnote 5.
16 Donatus Mola, MHA, North Bougainville open electorate.
17 Meanggarum said that there were members of Pangu who ‘want to form secessionist states. They have no forgiveness, they have no patience, and they do not believe in give and take … I support this motion for unity, but unfortunately my party’s policy is meaningless and what I want to say now is that I am going to secede from the Pangu Pati’ ( House of Assembly debates , 22 November 1968, NLA: Nq 328.952 PAP, p. 650).
18 Garrett moved that all those who sent their children to Australia receive the same education allowance; it was not fair that public servants should be given a greater subsidy ( This week in the House of Assembly , DIES, no. 7, 3 December 1968, NAA: A1838, 936/4/11/1).
19 Somare had moved that the House of Assembly ‘expresses its sympathy with the plight of West Irianese refugees in the Territory and urges the Administration to treat them with every consideration’ (telex 9336, Hay to Warwick Smith, 25 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5508). Already fearful of the possible impact of the West Irian problem on internal politics (see footnote 14, Document 237), the Administration had tried to anticipate interest in the refugee problem by an official statement in the House which highlighted the Commonwealth’s commitment to ‘internationally recognised principles of humanity’ as they related to political refugees and—on Barnes’ instructions—Australia’s international obligations to the Indonesian administration (see telex 9070, Administration to DOET, 14 December 1968; minute, Besley to Ballard, 18 November 1968; and statement by Watkins, 20 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5508). Thus Territories proved nervous prior to debate on Somare’s motion, cabling that ‘Should any attempt be made to broaden or amend [the] motion to comment on Indonesian administration or events internal to West Irian, Official Members should attempt to confine consideration to T.P.N.G. by reminding [the] House that [the] Papua and New Guinea Act confines the House’s activities to making ordinances for “the peace, order and good government of the Territory” … The [earlier] resolution on Czechoslovakia [which condemned the Soviet invasion of that country] was an exception but should be denied as a precedent. Further ventures in this field should be strongly resisted as outside the boundaries of the Territory and outside the province of the House’ (telex 8525, Warwick Smith to Hay, 25 November, ibid.). The motion was defeated after a speech by Somare in which he likened the holding centre at Manus Island to a concentration camp (see This week in the House , no. 7, 3 December 1968, NAA: A1838, 936/4/11/1).
20 The motion called for an investigation by the Public Accounts Committee into the efficiency of Government-sourced expenditure by UPNG and the Institute of Higher Technical Education as it pertained to staff and student accommodation (loc. cit.).
21 Lussick moved that the Administration consider urgently the establishment a local government service that would standardize pay and working conditions for all council workers (loc. cit.).
22 In an undated note to Ballard on the bottom of the report, Warwick Smith wrote: ‘What about (a) study meetings for elected members? (b) seminar in Canberra for official members (c) special efforts to advance the native elected members—the expatriates dominate too much’. The Secretary also asked Ballard for comments on a ‘2nd Chamber’ and ‘more committees’. Reflecting more generally on the MM system, Warwick Smith wrote to J.R. Kerr about comments by Kerr that ‘the main lesson to be learnt [by MM’s] is that all the big decisions tend to be made in Australia’ and that the intermediate steps before self-government needed to involve increasing ‘political control in the hands of an indigenous political elite rather than in the hands of a bureaucratic white elite’. Warwick Smith remarked: ‘[your second point] hits a nail on the head—if a definition of a dependent territory is that major decisions are taken outside it then at least in the Australian situation those major decisions are taken by elected Ministers (albeit elected by the Australian electorate); the devolution of political power is from elected people in the Australian Government to elected people in a New Guinea Government. The transitional stage referred to in your [first] reference … is admittedly difficult. In fact the Ministerial Members are learning quite a few things about administration and politics—perhaps they are learning also that although it is technically true that the big decisions tend to be made in Australia in the great bulk of cases the process is a confirmation or acceptance of Administration views. Those Administration views will increasingly be influenced by the Administrator’s Executive Council. None of us I suppose underestimates the problems of bringing New Guinea into the calm waters of independence in a democratic setting. In this respect time is an essential element in the problem and it appears that if the people understand the pre-requisites of stable democratic self-Government or Independence it is much less likely that the country as a whole will wish to rush its political hurdles. Perhaps this is saying the same thing as you do in emphasising the need for a continuous educational programme. We have to think of it in the widest terms’ (letter, 1968 (exact date illegible), NAA: NA 1983/239, 9/25).